Codes of best practice in competitive markets for managers

We study firms' corporate governance in environments where possibly heterogeneous shareholders compete for possibly heterogeneous managers. A firm, formed by a shareholder and a manager, can sign either an incentive contract or a contract including a Code of Best Practice. A Code allows for a better manager's control but makes manager's decisions hard to react when market conditions change. It tends to be adopted in markets with low volatility and in low-competitive environments. The firms with the best projects tend to adopt the Code when managers are not too heterogeneous while the best managers tend to be hired through incentive contracts when the projects are similar. Although the matching between shareholders and managers is often positively assortative, the shareholders with the best projects might be willing to renounce to hire the best managers, signing contracts including Codes with lower-ability managers.

Optimal coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts in labor Markets

We consider a market where firms hire workers to run their projects and such projects differ in profitability. At any period, each firm needs two workers to successfully run its project: a junior agent, with no specific skills, and a senior worker, whose effort is not verifiable. Senior workers differ in ability and their competence is revealed after they have worked as juniors in the market. We study the length of the contractual relationships between firms and workers in an environment where the matching between firms and workers is the result of market interaction. We show that, despite in a one-firm-one-worker set-up long-term contracts are the optimal choice for firms, market forces often induce firms to use short-term contracts. Unless the market only consists of firms with very profitable projects, firms operating highly profitable projects offer short-term contracts to ensure the service of high-ability workers and those with less lucrative projects also use short-term contracts to save on the junior workers' wage. Intermediate firms may (or may not) hire workers through long-term contracts.

The Innovation and Imitation Dichotomy in Spanish firms: do absorptive capacity and the technological frontier matter?

This paper analyses whether a firm’s absorptive capacity and its distance from the technological frontier affect the choice between innovation and imitation in innovative Spanish firms. From an extensive survey of 5,575 firms during the 2004-2009 period, we found two significant results. With regard to the role of absorptive capacity, the empirical evidence shows that when innovative firms have difficulties in accessing external information and hire skilled workers, their innovative capacity is reduced. Meanwhile, with regard to distance from the technological frontier, the firms that reduce this gap manage to increase their innovative capacity at the expense of imitation. To summarise, when we studied firms’ absorptive capacity and their relative position to the technological frontier in tandem, we found that the two factors directly affected firms' ability to innovate or imitate.

The Innovation and Imitation Dichotomy in Spanish firms: do absorptive capacity and the technological frontier matter?

This paper analyses whether a firm’s absorptive capacity and its distance from the technological frontier affect the choice between innovation and imitation in innovative Spanish firms. From an extensive survey of 5,575 firms during the 2004-2009 period, we found two significant results. With regard to the role of absorptive capacity, the empirical evidence shows that when innovative firms have difficulties in accessing external information and hire skilled workers, their innovative capacity is reduced. Meanwhile, with regard to distance from the technological frontier, the firms that reduce this gap manage to increase their innovative capacity at the expense of imitation. To summarise, when we studied firms’ absorptive capacity and their relative position to the technological frontier in tandem, we found that the two factors directly affected firms' ability to innovate or imitate. Key words: R&D sources, innovation and imitation strategies, absorptive capacity, technological frontier, ordered probit.

Treball Final de Carrera .NET : plataforma per a la gestió d'un servei de lloguer de vehicles

Plataforma per a la gestió d'un servei de lloguer de vehicles desenvolupat en tecnologia .Net de Microsoft.Consta d'una plana web enfocada als clients, una aplicació d'administració i d'una aplicació mòbil per a la gestió per part del personal de taller.

A hybrid method for sag source location in power network

The work presented in this paper belongs to the power quality knowledge area and deals with the voltage sags in power transmission and distribution systems. Propagating throughout the power network, voltage sags can cause plenty of problems for domestic and industrial loads that can financially cost a lot. To impose penalties to responsible party and to improve monitoring and mitigation strategies, sags must be located in the power network. With such a worthwhile objective, this paper comes up with a new method for associating a sag waveform with its origin in transmission and distribution networks. It solves this problem through developing hybrid methods which hire multiway principal component analysis (MPCA) as a dimension reduction tool. MPCA reexpresses sag waveforms in a new subspace just in a few scores. We train some well-known classifiers with these scores and exploit them for classification of future sags. The capabilities of the proposed method for dimension reduction and classification are examined using the real data gathered from three substations in Catalonia, Spain. The obtained classification rates certify the goodness and powerfulness of the developed hybrid methods as brand-new tools for sag classification

Selective hiring and welfare analysis in labor market models

Firms select not only how many, but also which workers to hire. Yet, in standardsearch models of the labor market, all workers have the same probability of being hired.We argue that selective hiring crucially affects welfare analysis. Our model is isomorphicto a search model under random hiring but allows for selective hiring. With selectivehiring, the positive predictions of the model change very little, but the welfare costsof unemployment are much larger because unemployment risk is distributed unequallyacross workers. As a result, optimal unemployment insurance may be higher and welfareis lower if hiring is selective.

Hiring and firing costs, adverse selection and long-term unemployment

In this paper, we present a matching model with adverse selection that explains why flows into and out of unemployment are much lower in Europe compared to North America, while employment-to-employment flows are similar in the two continents. In the model,firms use discretion in terms of whom to fire and, thus, low quality workers are more likely to be dismissed than high quality workers. Moreover, as hiring and firing costs increase, firms find it more costly to hire a bad worker and, thus, they prefer to hire out of the pool of employed job seekers rather than out of the pool of the unemployed, who are more likely to turn out to be 'lemons'. We use microdata for Spain and the U.S. and find that the ratio of the job finding probability of the unemployed to the job finding probability of employed job seekers was smaller in Spain than in the U.S. Furthermore, using U.S. data, we find that the discrimination of the unemployed increased over the 1980's in those states that raised firing costs by introducing exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine.

Stabilization versus insurance: Welfare effects of procyclical taxation under incomplete markets

We construct and calibrate a general equilibrium business cycle model with unemployment and precautionary saving. We compute the cost of business cycles and locate the optimum in a set of simple cyclical fiscal policies. Our economy exhibits productivity shocks, giving firms an incentive to hire more when productivity is high. However, business cycles make workers' income riskier, both by increasing the unconditional probability of unusuallylong unemployment spells, and by making wages more variable, and therefore they decrease social welfare by around one-fourth or one-third of 1% of consumption. Optimal fiscal policy offsets the cycle, holding unemployment benefits constant but varying the tax rate procyclically to smooth hiring. By running a deficit of 4% to 5% of output in recessions, the government eliminates half the variation in the unemployment rate, most of the variation in workers'aggregate consumption, and most of the welfare cost of business cycles.

Wage inequality in a frictional labor market

Wage inequality in the United States has grown substantially in thepast two decades. Standard supply-demand analysis in the empiricsof inequality (e.g.Katz and Murphy (1992)) indicates that we mayattribute some of this trend to an outward shift in the demand forhigh skilled labor. In this paper we examine a simple static channelin which the wage premium for skill may grow -increased firm entry.We consider a model of wage dispersion where there are two types ofworkers and homogeneous firms must set wages and preferences forwhat type of worker they would like to hire. We find that both thewage differential and the demand for high skill workers can increasewith the proportion of high skill workers -these high skill workerstherefore 'create' their own demand without exogenous factors. Inaddition, within group wage inequality can increase in step with thebetween group wage inequality. Simulations of the model are providedin order to compare the findings with empirical results.

Unemployment insurance with endogenous search intensity and precautionary saving

A welfare analysis of unemployment insurance (UI) is performed in a generalequilibrium job search model. Finitely-lived, risk-averse workers smooth consumption over time by accumulating assets, choose search effort whenunemployed, and suffer disutility from work. Firms hire workers, purchasecapital, and pay taxes to finance worker benefits; their equity is the assetaccumulated by workers. A matching function relates unemployment, hiringexpenditure, and search effort to the formation of jobs. The model is calibrated to US data; the parameters relating job search effort to the probability of job finding are chosen to match microeconomic studies ofunemployment spells. Under logarithmic utility, numerical simulation shows rather small welfaregains from UI. Even without UI, workers smooth consumption effectivelythrough asset accumulation. Greater risk aversion leads to substantiallylarger welfare gains from UI; however, even in this case much of its welfareimpact is due not to consumption smoothing effects, but rather to decreased work disutility, or to a variety of externalities.