Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement

In the presence of cost uncertainty, limited liability introduces the possibility of default in procurement with its associated bank-ruptcy costs. When financial soundness is not perfectly observable, we show that incentive compatibility implies that financially less sound contractors are selected with higher probability in any feasible mechanism. Informational rents are associated with unsound financial situations. By selecting the financially weakest contractor, stronger price competition (auctions) may not only increase the probability of default but also expected rents. Thus, weak conditions are suffcient for auctions to be suboptimal. In particular, we show that pooling firms with higher assets may reduce the cost of procurement even when default is costless for the sponsor.

Registre isotòpic d'alquenones i lípids terrestres en sediment marí: una reconstrucció paleoclimàtica a l'oceà Índic

Projecte de recerca elaborat a partir d’una estada a la Institute of mineralogy and geochemistry de la University of Lausanne, Suïssa, entre 2007 i 2009. Durant l’última dècada, la comunitat científica ha reconegut que les zones tropicals juguen un paper clau en els processos dinàmics que controlen el canvi climàtic global, probablement com a desencadenant dels canvis succeïts en altes latituds. A més a més, els sediments dels oceans tropicals, en trobar-se fora de l’impacte directe de les plaques de gel continentals creades durant les glaciacions, proporcionen un registre continu de les variacions climàtiques del planeta. Malgrat tot, encara hi ha moltes incògnites sobre el paper específic de les zones tropicals, especialment pel que fa a les variacions brusques suborbitals, degut als pocs registres d’alta resolució estudiats en aquestes àrees que abastin varis cicles glacial/interglacial. Per tal d’ajudar a clarificar el paper de les zones tropicals de l’hemisferi sud en el control del clima a escala mil•lenària s’ha estudiat la distribució i la composició isotòpica de biomarcadors moleculars marins i terrestres, a baixa resolució, en el testimoni MD98-2165 (9º39’S, 118º20’E, 2100 m de profunditat d’aigua, 42.3 m de llarg) està situat al sud-oest d’Indonèsia, on s’enregistren les temperatures superficials del mar més elevades del planeta i una elevada activitat convectiva, que té una influència en la distribució de la humitat atmosfèrica en una extensa superfície de la Terra. Les distribucions observades de biomarcadors terrígens (C23-C33 n-alcans i C20-C32 n-alcan-1-ols) són típiques del lipids de plantes superiors que arriben a l’oceà principalment per via eòlica. L’alcà de 31 àtoms de carboni i els alcohols de 28 o 32 àtoms de carboni són els homòlegs més abundants en ambdós testimonis. Cal destacar l’alcohol C32 com a homòleg principal durant les èpoques glacials, tot suggerint una expansió de les plantes tropicals C4 associada a unes condicions més àrides. La procedència d’aquests lipids queda corroborada mitjançant la seva composició isotòpica de carboni, que ens permet diferenciar la ruta fotosintètica emprada i per tant, entre el tipus de plantes.

The dynamics of research networks in Brite-Euram

Network formation within the BRITE--EURAM program is investigated.Wedescribe the role of the hub of the network, which is defined as the setofmain contractors that account for most of the participations. We studytheeffects that the conflict of objectives within European research fundingbetween pre-competitive research vs. European cohesion has on theformationof networks and on the relationship between different partnersof the network. \\A panel data set is constructed including the second and third frameworkof theBrite--Euram program. A model of joint production of research results isusedto test for changes in the behavior of partners within the twoframeworks. \\The main findings are that participations are very concentrated, that isasmall group of institutions account for most of the participations, butgoingfrom the second to the third framework the presence of subcontractorsand singleparticipants increases substantially. This result is reinforced by the factthat main contractors receive smaller spill-ins within networks, butspill-insincrease from the second to the third framework.

Competition and cost overruns. Optimal misspecification of procurement contracts

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in the initial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design specification in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspecification. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design specification and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project s design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design s specification level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design specification and shows that the sponsor s optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design specification so as to make significant cost overruns likely. Since no such misspecification occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Competition and cost overruns in procurement

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in theinitial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design speciffication in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspeciffication. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design speciffication and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project's design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design's speciffication level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design speciffication and shows that the sponsor's optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design speciffication so as to make signifficant cost overrunslikely. Since no such misspeciffication occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Heterogeneity-promoting optimal procurement

When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design of the object being procured affects the resulting degree of competition. This paper highlights the interaction between theoptimal procurement mechanism and the design choice. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the sponsor's design choice, instead of homogenizingthe market to generate competition, promotes heterogeneity.

Urban transport governance reform in Barcelona

The unusual mixed public-private structure of the urban bus market in the metropolitan area of Barcelona provides an interesting context in which to analyze the management challenges and opportunities of the partial privatization of public services. Initiatives used by the public regulator to promote competition for contracts, such as short term concessions to private contractors and the removal of entry barriers, have considerable potential for improving efficiency and quality. The growth in the share of routes managed by private firms in recent years shows that privatization is a credible threat that may well stimulate improved performance among public managers. The type of reform implemented in Barcelona is of interest to all metropolitan areas large enough to operate under constant returns to scale regimes, and suitable for potential concessions of routes in segregated areas inside the metropolitan area, so as not to miss out on the benefits of economies of density.