Effect of high pressure processing on the microbiology of skin-vacuum packaged sliced meat products: cooked pork ham, dry cured pork ham and marinated beef loin

High hydrostatic pressure is being increasingly investigated in food processing. It causes microbial inactivation and therefore extends the shelf life and enhances the safety of food products. Yeasts, molds, and vegetative cells of bacteria can be inactivated by pressures in the range of 200 to 700 MPa. Microorganisms are more or less sensitive to pressure depending on several factors such as type, strain and the phase or state of the cells. In general, Gram-positive organisms are usually more resistant than Gram-negative. High pressure processing modifies the permeability of the cell membrane, the ion exchange and causes changes in morphology and biochemical reactions, protein denaturations and inhibition of genetic mechanisms. High pressure has been used successfully to extend the shelf life of high-acid foods such as refrigerated fruit juices, jellies and jams. There is now an increasing interest in the use of this technology to extend the shelf life of low-acid foods such as different types of meat products.

Selection of internal control genes for real-time quantitative PCR in ovary and uterus of sows across pregnancy

Reproductive traits play a key role in pig production in order to reduce costs and increase economic returns. Among others, gene expression analyses represent a useful approach to study genetic mechanisms underlying reproductive traits in pigs. The application of reverse-transcription quantitative PCR requires the selection of appropriate reference genes, whose expression levels should not be affected by the experimental conditions, especially when comparing gene expression across different physiological stages.

Sex Reversal in Zebrafish fancl Mutants is Caused by Tp53-Mediated Germ Cell Apoptosis

The molecular genetic mechanisms of sex determination are not known for most vertebrates, including zebrafish. We identified a mutation in the zebrafish fancl gene that causes homozygous mutants to develop as fertile males due to female-to-male sex reversal. Fancl is a member of the Fanconi Anemia/BRCA DNA repair pathway. Experiments showed that zebrafish fancl was expressed in developing germ cells in bipotential gonads at the critical time of sexual fate determination. Caspase-3 immunoassays revealed increased germ cell apoptosis in fancl mutants that compromised oocyte survival. In the absence of oocytes surviving through meiosis, somatic cells of mutant gonads did not maintain expression of the ovary gene cyp19a1a and did not down-regulate expression of the early testis gene amh; consequently, gonads masculinized and became testes. Remarkably, results showed that the introduction of a tp53 (p53) mutation into fancl mutants rescued the sex-reversal phenotype by reducing germ cell apoptosis and, thus, allowed fancl mutants to become fertile females. Our results show that Fancl function is not essential for spermatogonia and oogonia to become sperm or mature oocytes, but instead suggest that Fancl function is involved in the survival of developing oocytes through meiosis. This work reveals that Tp53-mediated germ cell apoptosis induces sex reversal after the mutation of a DNA-repair pathway gene by compromising the survival of oocytes and suggests the existence of an oocyte-derived signal that biases gonad fate towards the female developmental pathway and thereby controls zebrafish sex determination.

Governance mechanisms in Spanish financial intermediaries

This paper examines the governance of Spanish Banks around two main issues. First, does a poor economic performance activate those governance interventions that favor the removal of executive directors and the merger of non-performing banks? And second, does the relationship between governance intervention and economic performance vary with the ownership form of the bank? Our results show that a bad performance does activate governance mechanisms in banks, although for the case of Savings Banks intervention is confined to a merger or acquisition. Nevertheless, the distinct ownership structure of Savings Banks does not fully protect non-performing banks from disappearing. Product-market competition compensates for those weak internal governance mechanisms that result from an ownership form which gives voice to several stakeholder groups.

Corrigendum to "On randomized matching mechanisms" [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381]

Ma (1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented - and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 - is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as ''symmetric.''

On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model

For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. In order to prove this result, we also show that under this domain of preferences (which contains the domain of responsive preferences of the college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking Lemma holds as well. We exhibit an example showing that none of these three results remain true if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q-separable.

Can genetic algorithms explain experimental anomalies? An application to common property resources

It is common to find in experimental data persistent oscillations in the aggregate outcomes and high levels of heterogeneity in individual behavior. Furthermore, it is not unusual to find significant deviations from aggregate Nash equilibrium predictions. In this paper, we employ an evolutionary model with boundedly rational agents to explain these findings. We use data from common property resource experiments (Casari and Plott, 2003). Instead of positing individual-specific utility functions, we model decision makers as selfish and identical. Agent interaction is simulated using an individual learning genetic algorithm, where agents have constraints in their working memory, a limited ability to maximize, and experiment with new strategies. We show that the model replicates most of the patterns that can be found in common property resource experiments.

How universal is behavior? A four country comparison of spite, cooperation and errors in voluntary contribution mechanisms

This paper studies behavior in experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries. Our 'contribution function' design allows us to obtain a view of subjects' behavior from two complementary points of view. If yields information about situations where, in purely pecuniary terms, it is a dominant strategy to contribute all the endowment and about situations where it is a dominant strategy to contribute nothing. Our results show, first, that differences in behavior across countries are minor. We find that when people play "the same game" they behave similarly. Second, for all four countries our data are inconsistent with the explanation that subjects contribute only out of confusion. A common cooperative motivation is needed to explain the date.

Cooperative vs. non-cooperative mechanisms in the EU decision making process

According to the account of the European Union (EU) decision making proposed in this paper, this is a bargaining process during which actors shift their policy positions with a view to reaching agreements on controversial issues.