Leaving the labour market: event-history analysis of the female workers' transition to housework in Denmark, Germany, Great Britain and Spain

This paper is aimed at exploring the determinants of female activity from a dynamic perspective. An event-history analysis of the transition form employment to housework has been made resorting to data from the European Household Panel Survey. Four countries representing different welfare regimes and, more specifically, different family policies, have been selected for the analysis: Britain, Denmark, Germany and Spain. The results confirm the importance of individual-level factors, which is consistent with an economic approach to female labour supply. Nonetheless, there are significant cross-national differences in how these factors act over the risk of abandoning the labour market. First, the number of trnasitions is much lower among Danish working women than among British, German or Spanish ones, revealing the relative importance of universal provision of childcare services, vis-à-vis other elements of the family policy, as time or money.

Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies

The origins of electoral systems have received scant attention in the literature. Looking at the history of electoral rules in the advanced world in the last century, this paper shows that the existing wide variation in electoral rules across nations can be traced to the strategic decisions that the current ruling parties, anticipating the coordinating consequences of different electoral regimes, make to maximize their representation according to the following conditions. On the one hand, as long as the electoral arena does not change substantially and the current electoral regime serves the ruling parties well, the latter have no incentives to modify the electoral regime. On the other hand, as soon as the electoral arena changes (due to the entry of new voters or a change in their preferences), the ruling parties will entertain changing the electoral system, depending on two main conditions: the emergence of new parties and the coordinating capacities of the old ruling parties. Accordingly, if the new parties are strong, the old parties shift from plurality/majority rules to proportional representation (PR) only if the latter are locked into a 'non-Duvergerian' equilibrium; i.e. if no old party enjoys a dominant position (the case of most small European states)--conversely, they do not if a Duvergerian equilibrium exists (the case of Great Britain). Similarly, whenever the new entrants are weak, a non-PR system is maintained, regardless of the structure of the old party system (the case of the USA). The paper discusses as well the role of trade and ethnic and religious heterogeneity in the adoption of PR rules.