The ‘Dragon’ and the ‘Elephant’ and Global Imbalances

Global financial imbalances receive a great deal of attention in relation to the emerging economies China and India. This chapter analyzes this relation, but argues first that they are actually re-balancing the existing structural inequality in the world economy, in which for so long only the Western economies and Japan dominated economic growth and international trade, moving towards a more multi-polar world economy. China in particular, with its rapid export-led growth, has indeed been part and parcel of the emerging financial imbalances, feeding the ‘over-consumption’ in the US and using its accumulating international reserves in buying US-treasury bonds. Finance therefore is moving to the economy that ‘least needs it’. This imbalance can only be redressed if the US (and some of the other OECD countries) start saving more and consuming less (and become more competitive), with China further stimulating domestic demand (which it already did in response to the crisis). China and to a lesser extend India, as emerging large economies and a more important roles in global markets, also contribute to new imbalances, such as the influence of the insatiable appetite for resources (carbon-hydrates, minerals and bio-mass) of these relatively energy-inefficient economies, while at the same time attracting an increasing share of FDI towards them. The chapter finally raises the issue that these three mentioned imbalances make it more difficult for developing countries (except for those who are resource-rich) to get access to the necessary development finance.

Prime Property Institutions for a Subprime Era: Exploring Innovative Models of Residential Development and Finance

This paper breaks new ground toward contractual and institutional innovation in models of homeownership, equity building, and mortgage enforcement. Inspired by recent developments in the affordable housing sector and in other types of public financing schemes, this paper suggests extending institutional and financial strategies such as timeand place-based division of property rights, conditional subsidies, and credit mediation to alleviate the systemic risks of mortgage foreclosure. Alongside a for-profit shared equity scheme that would be led by local governments, we also outline a private market shared equity model, one of bootstrapping home buying with purchase options.

Financial development, labor and market regulations and growth

This paper investigates the importance that market regulation and financial imperfections have on firm growth. We analyse institutions af- fecting labor market as Employment Protection Laws (EP) and Product Market Regulation (PM). We show that together with the beneficial effects of financial development, a firm will get less financing, and thus investless, in a weak financial market (finance effect), the strictness of product and labor market regulations also affect firm growth (labor effect). In particular, we show that the stricter the rules the more detrimental the influence on growth in sectoral value added for a large number of countries. We also show that the labor effect overcomes the positive finance effect.

Adjustment to Target Capital, Finance, and Growth

Does financial development result in capital being reallocated more rapidly to industries where it is most productive? We argue that if this was the case, financially developed countries should see faster growth in industries with investment opportunities due to global demand and productivity shifts. Testing this cross-industry cross-country growth implication requires proxies for (latent) global industry investment opportunities. We show that tests relying only on data from specific (benchmark) countries may yield spurious evidence for or against the hypothesis. We therefore develop an alternative approach that combines benchmark-country proxies with a proxy that does not reflect opportunities specific to a country or level of financial development. Our empirical results yield clear support for the capital reallocation hypothesis.

Price regulation of plastic money: A critical assessment of Spanish rules

Recent decisions by the Spanish national competition authority (TDC) mandate paymentsystems to include only two costs when setting their domestic multilateral interchange fees(MIF): a fixed processing cost and a variable cost for the risk of fraud. This artificiallowering of MIFs will not lower consumer prices, because of uncompetitive retailing; but itwill however lead to higher cardholders fees and, likely, new prices for point of saleterminals, delaying the development of the immature Spanish card market. Also, to the extent that increased cardholders fees do not offset the fall in MIFs revenue, the task of issuing new cards will be underpaid relatively to the task of acquiring new merchants, causing an imbalance between the two sides of the networks. Moreover, the pricing scheme arising from the decisions will cause unbundling and underprovision of those services whose costs are excluded. Indeed, the payment guarantee and the free funding period will tend to be removed from the package of services currently provided, to be either provided by third parties, by issuers for a separate fee, or not provided at all, especially to smaller and medium-sized merchants. Transaction services will also suffer the consequences that the TDC precludes pricing them in variable terms.

Finance versus costs for teaching hospitals in Spain

In this paper we analyse the observed systematic differences incosts for teaching hospitals (THhenceforth) in Spain. Concernhas been voiced regarding the existence of a bias in thefinancing of TH s has been raised once prospective budgets arein the arena for hospital finance, and claims for adjusting totake into account the legitimate extra costs of teaching onhospital expenditure are well grounded. We focus on theestimation of the impact of teaching status on average cost. Weused a version of a multiproduct hospital cost function takinginto account some relevant factors from which to derive theobserved differences. We assume that the relationship betweenthe explanatory and the dependent variables follows a flexibleform for each of the explanatory variables. We also model theunderlying covariance structure of the data. We assumed twoqualitatively different sources of variation: random effects andserial correlation. Random variation refers to both general levelvariation (through the random intercept) and the variationspecifically related to teaching status. We postulate that theimpact of the random effects is predominant over the impact ofthe serial correlation effects. The model is estimated byrestricted maximum likelihood. Our results show that costs are 9%higher (15% in the case of median costs) in teaching than innon-teaching hospitals. That is, teaching status legitimatelyexplains no more than half of the observed difference in actualcosts. The impact on costs of the teaching factor depends on thenumber of residents, with an increase of 51.11% per resident forhospitals with fewer than 204 residents (third quartile of thenumber of residents) and 41.84% for hospitals with more than 204residents. In addition, the estimated dispersion is higher amongteaching hospitals. As a result, due to the considerable observedheterogeneity, results should be interpreted with caution. From apolicy making point of view, we conclude that since a higherrelative burden for medical training is under public hospitalcommand, an explicit adjustment to the extra costs that theteaching factor imposes on hospital finance is needed, beforehospital competition for inpatient services takes place.

Adjustment to target capital, finance and growth

Does financial development result in capital being reallocated more rapidly to industries where it is most productive? We argue that if this was the case, financially developed countries should see faster growth in industries with investment opportunities due to global demand and productivity shifts. Testing this cross-industry cross-country growth implication requires proxies for (latent) global industry investment opportunities. We show that tests relying only on data from specific (benchmark) countries may yield spurious evidence for or against the hypothesis. We therefore develop an alternative approach that combines benchmark-country proxies with a proxy that does not reflect opportunities specific to a country or level of financial development. Our empirical results yield clear support for the capital reallocation hypothesis.

Reinventar la metròpoli: Barcelona i el model de la Greater London Authority

La dècada de 1980 va significar un punt i a part per als governs metropolitans. Després de viure una època daurada durant els 60 i 70, la reestructuració del sistema politicoeconòmic va comportar que les estructures de govern metropolità fossin qüestionades i fins i tot suprimides. Quan tot semblava indicar que restarien només com a record, la lògica de competència entre grans ciutats i la necessitat de reinventar-se en base a un desenvolupament sostenible va suposar un inesperat renaixement de la política metropolitana. Si fins aleshores la seva necessitat s'havia justificat bàsicament des d'un punt de vista funcional, seguint pautes tecnòcrates i burocratitzades, la nova metropolítica se centra en la competitivitat i en la sostenibilitat, alhora que posa èmfasi en assajar mètodes de governança. Londres, ciutat que presenta certs paral·lelismes històrics amb Barcelona, ha estat una ciutat pionera i de la seva experiència es pot aprendre per la capital catalana