26 resultados para Housing provision
em Consorci de Serveis Universitaris de Catalunya (CSUC), Spain
Resumo:
We accomplish two goals. First, we provide a non-cooperative foundation for the use of the Nash bargaining solution in search markets. This finding should help to close the rift between the search and the matching-and-bargaining literature. Second, we establish that the diversity of quality offered (at an increasing price-quality ratio) in a decentralized market is an equilibrium phenomenon - even in the limit as search frictions disappear.
Resumo:
Estimating the social benefits of barrier-free building has always required indirect solutions, such as calculating the savings in social services, hospitalisation or adaptations made possible by the increase in accessibility. This research uses the Contingent Valuation Method to gain a direct appraisal of the benefits from barrier-free housing. When comparing two similar dwellings, with the only difference being their accessibility conditions, the 1,007 randomly chosen households that answered the direct survey would pay, on average 12.5 per cent more for being barrier-free. None of the different appraisals made on accessibility costs reaches 5 per cent. This confirms the social profitability of building without barriers and shows the potential size of the private market for those housing developers that meet the demand. Accessibility is a general concern, an economic good or attribute that most households value, irrespective of the physical conditions of their members.
Resumo:
Using panel data for twelve EU countries, we analyze the relationship between selfreported housing satisfaction and residential mobility. Our results indicate the existence of a positive link between the two variables and that housing satisfaction exerts a mediating effect between residential characteristics and dwellers' mobility propensities. Some interesting cross-country differences regarding the effect of other variables on mobility are also observed. Our results can be used in defining, implementing and evaluating housing and neighbourhood policies. Residential satisfaction is put forward as one of the most appropriate indicators of the success or failure of such policies. Keywords: Housing satisfaction, residential mobility JEL classification: R21, D19
Resumo:
There is a general consensus that homeownership has beneficial effects for both individuals and society in many outcomes. However, research regarding the effect of homeownership on individuals' subjective well-being remains inconclusive. In this paper, for the first time, we provide empirical evidence for the link between homeownership and housing satisfaction using panel data. We use the eight waves of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) covering the period 1994-2001. We observe that renters who become homeowners not only experience a significant increase in housing satisfaction, but also after changing their tenure status, they obtain a different utility from the same housing context. This evidence might provide support to the hypothesis that a share of the differences in the perceived utility derived from housing can be attributed to (un)fulfilled expectations or aspirations regarding homeownership. Keywords: Housing satisfaction, subjective well-being, homeownership, fixed-effects, housing aspirations JEL classification: D1, R2.
Resumo:
The literature on local services has focused on the effects of privatization and, if anything, has compared the effects of private and mixed public-private systems versus public provision. However, alternative forms of provision such as cooperatives, which can be very prevalent in many developing countries, have been completely ignored. In this paper, we investigate the effects of communal water provison (Comités Vecinales and Juntas Administrativas de Servicios de Saneamiento) on child health in Peru. Using detailed survey data at the household- and child-level for the years 2006-2010, we exploit the cross-section variability to assess the differential impact of this form of provision. Despite controlling for a wide range of household and local characteristics, the municipalities served by communal organizations are more likely to have poorer health indicators, what would result in a downward bias on the absolute magnitude of the effect of cooperatives. We rely on an instrumental variable strategy to deal with this potential endogeneity problem, and use the personnel resources and the administrative urban/rural classi fication of the municipalities as instruments for the provision type. The results show a negative and signi cant effect of comunal water provision on diarrhea among under- five year old children. Keywords: water utilities, cooperatives, child health, regulation, Peru. JEL Classi fication Numbers: L33; L50; L95
Resumo:
We study how gender differences in performance under competition areaffected by the provision of information regarding rival s gender and/ordifferences in relative ability. In a laboratory experiment, we use two tasks thatdiffer regarding perceptions about which gender outperforms the other. Weobserve women s underperformance only under two conditions: 1) tasks areperceived as favoring men and 2) rivals gender is explicitly mentioned. Thisresult can be explained by stereotype-threat being reinforced when explicitlymentioning gender in tasks in which women already consider they are inferior.Omitting information about gender is a safe alternative to avoid women sunderperformance in competition.
Resumo:
We estimate empirically the effect of immigration on house prices and residentialconstruction activity in Spain over the period 1998-2008. This decade is characterized by both aspectacular housing market boom and a stunning immigration wave. We exploit the variation inimmigration across Spanish provinces and construct an instrument based on the historicallocation patterns of immigrants by country of origin. The evidence points to a sizeable causaleffect of immigration on both prices and quantities in the housing market. Between 1998 and2008, the average Spanish province received an immigrant inflow equal to 17% of the initialworking-age population. We estimate that this inflow increased house prices by about 52% andis responsible for 37% of the total construction of new housing units during the period. Thesefigures imply that immigration can account for roughly one third of the housing boom, both interms of prices and new construction.
Resumo:
This paper studies how privatising service provision (shifting control rights and contractualobligations to providers) affects accountability. There are two main effects. (1) Privatisation demotivates governments from investigating and responding to public demands, since providers then hold up service adaptations. (2) Privatisation demotivates the public from mobilising to pressure for service adaptations, since providers then indirectly holdup the public by inflating the government s cost of implementing these adaptations. So, when choosing governance mode, politicians may be biased towards privatising as a way to escape public attention; relatedly, privatising utilities may reduce public pressure and increase consumer prices.
Resumo:
This paper provides evidence that the combination of land-use restrictions and anincreasing demand for housing can create incentives to induce forest fires as a means tocircumvent regulation and increase the supply of land available for residential construction.I estimate the effect of the price of housing on the incidence of forest fires using Spanishdata by region for 1991-2005. The results suggest that higher house prices led to asignificant increase in the incidence of forest fires in a region. I also find that the increasedincidence of forest fires led to a subsequent reduction in forest area and an increase in urbanland area. This evidence supports the claims often found in the media that propertyspeculators trying to build in forest land may be behind the recent increases in the incidenceof forest fires in Mediterranean countries.
Resumo:
This paper studies the effect of changes in foreign competition on the structureof compensation and incentives of U.S. executives. We measure foreign competitionas import penetration and use tariffs and exchange rates as instrumental variables toestimate its causal effect on pay. We find that higher foreign competition leads tomore incentive provision in a variety of ways. First, it increases the sensitivity of payto performance. Second, it increases whithin-firm pay differentials between executivelevels, with CEOs typically experiencing the largest wage increases, partly becausethey receive the steepest incentive contracts. Finally, higher foreign competition is alsoassociated with a higher demand for talent. These results indicate that increased foreigncompetition can explain some of the recent trends in compensation structures.
Resumo:
This paper studies the effect of providing relative performance feedback information onindividual performance and on individual affective response, when agents are rewardedaccording to their absolute performance. In a laboratory set-up, agents perform a realeffort task and when receiving feedback, they are asked to rate their happiness, arousaland feeling of dominance. Control subjects learn only their absolute performance, whilethe treated subjects additionally learn the average performance in the session.Performance is 17 percent higher when relative performance feedback is provided.Furthermore, although feedback increases the performance independent of the content(i.e., performing above or below the average), the content is determinant for theaffective response. When subjects are treated, the inequality in the happiness and thefeeling of dominance between those subjects performing above and below the averageincreases by 8 and 6 percentage points, respectively.
Resumo:
We model systemic risk in an interbank market. Banks face liquidityneeds as consumers are uncertain about where they need to consume. Interbank credit lines allow to cope with these liquidity shocks while reducing the cost of maintaining reserves. However, the interbank market exposes the system to a coordination failure(gridlock equilibrium) even if all banks are solvent. When one bankis insolvent, the stability of the banking system is affected in various ways depending on the patterns of payments across locations. We investigate the ability of the banking industry to withstand the insolvency of one bank and whether the closure ofone bank generates a chain reaction on the rest of the system. Weanalyze the coordinating role of the Central Bank in preventing payments systemic repercussions and we examine the justification ofthe Too-big-to-fail-policy.
Resumo:
Previous indirect evidence suggests that impulses towards pro-socialbehavior are diminished when an external authority is responsiblefor an outcome. The responsibility-alleviation effect states that ashift of responsibility to an external authority dampens internalimpulses toward honesty, loyalty, or generosity. In a gift-exchangeexperiment, we find that subjects respond with more generosity(higher effort) when a wage is determined by a random process thanwhen it is assigned by a third party, indicating that even a slightshift in perceived responsibility for the final payoffs can changebehavior. Responsibility-alleviation is a factor in economicenvironments featuring substantial personal interaction.
Resumo:
In some markets, such as the market for drugs or for financial services, sellers have better information than buyersregarding the matching between the buyer's needs and the good's actual characteristics. Depending on the market structure,this may lead to conflicts of interest and/or the underprovision of information by the seller. This paper studies this issuein the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, as banks' pricecompetition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We compare two different firm structures,specialized banking, where financial institutions provide a unique financial product, and one-stop banking, where a financialinstitution is able to provide several financial products which are horizontally differentiated. We show first that, althoughconflicts of interest may prevent information disclosure under monopoly, competition forces full information provision forsufficiently high reputation costs. Second, in the presence of market power, one-stop banks will use information strategicallyto increase product differentiation and therefore will always provide reliable information and charge higher rices thanspecialized banks, thus providing a new justification for the creation of one-stop banks. Finally, we show that, ifindependent financial advisers are able to provide reliable information, this increases product differentiation and thereforemarket power, so that it is in the interest of financial intermediaries to promote external independent financial advice.