Testing Cayley graph densities

We present a computer-assisted analysis of combinatorial properties of the Cayley graphs of certain finitely generated groups: Given a group with a finite set of generators, we study the density of the corresponding Cayley graph, that is, the least upper bound for the average vertex degree (= number of adjacent edges) of any finite subgraph. It is known that an m-generated group is amenable if and only if the density of the corresponding Cayley graph equals to 2m. We test amenable and non-amenable groups, and also groups for which amenability is unknown. In the latter class we focus on Richard Thompson’s group F.

Dynamic matching and bargaining: the role of deadlines

We consider a dynamic model where traders in each period are matched randomly into pairs who then bargain about the division of a fixed surplus. When agreement is reached the traders leave the market. Traders who do not come to an agreement return next period in which they will be matched again, as long as their deadline has not expired yet. New traders enter exogenously in each period. We assume that traders within a pair know each other's deadline. We define and characterize the stationary equilibrium configurations. Traders with longer deadlines fare better than traders with short deadlines. It is shown that the heterogeneity of deadlines may cause delay. It is then shown that a centralized mechanism that controls the matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized mechanism is not as good for traders with long deadlines, it is shown that in a model where all traders can choose which mechanism to

Median stable matching for college admission

We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined stable matchings for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings.

Corrigendum to "On randomized matching mechanisms" [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381]

Ma (1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented - and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 - is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as ''symmetric.''

Paths to stability for matching markets with couples

We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to stability for decentralized singles markets. Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not weakly responsive, for some initial matchings there may not exist any path obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching.

Procedurally fair and stable matching

We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair and stable mechanisms: employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999) and the random order mechanism (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990, Ma, 1996). For both mechanisms we give various examples of probability distributions on the set of stable matchings and discuss properties that differentiate employment by lotto and the random order mechanism. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism, that combines aspects of procedural and "endstate'' fairness. Aldershof et al. (1999) and Ma (1996) that exist on the probability distribution induced by both mechanisms. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism.

On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model

For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. In order to prove this result, we also show that under this domain of preferences (which contains the domain of responsive preferences of the college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking Lemma holds as well. We exhibit an example showing that none of these three results remain true if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q-separable.

On bilateral agreements: just a matter of matching

This paper aims at assessing the importance of the initial technological endowments when firms decide to establish a technological agreement. We propose a Bertrand duopoly model where firms evaluate the advantages they can get from the agreement according to its length. Allowing them to exploit a learning process, we depict a strict connection between the starting point and the final result. Moreover, as far as learning is evaluated as an iterative process, the set of initial conditions that lead to successful ventures switches from a continuum of values to a Cantor set.

The principal-agent matching market

We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyze an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterize the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of principal-agent economies where the results fit into.

Theoretical aspects of graph models for MANETs

We survey the main theoretical aspects of models for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs). We present theoretical characterizations of mobile network structural properties, different dynamic graph models of MANETs, and finally we give detailed summaries of a few selected articles. In particular, we focus on articles dealing with connectivity of mobile networks, and on articles which show that mobility can be used to propagate information between nodes of the network while at the same time maintaining small transmission distances, and thus saving energy.

Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests

We study comparative statics of manipulations by women in the men-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in the two-sided one-to-one marriage market. We prove that if a group of women employs truncation strategies or weakly successfully manipulates, then all other women weakly benefit and all men are weakly harmed. We show that our results do not appropriately generalize to the many-to-one college admissions model.

Bioinformática: identificar genes en una interfaz gráfica vía web para la comparación de genomas

Este trabajo desarrolla el proceso de diseño e implementación de una interfaz web que permite la exploración en detalle de las relaciones entre genomas completos. La interfaz permite la comparación simultánea de nueve genomas, representando en cada gráfica las relaciones entre cada par de genomas junto los genes identificados de cada uno de ellos. Es capaz de trabajar con genomas del dominio Eukaryota y se adapta a la capacidad de cómputo de la máquina cliente. La información representada son MUMs (Maximal Unique Matching, secuencia máxima y única encontrada en ambos genomas) y SuperMUMs (agrupación de MUMs mediante Approximate String Matching). Los datos son previamente calculados y accesibles desde un servidor web.

A linear optimization technique for graph pebbling

Graph pebbling is a network model for studying whether or not a given supply of discrete pebbles can satisfy a given demand via pebbling moves. A pebbling move across an edge of a graph takes two pebbles from one endpoint and places one pebble at the other endpoint; the other pebble is lost in transit as a toll. It has been shown that deciding whether a supply can meet a demand on a graph is NP-complete. The pebbling number of a graph is the smallest t such that every supply of t pebbles can satisfy every demand of one pebble. Deciding if the pebbling number is at most k is NP 2 -complete. In this paper we develop a tool, called theWeight Function Lemma, for computing upper bounds and sometimes exact values for pebbling numbers with the assistance of linear optimization. With this tool we are able to calculate the pebbling numbers of much larger graphs than in previous algorithms, and much more quickly as well. We also obtain results for many families of graphs, in many cases by hand, with much simpler and remarkably shorter proofs than given in previously existing arguments (certificates typically of size at most the number of vertices times the maximum degree), especially for highly symmetric graphs. Here we apply theWeight Function Lemma to several specific graphs, including the Petersen, Lemke, 4th weak Bruhat, Lemke squared, and two random graphs, as well as to a number of infinite families of graphs, such as trees, cycles, graph powers of cycles, cubes, and some generalized Petersen and Coxeter graphs. This partly answers a question of Pachter, et al., by computing the pebbling exponent of cycles to within an asymptotically small range. It is conceivable that this method yields an approximation algorithm for graph pebbling.

Hierarchical conditional random fields for parts based models matching

A parts based model is a parametrization of an object class using a collection of landmarks following the object structure. The matching of parts based models is one of the problems where pairwise Conditional Random Fields have been successfully applied. The main reason of their effectiveness is tractable inference and learning due to the simplicity of involved graphs, usually trees. However, these models do not consider possible patterns of statistics among sets of landmarks, and thus they sufffer from using too myopic information. To overcome this limitation, we propoese a novel structure based on a hierarchical Conditional Random Fields, which we explain in the first part of this memory. We build a hierarchy of combinations of landmarks, where matching is performed taking into account the whole hierarchy. To preserve tractable inference we effectively sample the label set. We test our method on facial feature selection and human pose estimation on two challenging datasets: Buffy and MultiPIE. In the second part of this memory, we present a novel approach to multiple kernel combination that relies on stacked classification. This method can be used to evaluate the landmarks of the parts-based model approach. Our method is based on combining responses of a set of independent classifiers for each individual kernel. Unlike earlier approaches that linearly combine kernel responses, our approach uses them as inputs to another set of classifiers. We will show that we outperform state-of-the-art methods on most of the standard benchmark datasets.

Matching entre servidor de recursos y consumidores

L'objectiu del TFC consisteix en desenvolupar una aplicació que permeti, per una banda, la definició d'una oferta de recursos; per altra banda el uns usuaris-consumidors puguéssin apuntar-se a dites ofertes i, finalment,