Growth in a Cross-Section of Cities: Location, Increasing Returns or Random Growth?

This article analyzes empirically the main existing theories on income and population city growth: increasing returns to scale, locational fundamentals and random growth. To do this we implement a threshold nonlinearity test that extends standard linear growth regression models to a dataset on urban, climatological and macroeconomic variables on 1,175 U.S. cities. Our analysis reveals the existence of increasing returns when per-capita income levels are beyond $19; 264. Despite this, income growth is mostly explained by social and locational fundamentals. Population growth also exhibits two distinct equilibria determined by a threshold value of 116,300 inhabitants beyond which city population grows at a higher rate. Income and population growth do not go hand in hand, implying an optimal level of population beyond which income growth stagnates or deteriorates

Increasing returns, imperfect competition and factor prices

We show how, in general equilibrium models featuring increasing returns, imperfectcompetition and endogenous markups, changes in the scale of economic activity affectincome distribution across factors. Whenever final goods are gross-substitutes (gross-complements), a scale expansion raises (lowers) the relative reward of the scarce factoror the factor used intensively in the sector characterized by a higher degree of product differentiation and higher fixed costs. Under very reasonable hypothesis, our theory suggests that scale is skill-biased. This result provides a microfoundation for the secular increase in the relative demand for skilled labor. Moreover, it constitutes an important link among major explanations for the rise in wage inequality: skill-biased technical change, capital-skill complementarities and international trade. We provide new evidence on the mechanism underlying the skill bias of scale.

All-pay auction equilibria in contests

We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restriction on the number of contestants or on their valuations for the prize. We provide intuitive and easily verifiable conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with properties similar to the one of the (deterministic) all-pay auction. Since these conditions are fulfilled for a wide array of situations, the predictions of this equilibrium are very robust to the specific details of the contest. An application of this result contributes to fill a gap in the analysis of the popular Tullock rent- seeking game because it characterizes properties of an equilibrium for increasing returns to scale larger than two, for any number of contestants and in contests with or without a common value. Keywords: (non-) deterministic contest, all-pay auction, contest success functions. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D44 (Auctions).

On the distribution of income and worker assignment under intra-firm spillovers, with an application to ideas and networks

We study the earnings structure and the equilibrium assignment of workers when workers exert intra-firm spillovers on each other.We allow for arbitrary spillovers provided output depends on some aggregate index of workers' skill. Despite the possibility of increasing returns to skills, equilibrium typically exists. We show that equilibrium will typically be segregated; that the skill space can be partitioned into a set of segments and any firm hires from only one segment. Next, we apply the model to analyze the effect of information technology on segmentation and the distribution of income. There are two types of human capital, productivity and creativity, i.e. the ability to produce ideas that may be duplicated over a network. Under plausible assumptions, inequality rises and then falls when network size increases, and the poorest workers cannot lose. We also analyze the impact of an improvement in worker quality and of an increased international mobility of ideas.

Start-up costs and pecuniary externalities as barriers to economic development

We use a dynamic monopolistic competition model to show that an economythat inherits a small range of specialized inputs can be trapped into alower stage of development. The limited availability of specialized inputsforces the final goods producers to use a labor intensive technology, whichin turn implies a small inducement to introduce new intermediate inputs. Thestart--up costs, which make the intermediate inputs producers subject todynamic increasing returns, and pecuniary externalities that result from thefactor substitution in the final goods sector, play essential roles in themodel.

Input chains and industrialization

A key aspect of industrialization is theadoption of increasing-returns-to-scale, industrial,technologies. Two other, well-documented aspects arethat industrial technologies are adopted throughoutintermediate-input chains and that they use intermediateinputs intensively relative to the technologies theyreplace. These features of industrial technologiescombined imply that countries with access to similartechnologies may have very different levels ofindustrialization and income, even if the degree ofincreasing returns to scale at the firm level is relativelysmall. Furthermore, a small improvement in theproductivity of industrial technologies can trigger full-scaleindustrialization and a large increase in income.

Contracting externalities and multiple equilibria in sectors: Theory and evidence

We consider an economy where the production technology has constantreturns to scale but where in the descentralized equilibrium thereare aggregate increasing returns to scale. The result follows froma positive contracting externality among firms. If a firms issurrounded by more firms, employees have more opportunitiesoutside their own firm. This improves employees' incentives toinvest in the presence of ex post renegotiation at the firm level,at not cost. Our leading result is that if a region is sparselypopulated or if the degree of development in the region is lowenough, there are multiple equilibria in the level of sectorialemployment. From the theoretical model we derive a non-linearfirst-order censored difference equation for sectoral employment.Our results are strongly consistent with the multiple equilibriahypothesis and the existence of a sectoral critical scale (belowwich the sector follows a delocation process). The scale of theregions' population and the degree of development reduce thecritical scale of the sector.

Human capital distribution, growth and convergence

This paper studies the dynamic relationship between distribution and endogenous growth in an overlapping generations model with accumulation of human and physical capital. It is shown how human capital can determine a relationship between per capita growth rates and inequality in the distribution of income. Family background effects and spillovers in the transmission of human capital generate a dynamics in which aggregate variables depend not only on the stock, but also on the distribution of human capital. The evolution of this distribution over time is then characterized under different assumptions on private returns and the form of the externality in the technology for humancapital. Conditions for existence, uniqueness and stability of a constant growth equilibrium with a stationary distribution are derived. Increasing returns, idiosyncratic abilities and the possibility of poverty traps are explicitely characterized in a closed form solution of the equilibrium dynamics, showing the role played by technology and preferences parameters.

Labor Mobility and Productivity Growth

[cat] Els models de creixement amb aprenentatge suposen que el coneixement après en producció es transmet de forma lliure i instantània a tota l'economia. En con- seqüència, l'economia presenta economies d'escala creixents i el creixement de la productivitat (TFP) és endògena. No obstant, el supòsit de difusió instantània del coneixement és poc realista. La difusió del coneixement necessita temps i algun canal de transmissió. En aquest article suposem que el coneixement es transmet amb la contractació de treballadors nous (learning-by-hiring). En el nostre model la difusió instantània i lliure de coneixement pot ocórrer només dins d'un sector. La difusió de coneixement entre sectors pot ocórrer només a través de la mobilitat de treballadors, i per tant, el mercat de treball determina el nivell i la taxa de creixement de productivitat (TFP). Estudiem com els costos de mobilitat laboral modifiquen l'equilibri sota dos escenaris: creixement endogen i exogen. A més, demostrem que d'altres ineficiències del mercat laboral, com són les taxes o els costos de cerca, poden reduir la mobilitat laboral, i per tant, modificar la TFP.

Labor Mobility and Productivity Growth

[cat] Els models de creixement amb aprenentatge suposen que el coneixement après en producció es transmet de forma lliure i instantània a tota l'economia. En con- seqüència, l'economia presenta economies d'escala creixents i el creixement de la productivitat (TFP) és endògena. No obstant, el supòsit de difusió instantània del coneixement és poc realista. La difusió del coneixement necessita temps i algun canal de transmissió. En aquest article suposem que el coneixement es transmet amb la contractació de treballadors nous (learning-by-hiring). En el nostre model la difusió instantània i lliure de coneixement pot ocórrer només dins d'un sector. La difusió de coneixement entre sectors pot ocórrer només a través de la mobilitat de treballadors, i per tant, el mercat de treball determina el nivell i la taxa de creixement de productivitat (TFP). Estudiem com els costos de mobilitat laboral modifiquen l'equilibri sota dos escenaris: creixement endogen i exogen. A més, demostrem que d'altres ineficiències del mercat laboral, com són les taxes o els costos de cerca, poden reduir la mobilitat laboral, i per tant, modificar la TFP.

Increasing quasiconcave production and utility functions with diminishing returns to scale

In microeconomic analysis functions with diminishing returns to scale (DRS) have frequently been employed. Various properties of increasing quasiconcave aggregator functions with DRS are derived. Furthermore duality in the classical sense as well as of a new type is studied for such aggregator functions in production and consumer theory. In particular representation theorems for direct and indirect aggregator functions are obtained. These involve only small sets of generator functions. The study is carried out in the contemporary framework of abstract convexity and abstract concavity.

Increasing political returns and rural-urban migrations

This paper analyzes the different equilibria in rural-urban migrationsand political redistribution that result from the interaction betweenincreasing political returns, the distribution of land, and creditmarket imperfections. Governments that put a special weight on thewelfare of urban workers when setting agricultural prices generate apolitical externality in the urban sector, giving peasants anincentive to migrate in anticipation of policy determination. Ifcredit markets are imperfect, land ownership confers higherproductivity to peasants, who require large price changes to migrate.In this context, land inequality would lead to large migrations and tolarge policy change, while an egalitarian land distribution would leadto no migration and to a small policy change. This interaction shedslight on the contrasting experience of Latin America and East Asia atthe outset of World War II.

The private and fiscal returns to schooling and the effect of public policies on private incentives to invest in education: a general framework and some results for the EU

This paper develops a comprehensive framework for the quantitative analysis of the private and fiscal returns to schooling and of the effect of public policies on private incentives to invest in education. This framework is applied to 14 member states of the European Union. For each of these countries, we construct estimates of the private return to an additional year of schooling for an individual of average attainment, taking into account the effects of education on wages and employment probabilities after allowing for academic failure rates, the direct and opportunity costs of schooling, and the impact of personal taxes, social security contributions and unemployment and pension benefits on net incomes. We also construct a set of effective tax and subsidy rates that measure the effects of different public policies on the private returns to education, and measures of the fiscal returns to schooling that capture the long-term effects of a marginal increase in attainment on public finances under c