Informational Aesthetics Measures

The Birkhoff aesthetic measure of an object is the ratio between order and complexity. Informational aesthetics describes the interpretation of this measure from an information-theoretic perspective. From these ideas, the authors define a set of ratios based on information theory and Kolmogorov complexity that can help to quantify the aesthetic experience

Quality coding by neural populations in the early olfactory pathway: analysis using information theory

In this article, we analyze the ability of the early olfactory system to detect and discriminate different odors by means of information theory measurements applied to olfactory bulb activity images. We have studied the role that the diversity and number of receptor neuron types play in encoding chemical information. Our results show that the olfactory receptors of the biological system are low correlated and present good coverage of the input space. The coding capacity of ensembles of olfactory receptors with the same receptive range is maximized when the receptors cover half of the odor input space - a configuration that corresponds to receptors that are not particularly selective. However, the ensemble's performance slightly increases when mixing uncorrelated receptors of different receptive ranges. Our results confirm that the low correlation between sensors could be more significant than the sensor selectivity for general purpose chemo-sensory systems, whether these are biological or biomimetic.

View-dependent information theory quality measures for pixel sampling and scene discretization in flatland

In this paper, we present view-dependent information theory quality measures for pixel sampling and scene discretization in flatland. The measures are based on a definition for the mutual information of a line, and have a purely geometrical basis. Several algorithms exploiting them are presented and compare well with an existing one based on depth differences

Parental altruism under imperfect information: Theory and evidence

Can we reconcile the predictions of the altruism model of the familywith the evidence on intervivos transfers in the US? This paper expandsthe altruism model by introducing e ?ort of the child and by relaxingthe assumption of perfect information of the parent about the labormarket opportunities of the child. First, I solve and simulate a modelof altruism under imperfect information. Second, I use cross-sectionaldata to test a prediction of the model: Are parental transfers especiallyresponsive to the income variations of children who are very attached tothe labor market? The results suggest that imperfect information accountsfor several patterns of intergenerational transfers in the US.

Parental altruism under imperfect information: Theory and evidence

Can we reconcile the predictions of the altruism model of the family withthe evidence on parental monetary transfers in the US? This paper providesa new assessment of this question. I expand the altruism model by introducingeffort of the child and by relaxing the assumption of perfect informationof the parent about the labor market opportunities of the child. First,I solve and simulate a model of altruism and labor supply under imperfectinformation. Second, I use cross-sectional data to test the following prediction of the model: Are parental transfers especially responsive tothe income variations of children who are very attached to the labor market? The results of the analysis suggest that imperfect informationaccounts for many of the patterns of intergenerational transfers in theUS.

Delegation and information sharing in oligopoly

Information sharing in oligopoly has been analyzed by assuming that firms behave as a sole economic agent. In this paper I assume that ownership and management are separated. Managers are allowed to falsely report their costs to owners and rivals. Under such circumstances, if owners want to achieve information sharing they must use managerial contracts that implement truthful cost reporting by managers as a dominant strategy. I show that, contrary to the classical result, without the inclusion of message-dependent payments in managerial contracts there will be no information sharing. On the other hand, with the inclusion of such publicly observable payments and credible ex-ante commitment by owners not to modify these payments, there will be perfect information sharing without the need for third parties. Keywords: Information sharing, Delegation, Managerial contracts. JEL classification numbers: D21, D82, L13, L21

Improving the risk concept: a revision of Arrow-Pratt theory in the context of controlled dynamic stochastic environments

In the literature on risk, one generally assume that uncertainty is uniformly distributed over the entire working horizon, when the absolute risk-aversion index is negative and constant. From this perspective, the risk is totally exogenous, and thus independent of endogenous risks. The classic procedure is "myopic" with regard to potential changes in the future behavior of the agent due to inherent random fluctuations of the system. The agent's attitude to risk is rigid. Although often criticized, the most widely used hypothesis for the analysis of economic behavior is risk-neutrality. This borderline case must be envisaged with prudence in a dynamic stochastic context. The traditional measures of risk-aversion are generally too weak for making comparisons between risky situations, given the dynamic �complexity of the environment. This can be highlighted in concrete problems in finance and insurance, context for which the Arrow-Pratt measures (in the small) give ambiguous.

A well-posedness theory in measures for some kinetic models of collective motion

We present existence, uniqueness and continuous dependence results for some kinetic equations motivated by models for the collective behavior of large groups of individuals. Models of this kind have been recently proposed to study the behavior of large groups of animals, such as flocks of birds, swarms, or schools of fish. Our aim is to give a well-posedness theory for general models which possibly include a variety of effects: an interaction through a potential, such as a short-range repulsion and long-range attraction; a velocity-averaging effect where individuals try to adapt their own velocity to that of other individuals in their surroundings; and self-propulsion effects, which take into account effects on one individual that are independent of the others. We develop our theory in a space of measures, using mass transportation distances. As consequences of our theory we show also the convergence of particle systems to their corresponding kinetic equations, and the local-in-time convergence to the hydrodynamic limit for one of the models.

Information Mobility: Information Dissemination in Mobile Networks

En el nostre projecte, considerem un escenari urbà o interurbà on persones amb dispositius mòbils (smartphones) o vehicles equipats amb interfícies de comunicació, estan interessats en compartir fitxers entre ells o descarregar-los al creuar Punts d’Accés (APs) propers a la carretera. Estudiem la possibilitat d’utilizar la cooperació en les trobades casuals entre nodes per augmentar la velocitat de descàrrega global. Amb aquest objectiu, plantejem algoritmes per a la selecció de quins paquets, per a quins destins i quins transportistes s’escullen en cada moment. Mitjançant extenses simulacions, mostrem com les cooperacions carry&forward dels nodes augmenten significativament la velocitat de descàrrega dels usuaris, i com aquest resultat es manté per a diversos patrons de mobilitat, col•locacions d'AP i càrregues de la xarxa. Per altra banda, aparells com els smartphones, on la targeta de WiFi està encesa contínuament, consumeixen l'energia de la bateria en poques hores. En molts escenaris, una targeta WiFi sempre activa és poc útil, perque sovint no hi ha necessitat de transmissió o recepció. Aquest fet es veu agreujat en les Delay Tolerant Networks (DTN), on els nodes intercanvien dades quan es creuen i en tenen l’oportunitat. Les tècniques de gestió de l’estalvi d’energia permeten extendre la duració de les bateries. El nostre projecte analitza els avantatges i inconvenients que apareixen quan els nodes apaguen períodicament la seva targeta wireless per a estalviar energia en escenaris DTN. Els nostres resultats mostren les condicions en que un node pot desconnectar la bateria sense afectar la probabilitat de contacte amb altres nodes, i les condicions en que aquesta disminueix. Per exemple, es demostra que la vida del node pot ser duplicada mantenint la probabilitat de contacte a 1. I que aquesta disminueix ràpidament en intentar augmentar més la vida útil.

The Value of Imperfection : the Wabi-Sabi Principle in Aesthetics and Learning

OER-based learning has the potential to overcome many shortcomings and problems of traditional education. It is not hampered by IP restrictions; can depend on collaborative, cumulative, iterative refinement of resources; and the digital form provides unprecedented flexibility with respect to configuration and delivery. The OER community is a progressive group of educators and learners with decades of learning research to draw from, who know that we must prepare learners for an evolving and diverse reality. Despite this OER tends to replicate the unsuccessful characteristics of traditional education. To remedy this we may need to remember the importance of imperfection, mistakes, problems, disagreement, and the incomplete for engaged learning, and relinquish our notions of perfection, acknowledging that learners learn differently and we need diverse learners. We must stretch our perceptions of quality and provide mechanisms for engaging the incredible pool of educators globally to fulfill the promise of inclusive education.

Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets

Two-stage game models of information acquisition in stochastic oligopoliesrequire the unrealistic assumption that firms observe the precision ofinformation chosen by their competitors before determining quantities. Thispaper analyzes secret information acquisition as a one-stage game. Relativeto the two-stage game firms are shown to acquire less information. Policyimplications based on the two-stage game yield, therefore, too high taxes ortoo low subsidies for research activities. For the case of heterogeneousduopoly it is shown that comparative statics results partly depend on theobservability assumption.

Optimal information transmission in organizations: Search and congestion

We propose a stylized model of a problem-solving organization whoseinternal communication structure is given by a fixed network. Problemsarrive randomly anywhere in this network and must find their way to theirrespective specialized solvers by relying on local information alone.The organization handles multiple problems simultaneously. For this reason,the process may be subject to congestion. We provide a characterization ofthe threshold of collapse of the network and of the stock of foatingproblems (or average delay) that prevails below that threshold. We buildupon this characterization to address a design problem: the determinationof what kind of network architecture optimizes performance for any givenproblem arrival rate. We conclude that, for low arrival rates, the optimalnetwork is very polarized (i.e. star-like or centralized ), whereas it islargely homogenous (or decentralized ) for high arrival rates. We also showthat, if an auxiliary assumption holds, the transition between these twoopposite structures is sharp and they are the only ones to ever qualify asoptimal.

Setting standards: Information accumulation in development

We propose a model in which economic relations and institutions in advancedand less developed economies differ as these societies have access to different amounts of information. This lack of information makes it hard to give the right incentives to managers and entrepreneurs. We argue that differences in the amount of information arise because of the differences in the scale of activities in rich and poor economies; namely, there is too little repetition of similar activities in pooreconomies, thus insufficient information to set the appropriate standards for firm performance. Our model predicts a number of institutional and structural transformations as the economy accumulates capital and information.