Positioning an underwater vehicle through image mosaicking

Mosaics have been commonly used as visual maps for undersea exploration and navigation. The position and orientation of an underwater vehicle can be calculated by integrating the apparent motion of the images which form the mosaic. A feature-based mosaicking method is proposed in this paper. The creation of the mosaic is accomplished in four stages: feature selection and matching, detection of points describing the dominant motion, homography computation and mosaic construction. In this work we demonstrate that the use of color and textures as discriminative properties of the image can improve, to a large extent, the accuracy of the constructed mosaic. The system is able to provide 3D metric information concerning the vehicle motion using the knowledge of the intrinsic parameters of the camera while integrating the measurements of an ultrasonic sensor. The experimental results of real images have been tested on the GARBI underwater vehicle

Feature-based matching of underwater images

This work investigates performance of recent feature-based matching techniques when applied to registration of underwater images. Matching methods are tested versus different contrast enhancing pre-processing of images. As a result of the performed experiments for various dominating in images underwater artifacts and present deformation, the outperforming preprocessing, detection and description methods are proposed

LSB Matching Steganalysis Based on Patterns of Pixel Differences and Random Embedding

Peer-reviewed

Image registration techniques with multiresolution analysis in satellite oceanography

En aquest article es fa una descripció dels procediments realitzats per enregistrar dues imatges geomètricament, de forma automàtica, si es pren la primera com a imatge de referència. Es comparen els resultats obtinguts mitjançant tres mètodes. El primer mètode és el d’enregistrament clàssic en domini espacial maximitzant la correlació creuada (MCC)[1]. El segon mètode es basa en aplicar l’enregistrament MCC conjuntament amb un anàlisi multiescala a partir de transformades wavelet [2]. El tercer mètode és una variant de l’anterior que es situa a mig camí dels dos. Per cada un dels mètodes s’obté una estimació dels coeficients de la transformació que relaciona les dues imatges. A continuació es transforma per cada cas la segona imatge i es georeferencia respecte la primera. I per acabar es proposen unes mesures quantitatives que permeten discutir i comparar els resultats obtinguts amb cada mètode.

Dynamic matching and bargaining: the role of deadlines

We consider a dynamic model where traders in each period are matched randomly into pairs who then bargain about the division of a fixed surplus. When agreement is reached the traders leave the market. Traders who do not come to an agreement return next period in which they will be matched again, as long as their deadline has not expired yet. New traders enter exogenously in each period. We assume that traders within a pair know each other's deadline. We define and characterize the stationary equilibrium configurations. Traders with longer deadlines fare better than traders with short deadlines. It is shown that the heterogeneity of deadlines may cause delay. It is then shown that a centralized mechanism that controls the matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized mechanism is not as good for traders with long deadlines, it is shown that in a model where all traders can choose which mechanism to

Median stable matching for college admission

We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined stable matchings for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings.

Corrigendum to "On randomized matching mechanisms" [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381]

Ma (1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented - and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 - is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as ''symmetric.''

Paths to stability for matching markets with couples

We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to stability for decentralized singles markets. Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not weakly responsive, for some initial matchings there may not exist any path obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching.

Procedurally fair and stable matching

We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair and stable mechanisms: employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999) and the random order mechanism (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990, Ma, 1996). For both mechanisms we give various examples of probability distributions on the set of stable matchings and discuss properties that differentiate employment by lotto and the random order mechanism. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism, that combines aspects of procedural and "endstate'' fairness. Aldershof et al. (1999) and Ma (1996) that exist on the probability distribution induced by both mechanisms. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism.

On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model

For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. In order to prove this result, we also show that under this domain of preferences (which contains the domain of responsive preferences of the college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking Lemma holds as well. We exhibit an example showing that none of these three results remain true if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q-separable.

On bilateral agreements: just a matter of matching

This paper aims at assessing the importance of the initial technological endowments when firms decide to establish a technological agreement. We propose a Bertrand duopoly model where firms evaluate the advantages they can get from the agreement according to its length. Allowing them to exploit a learning process, we depict a strict connection between the starting point and the final result. Moreover, as far as learning is evaluated as an iterative process, the set of initial conditions that lead to successful ventures switches from a continuum of values to a Cantor set.

The principal-agent matching market

We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyze an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterize the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of principal-agent economies where the results fit into.

Some variational problems from image processing

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests

We study comparative statics of manipulations by women in the men-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in the two-sided one-to-one marriage market. We prove that if a group of women employs truncation strategies or weakly successfully manipulates, then all other women weakly benefit and all men are weakly harmed. We show that our results do not appropriately generalize to the many-to-one college admissions model.

Quantitative analysis of image factors in a cultural heritage tourist destination

The tourism consumer’s purchase decision process is, to a great extent, conditioned by the image the tourist has of the different destinations that make up his or her choice set. In a highly competitive international tourist market, those responsible for destinations’ promotion and development policies seek differentiation strategies so that they may position the destinations in the most suitable market segments for their product in order to improve their attractiveness to visitors and increase or consolidate the economic benefits that tourism activity generates in their territory. To this end, the main objective we set ourselves in this paper is the empirical analysis of the factors that determine the image formation of Tarragona city as a cultural heritage destination. Without a doubt, UNESCO’s declaration of Tarragona’s artistic and monumental legacies as World Heritage site in the year 2000 meant important international recognition of the quality of the cultural and patrimonial elements offered by the city to the visitors who choose it as a tourist destination. It also represents a strategic opportunity to boost the city’s promotion of tourism and its consolidation as a unique destination given its cultural and patrimonial characteristics. Our work is based on the use of structured and unstructured techniques to identify the factors that determine Tarragona’s tourist destination image and that have a decisive influence on visitors’ process of choice of destination. In addition to being able to ascertain Tarragona’s global tourist image, we consider that the heterogeneity of its visitors requires a more detailed study that enables us to segment visitor typology. We consider that the information provided by these results may prove of great interest to those responsible for local tourism policy, both when designing products and when promoting the destination.