Stable coalition structures with fixed decision scheme

This paper studies the stability of a finite local public goods economy in horizontal differentiation, where a jurisdiction's choice of the public good is given by an exogenous decision scheme. In this paper, we characterize the class of decision schemes that ensure the existence of an equilibrium with free mobility (that we call Tiebout equilibrium) for monotone distribution of players. This class contains all the decision schemes whose choice lies between the Rawlsian decision scheme and the median voter with mid-distance of the two median voters when there are ties. We show that for non-monotone distribution, there is no decision scheme that can ensure the stability of coalitions. In the last part of the paper, we prove the non-emptiness of the core of this coalition formation game

Heterogeneity-promoting optimal procurement

When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design of the object being procured affects the resulting degree of competition. This paper highlights the interaction between theoptimal procurement mechanism and the design choice. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the sponsor's design choice, instead of homogenizingthe market to generate competition, promotes heterogeneity.

Allocating ideas: Horizontal competition in tournaments

We develop a stylized model of horizontal and vertical competition intournaments with two competing firms. The sponsor cares about the qualityof the design but also about the design location. A priori not even thesponsor knows his preferred design location, which is only discoveredonce he has seen the actual proposals. We show that the more efficientfirm is more likely to be conservative when choosing the design location.Also, to get some differentiation in design locations, the cost differencebetween contestants can neither be too small nor too big. Therefore, ifthe sponsor mainly cares about the design location, participation in thetournaments by the two lowest cost contestants cannot be optimal for thesponsor.

Information-sharing implications of horizontal mergers

We analyze the effects of uncertainty and private information on horizontal mergers. Firms face uncertain demands or costs and receive private signals. They may decide to merge sharing their private information. If the uncertainty parameters are independent and the signals are perfect, uncertainty generates an informational advantage only to the merging firms, increasing merger incentives and decreasing free-riding effects. Thus, mergers become more profitable and stable. These results generalize to the case of correlated parameters if the correlation is not very severe, and for perfect correlation if the firms receive noisy signals. From the normative point of view, mergers are socially less harmful compared to deterministic markets and may even be welfare enhancing. If the signals are, instead, publicly observed, uncertainty does not necessarily give more incentives to merge, and mergers are not always less socially harmful.

Classical horizontal inequity and reranking: an integrated approach

The last 20 years have seen a significant evolution in the literature on horizontal inequity (HI) and have generated two major and "rival" methodological strands, namely, classical HI and reranking. We propose in this paper a class of ethically flexible tools that integrate these two strands. This is achieved using a measure of inequality that merges the well-known Gini coefficient and Atkinson indices, and that allows a decomposition of the total redistributive effect of taxes and transfers in a vertical equity effect and a loss of redistribution due to either classical HI or reranking. An inequality-change approach and a money-metric cost-of-inequality approach are developed. The latter approach makes aggregate classical HI decomposable across groups. As in recent work, equals are identified through a nonparametric estimation of the joint density of gross and net incomes. An illustration using Canadian data from 1981 to 1994 shows a substantial, and increasing, robust erosion of redistribution attributable both to classical HI and to reranking, but does not reveal which of reranking or classical HI is more important since this requires a judgement that is fundamentally normative in nature.

Maximal operators and differentiation theorems for sparse sets

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Plataforma cerámica para la accesibilidad horizontal

Desenvolupament d'innovacions en elements vinculats amb l'accessibilitat física, en concret de sistemes de paviments. Es tracta de sistemes de paviments que permetin el desplaçament segur i accessible en el patrimoni arquitectònic, on és habitual que les irregularitats del sòl impedeixin la mobilitat de persones amb discapacitat.

Product differentiation, competitive pressure and the effects of innovation on the success and survivability of firms in oligopoly markets

In a recent paper Tishler and Milstein (2009) fi…nd that increased competition may increase aggregate R&D spending while market output decreases. Therefore, they obtain the surprising result that R&D spending is excessive when competition becomes intense. Their result is based on the standard linear demand function for differentiated products introduced by Bowley (1924) where decreased product differentiation is interpreted as more competitive pressure. In this paper I show that at an aggregate level this interpretation is problematic because equilibrium effects are dominated by a demand reduction effect. A slight modifi…cation of the standard demand function eliminates this effect. For the Tishler and Milstein (2009) setting it is shown that then increased competition increases both R&D spending and aggregate market output. Therefore, at least for consumers, more intense competition increases welfare. Journal of Economic Literature Classi…fication Numbers: D43, L1, O3. Keywords: Oligopoly markets, Product differentiation, Competitive pressure.

Distribution of events of positive selection and population differentiation in a metabolic pathway: the case of asparagine N-glycosylation

Background: Asparagine N-Glycosylation is one of the most important forms of protein post-translational modification in eukaryotes. This metabolic pathway can be subdivided into two parts: an upstream sub-pathway required for achieving proper folding for most of the proteins synthesized in the secretory pathway, and a downstream sub-pathway required to give variability to trans-membrane proteins, and involved in adaptation to the environment andinnate immunity. Here we analyze the nucleotide variability of the genes of this pathway in human populations, identifying which genes show greater population differentiation and which genes show signatures of recent positive selection. We also compare how these signals are distributed between the upstream and the downstream parts of the pathway, with the aim of exploring how forces of population differentiation and positive selection vary among genes involved in the same metabolic pathway but subject to different functional constraints. Results:Our results show that genes in the downstream part of the pathway are more likely to show a signature of population differentiation, while events of positive selection are equally distributed among the two parts of the pathway. Moreover, events of positive selection arefrequent on genes that are known to be at bifurcation points, and that are identified as beingin key position by a network-level analysis such as MGAT3 and GCS1.Conclusions: These findings indicate that the upstream part of the Asparagine N-Glycosylation pathway has lower diversity among populations, while the downstream part is freer to tolerate diversity among populations. Moreover, the distribution of signatures of population differentiation and positive selection can change between parts of a pathway, especially between parts that are exposed to different functional constraints. Our results support the hypothesis that genes involved in constitutive processes can be expected to show lower population differentiation, while genes involved in traits related to the environment should show higher variability. Taken together, this work broadens our knowledge on how events of population differentiation and of positive selection are distributed among different parts of a metabolic pathway.

Origin and genetic differentiation of Three Mexican Native Groups (Purépechas, Triquis and Mayas): contribution of CODIS-STRs to the history of human populations of Mesoamerica

BACKGROUND: CODIS-STRs in Native Mexican groups have rarely been analysed for human identification and anthropological purposes. AIM:To analyse the genetic relationships and population structure among three Native Mexican groups from Mesoamerica.SUBJECTS AND METHODS: 531 unrelated Native individuals from Mexico were PCR-typed for 15 and 9 autosomal STRs (Identifiler™ and Profiler™ kits, respectively), including five population samples: Purépechas (Mountain, Valley and Lake), Triquis and Yucatec Mayas. Previously published STR data were included in the analyses. RESULTS:Allele frequencies and statistical parameters of forensic importance were estimated by population. The majority of Native groups were not differentiated pairwise, excepting Triquis and Purépechas, which was attributable to their relative geographic and cultural isolation. Although Mayas, Triquis and Purépechas-Mountain presented the highest number of private alleles, suggesting recurrent gene flow, the elevated differentiation of Triquis indicates a different origin of this gene flow. Interestingly, Huastecos and Mayas were not differentiated, which is in agreement with the archaeological hypothesis that Huastecos represent an ancestral Maya group. Interpopulation variability was greater in Natives than in Mestizos, both significant.CONCLUSION: Although results suggest that European admixture has increased the similarity between Native Mexican groups, the differentiation and inconsistent clustering by language or geography stresses the importance of serial founder effect and/or genetic drift in showing their present genetic relationships.

Is there a wage penalty for horizontal and vertical mismatch?

This paper studies how the horizontal and vertical mismatches in the labor market affect wage. We do so by taking into account that by choosing a job, wage and mismatches are simultaneously determined. The Seemingly Unrelated Equations model also allows us to control for any omitted variable that could cause biased estimators. We use REFLEX data for Spain. Results reveal that in most cases being horizontally matched has a wage premium and being over-educated does not affect wage. Results suggest that the modeling strategy successfully accounts for some omitted variable that affects simultaneously the probability of being horizontally matched and the wage. This could explain the existence of a wage penalty for over-educated workers when the omitted variable issue is not dealt with.

Overeducation among European university graduates : a comparative analysis ot its incidence and the importance of higher education differentiation

The incidence of over-education is here assessed by applying some standard subjective and objective indicators and a new skill-based indicator of over-education to the national samples of eight European countries in the REFLEX survey. With the exception of Spain, the results reveal that over-education is a minor risk amongst European tertiary graduates. Yet, the contrast between the standard indicators and the skill-based indicator reveals the existence of an over-education of a moderate kind in countries with high tertiary attainment rates (Norway, Finland and Netherlands). Such a type of over-education does not come to the surface when applying the standard indicators. Our results also reveal the importance of higher education differentiation (i.e. field of study and branch of higher education) for understanding the risk of over-education. Graduates from humanistic fields, bachelor courses and vocational colleges are more exposed to over-education, though their disadvantage varies across-nationally to a significant extent.

Pharmaceutical Generics, Vertical Product Differentiation, and Public Policy

This paper studies oligopolistic competition in off-patent pharmaceutical markets using a vertical product differentiation model. This model can explain the observation that countries with stronger regulations have smaller generic market shares. It can also explain the differences in observed regulatory regimes. Stronger regulation may be due to a higher proportion of production that is done by foreign firms. Finally, a closely related model can account for the observed increase in prices by patent owners after entry of generic producers.

Horizontal innovation in the theory of growth and development

We analyze recent contributions to growth theory based on the model of expanding variety of Romer (1990). In the first part, we present different versions of the benchmark linear model with imperfect competition. These include the labequipment model, labor-for-intermediates and directed technical change . We review applications of the expanding variety framework to the analysis of international technology diffusion, trade, cross-country productivity differences, financial development and fluctuations. In many such applications, a key role is played by complementarities in the process of innovation.

Country asymmetries, endogenous product choice and the speed of trade liberalization

In a world with two countries which differ in size, we study theimpact of (the speed of) trade liberalization on firms' profitsand total welfare of the countries involved. Firms correctlyanticipate the pace of trade liberalization and take it intoaccount when deciding on their product choices, which areendogenously determined at the beginning of the game. Competitionin the marketplace then occurs either on quantities or on prices.As long as the autarkic phase continues, local firms are nationalmonopolists. When trade liberalization occurs, firms compete in aninternational duopoly. We analyze trade effects by using twodifferent models of product differentiation. Across all thespecifications adopted (and independently of the price v. quantitycompetition hypothesis), total welfare always unambiguously riseswith the speed of trade liberalization: Possible losses by firmsare always outweighed by consumers' gains, which come under theform of lower prices, enlarged variety of higher average qualitiesavailable. The effect on profits depends on the type of industryanalyzed. Two results in particular seem to be worth of mention.With vertical product differentiation and fixed costs of qualityimprovements, the expected size of the market faced by the firmsdetermines the incentive to invest in quality. The longer the periodof autarky, the lower the possibility that the firm from the smallcountry would be producing the high quality and be the leader in theinternational market when it opens. On the contrary, when trade opensimmediately, national markets do not play any role and firms fromdifferent countries have the same opportunity to become the leader.Hence, immediate trade liberalization might be in the interest ofproducers in the small country. In general, the lower the size of thesmall country, the more likely its firm will gain from tradeliberalization. Losses from the small country firm can arise when itis relegated to low quality good production and the domestic marketsize is not very small. With horizontal product differentiation (thehomogeneous good case being a limit case of it when costs ofdifferentiation tend to infinity), investments in differentiationbenefit both firms in equal manner. Firms from the small country do notrun the risk of being relegated to a lower competitive position undertrade. As a result, they would never lose from it. Instead, firms fromthe large country may still incur losses from the opening of trade whenthe market expansion effect is low (i.e. when the country is very largerelative to the other).