Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.

Some common indexes of group diversity: upper boundaries

Workgroup diversity can be conceptualized as variety, separation, or disparity. Thus, the proper operationalization of diversity depends on how a diversity dimension has been defined. Analytically, the minimal diversity must be obtained when there are no differences on an attribute among the members of a group, however maximal diversity has a different shape for each conceptualization of diversity. Previous work on diversity indexes indicated maximum values for variety (e.g., Blau"s index and Teachman"s index), separation (e.g., standard deviation and mean Euclidean distance), and disparity (e.g., coefficient of variation and the Gini coefficient of concentration), although these maximum values are not valid for all group characteristics (i.e., group size and group size parity) and attribute scales (i.e., number of categories). We demonstrate analytically appropriate upper boundaries for conditional diversity determined by some specific group characteristics, avoiding the bias related to absolute diversity. This will allow applied researchers to make better interpretations regarding the relationship between group diversity and group outcomes.

The effect of skewness and kurtosis on the Kenward-Roger approximation when group distributions differ

This study examined the independent effect of skewness and kurtosis on the robustness of the linear mixed model (LMM), with the Kenward-Roger (KR) procedure, when group distributions are different, sample sizes are small, and sphericity cannot be assumed. Methods: A Monte Carlo simulation study considering a split-plot design involving three groups and four repeated measures was performed. Results: The results showed that when group distributions are different, the effect of skewness on KR robustness is greater than that of kurtosis for the corresponding values. Furthermore, the pairings of skewness and kurtosis with group size were found to be relevant variables when applying this procedure. Conclusions: With sample sizes of 45 and 60, KR is a suitable option for analyzing data when the distributions are: (a) mesokurtic and not highly or extremely skewed, and (b) symmetric with different degrees of kurtosis. With total sample sizes of 30, it is adequate when group sizes are equal and the distributions are: (a) mesokurtic and slightly or moderately skewed, and sphericity is assumed; and (b) symmetric with a moderate or high/extreme violation of kurtosis. Alternative analyses should be considered when the distributions are highly or extremely skewed and samples sizes are small.

Leadership in collective action

We extend the model of collective action in which groups compete for a budged by endogenizing the group platform, namely the specific mixture of public/private good and the distribution of the private good to group members which can be uniform or performance-based. While the group-optimal platform contains a degree of publicness that increases in group size and divides the private benefits uniformly, a success-maximizing leader uses incentives and distorts the platform towards more private benefits - a distortion that increases with group size. In both settings we obtain the anti-Olson type result that win probability increases with group size.

Vigilance behavior of Pyrenean chamois (Rupicapra pyrenaica pyrenaica): Effect of sex and position in the herd

The Pyrenean chamois (Rupicapra pyrenaica pyrenaica) is a mountain-dwelling ungulate with an extensive presence in open areas. Optimal group size results from the trade off between advantages (a reduction in the risk of predation) and disadvantages (competition between members of the herd) of group living. In addition, advantages and disadvantages of group living may vary depending on the position of each individual within the herd. Our objective was to study the effect of central vs. peripheral position in the herd on feeding and vigilance behavior in male and female Pyrenean chamois and to ascertain if a group size effect existed. We used focal animal sampling and recorded social interactions when a focal animal was involved. With males, vigilance rate was higher in the central part of the group than at the periphery, probably due to a higher density of animals in the central part of the herd and a higher probability of being disturbed by conspecifics. With females, vigilance rate did not differ according to position in the herd. Females spent more time feeding than males, and males showed a higher frequency of the vigilance behavior than females. We did not observe a clear relationship between group size and vigilance behavior. The differences in vigilance behavior might be due to social interactions.

Parents, television and cultural change

This paper develops a model of cultural transmission where television plays a central role for socialization. Parents split their free time between educating their children which is costly and watching TV which though entertaining might socialize the children to the wrong trait. The free to air television industry maximizes advertisement revenue. We show that TV watching is increasing in cultural coverage, cost of education, TV's entertainment value and decreasing in the perceived cultural distance between the two traits. A monopolistic television industry captures all TV watching by both groups if the perceived cultural distance between groups is small relative to the TV's entertainment value. Otherwise, more coverage will be given to the most profitable group where profitability increases in group size, advertisement sensitivity and perceived cultural distance. This leads to two possible steady states where one group is larger but both groups survive in the long run. Competition in the media industry might lead to cultural extinction but only if one group is very insensitive to advertisement and not radical enough not to watch TV. We briefly discuss the existing evidence for the empirical predictions of the model.

Reconciling context and contact with immigrants effects: an examination of the Catalan case

Contact theory and threat group theory offer contradictory hypotheses regarding the effect of contact with immigrants. Despite recent efforts to test the validity of both approaches, we still lack a definitive conclusion. This article integrates both approaches and tests the effect of contact towards immigrants and how this changes when different contexts are considered. Mainly, we investigate the effect of the economic environment and the immigrant group size on modifying attitudes toward immigration. The hypotheses, which are tested in Catalonia, show that contact with immigrants reduce negative attitudes towards immigration, especially friendship and family contact. However, mixed results are reported regarding the effect of economic environment and immigrant group size. Whereas the former modifies positively the effect of workplace contact, the latter has no effect. Findings have implications for the impact of context when dealing with the impact of contact on attitudes towards immigration.

An overall statistic for testing symmetry in social interactions

The present work focuses the attention on the skew-symmetry index as a measure of social reciprocity. This index is based on the correspondence between the amount of behaviour that each individual addresses to its partners and what it receives from them in return. Although the skew-symmetry index enables researchers to describe social groups, statistical inferential tests are required. The main aim of the present study is to propose an overall statistical technique for testing symmetry in experimental conditions, calculating the skew-symmetry statistic (Φ) at group level. Sampling distributions for the skew- symmetry statistic have been estimated by means of a Monte Carlo simulation in order to allow researchers to make statistical decisions. Furthermore, this study will allow researchers to choose the optimal experimental conditions for carrying out their research, as the power of the statistical test has been estimated. This statistical test could be used in experimental social psychology studies in which researchers may control the group size and the number of interactions within dyads.

Superstars need social benefits: an experiment on network formation

We investigate contributions to the provision of public goods on a network when efficient provision requires the formation of a star network. We provide a theoretical analysis and study behavior is a controlled laboratory experiment. In a 2x2 design, we examine the effects of group size and the presence of (social) benefits for incoming links. We find that social benefits are highly important. They facilitate convergence to equilibrium networks and enhance the stability and efficiency of the outcome. Moreover, in large groups social benefits encourage the formation of superstars: star networks in which the core contributes more than expected in the stage-game equilibrium. We show that this result is predicted by a repeated game equilibrium.

Workers cooperation within the firm: an analysis using small and medium size firms

We investigate the determinants of teamwork and workers cooperation within the firm. Up to now the literature has almost exclusively focused on workers incentives as the main determinants for workers cooperation. We take a broader look at the firm's organizational design and analyze the impact that different aspects of it might have on cooperation. In particular, we consider the way in which the degree of decentralization of decisions and the use of complementary HRM practices (what we call the .rm.s vertical organizational design) can affect workers'collaboration with each other. We test the model's predictions on a unique dataset on Spanish small and medium size firms containing a rich set of variables that allows us to use sensible proxies for workers cooperation. We find that the decentralization of labor decisions (and to a less extent that of task planning) has a positive impact on workers cooperation. Likewise, cooperation is positively correlated to many of the HRM practices that seem to favor workers'interaction the most. We also confirm the previous finding that collaborative efforts respond positively to pay incentives, and particularly, to group or company incentives.

Extreme-value distributions and renormalization group

In the classical theorems of extreme value theory the limits of suitably rescaled maxima of sequences of independent, identically distributed random variables are studied. The vast majority of the literature on the subject deals with affine normalization. We argue that more general normalizations are natural from a mathematical and physical point of view and work them out. The problem is approached using the language of renormalization-group transformations in the space of probability densities. The limit distributions are fixed points of the transformation and the study of its differential around them allows a local analysis of the domains of attraction and the computation of finite-size corrections.

Family Size Evolution in Drosophila Chemosensory Gene Families: A Comparative Analysis with a Critical Appraisal of Methods

Gene turnover rates and the evolution of gene family sizes are important aspects of genome evolution. Here, we use curated sequence data of the major chemosensory gene families from Drosophila-the gustatory receptor, odorant receptor, ionotropic receptor, and odorant-binding protein families-to conduct a comparative analysis among families, exploring different methods to estimate gene birth and death rates, including an ad hoc simulation study. Remarkably, we found that the state-of-the-art methods may produce very different rate estimates, which may lead to disparate conclusions regarding the evolution of chemosensory gene family sizes in Drosophila. Among biological factors, we found that a peculiarity of D. sechellia's gene turnover rates was a major source of bias in global estimates, whereas gene conversion had negligible effects for the families analyzed herein. Turnover rates vary considerably among families, subfamilies, and ortholog groups although all analyzed families were quite dynamic in terms of gene turnover. Computer simulations showed that the methods that use ortholog group information appear to be the most accurate for the Drosophila chemosensory families. Most importantly, these results reveal the potential of rate heterogeneity among lineages to severely bias some turnover rate estimation methods and the need of further evaluating the performance of these methods in a more diverse sampling of gene families and phylogenetic contexts. Using branch-specific codon substitution models, we find further evidence of positive selection in recently duplicated genes, which attests to a nonneutral aspect of the gene birth-and-death process.