Consistency and the core of multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball es demostra que en el domini dels jocs d’assignació equilibrats multisectorials (Quint, 1991), el core és l’única solució no buida que satisfà derived consistency i projection consistency. També es caracteritza el core en tota la classe dels jocs d’assignació multisectorials amb els axiomes de singleness best, individual antimonotonicity i derived consistency. Com a casos particulars, s’obtenen dues noves axiomàtiques del core per als jocs d’assignació bilaterals (Shapley and Shubik, 1972).

Consistency and the core of multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball es demostra que en el domini dels jocs d’assignació equilibrats multisectorials (Quint, 1991), el core és l’única solució no buida que satisfà derived consistency i projection consistency. També es caracteritza el core en tota la classe dels jocs d’assignació multisectorials amb els axiomes de singleness best, individual antimonotonicity i derived consistency. Com a casos particulars, s’obtenen dues noves axiomàtiques del core per als jocs d’assignació bilaterals (Shapley and Shubik, 1972).

A method for decision making with the OWA operator

A new method for decision making that uses the ordered weighted averaging (OWA) operator in the aggregation of the information is presented. It is used a concept that it is known in the literature as the index of maximum and minimum level (IMAM). This index is based on distance measures and other techniques that are useful for decision making. By using the OWA operator in the IMAM, we form a new aggregation operator that we call the ordered weighted averaging index of maximum and minimum level (OWAIMAM) operator. The main advantage is that it provides a parameterized family of aggregation operators between the minimum and the maximum and a wide range of special cases. Then, the decision maker may take decisions according to his degree of optimism and considering ideals in the decision process. A further extension of this approach is presented by using hybrid averages and Choquet integrals. We also develop an application of the new approach in a multi-person decision-making problem regarding the selection of strategies.

A method for decision making with the OWA operator

A new method for decision making that uses the ordered weighted averaging (OWA) operator in the aggregation of the information is presented. It is used a concept that it is known in the literature as the index of maximum and minimum level (IMAM). This index is based on distance measures and other techniques that are useful for decision making. By using the OWA operator in the IMAM, we form a new aggregation operator that we call the ordered weighted averaging index of maximum and minimum level (OWAIMAM) operator. The main advantage is that it provides a parameterized family of aggregation operators between the minimum and the maximum and a wide range of special cases. Then, the decision maker may take decisions according to his degree of optimism and considering ideals in the decision process. A further extension of this approach is presented by using hybrid averages and Choquet integrals. We also develop an application of the new approach in a multi-person decision-making problem regarding the selection of strategies.

A characterization of cooperative TU-games with large monotonic core

[cat] El concepte de joc cooperatiu amb large core és introduït per Sharkey (1982) i el de Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme és definit per Sprumont (1990). Inspirat en aquests conceptes, Moulin (1990) introdueix la noció de large monotonic core donant una caracterització per a jocs de tres jugadors. En aquest document provem que tots els jocs amb large monotonic core són convexes. A més, donem un criteri efectiu per determinar si un joc té large monotonic core o no, i daquí obtenim una caracterització pel cas de quatre jugadors.

A characterization of cooperative TU-games with large monotonic core

[cat] El concepte de joc cooperatiu amb large core és introduït per Sharkey (1982) i el de Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme és definit per Sprumont (1990). Inspirat en aquests conceptes, Moulin (1990) introdueix la noció de large monotonic core donant una caracterització per a jocs de tres jugadors. En aquest document provem que tots els jocs amb large monotonic core són convexes. A més, donem un criteri efectiu per determinar si un joc té large monotonic core o no, i daquí obtenim una caracterització pel cas de quatre jugadors.

International Institutions as Solutions to Underlying Games of Cooperation

This Working Paper was presented at the international workshop "Game Theory in International Relations at 50", organized and coordinated by Professor Jacint Jordana and Dr. Yannis Karagiannis at the Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals on May 22, 2009. The day-long Workshop was inspired by the desire to honour the ground-breaking work of Professor Thomas Schelling in 1959-1960, and to understand where the discipline International Relations lies today vis-à-vis game theory.

Observational methodology in football: Development of an instrument to study the offensiva game in football.

The following paper introduces a new approach to the analysis of offensive game in football. Therefore, the main aim of this study was to create an instrument for collecting information for the analysis of offensive action and interactions game. The observation instrument that was used to accomplish the main objective of this work consists of a combination of format fields (FC) and systems of categories (SC). This methodology is a particular strategy of the scientific method that has as an objective to analyse the perceptible behaviour that occurs in habitual contexts, allowing them to be formally recorded and quantified and using an ad hoc instrument in order to obtain a behaviour systematic registration that, since they have been transformed in quantitative data with the necessary reliability and validity determined level, will allow analysis of the relations between these behaviours. The codifications undertaken to date in various games of football have shown that it serves the purposes for which it was developed, allowing more research into the offensive game methods in football.

Assessing the structural change of strategic mobility: determinants under hypercompetitive environments

The primary purpose of this exploratory empirical study is to examine the structural stability of a limited number of alternative explanatory factors of strategic change. On the basis of theoretical arguments and prior empirical evidence from two traditional perspectives, we propose an original empirical framework to analyse whether these potential explanatory factors have remained stable over time in a highly turbulent environment. This original question is explored in a particular setting: the population of Spanish private banks. The firms of this industry have experienced a high level of strategic mobility as a consequence of fundamental changes undergone in their environmental conditions over the last two decades (mainly changes related to the new banking and financial regulation process). Our results consistently support that the effect of most explanatory factors of strategic mobility considered did not remain stable over the whole period of analysis. From this point of view, the study sheds new light on major debates and dilemmas in the field of strategy regarding why firms change their competitive patterns over time and, hence, to what extent the "contextdependency" of alternative views of strategic change as their relative validation can vary over time for a given population. Methodologically, this research makes two major contributions to the study of potential determinants of strategic change. First, the definition and measurement of strategic change employing a new grouping method, the Model-based Cluster Method or MCLUST. Second, in order to asses the possible effect of determinants of strategic mobility we have controlled the non-observable heterogeneity using logistic regression models for panel data.

A maximal domain of preferences for tops-only rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. Ching and Serizawa (1998) extended this result by showing that the set of single-plateaued preferences is the largest domain, for all possible values of M, admitting a rule (the extended uniform rule) satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency and symmetry. We identify, for each M and n, a maximal domain of preferences under which the extended uniform rule also satisfies the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, continuity, and "tops-onlyness". These domains (called weakly single-plateaued) are strictly larger than the set of single-plateaued preferences. However, their intersection, when M varies from zero to infinity, coincides with the set of single-plateaued preferences.

On Strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness

We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin (1980)) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy-proof on the smaller domain. Our result identifies the specific nature of these discontinuities which allow to design non-onto social choice functions to deal with feasibility constraints.

Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?

A social choice function may or may not satisfy a desirable property depending on its domain of definition. For the same reason, different conditions may be equivalent for functions defined on some domains, while different in other cases. Understanding the role of domains is therefore a crucial issue in mechanism design. We illustrate this point by analyzing the role of different conditions that are always related, but not always equivalent to strategy-proofness. We define two very natural conditions that are necessary for strategy-proofness: monotonicity and reshuffling invariance. We remark that they are not always sufficient. Then, we identify a domain condition, called intertwinedness, that ensures the equivalence between our two conditions and that of strategy-proofness. We prove that some important domains are intertwined: those of single-peaked preferences, both with public and private goods, and also those arising in simple models of house allocation. We prove that other necessary conditions for strategy-proofness also become equivalent to ours when applied to functions defined on intertwined domains, even if they are not equivalent in general. We also study the relationship between our domain restrictions and others that appear in the literature, proving that we are indeed introducing a novel proposal.

Approximate knowledge of rationality and correlated equilibria

We extend Aumann's theorem [Aumann 1987], deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality, by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. Wereplace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker one, joint p-belief of rationality, where agents believe the other agents are rational with probability p or more. We show that behavior in this case constitutes a kind of correlated equilibrium satisfying certain p-belief constraints, and that it varies continuously in the parameters p and, for p sufficiently close to one,with high probability is supported on strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Finally, we extend the analysis to characterizing rational expectations of interimtypes, to games of incomplete information, as well as to the case of non-common priors.

The evolution of conventions under incomplete information

We formulate an evolutionary learning process in the spirit ofYoung (1993a) for games of incomplete information. The process involves trembles. For many games, if the amount of trembling is small, play will be in accordance with the games' (semi-strict) Bayesian equilibria most of the time. This supports the notion of Bayesian equilibrium. Further, often play will most of the time be in accordance with exactly one Bayesian equilibrium. This gives a selection among the Bayesian equilibria. For two specific games of economic interest wecharacterize this selection. The first is an extension to incomplete information of the prototype strategic conflict known as Chicken. The second is an incomplete information bilateral monopoly, which is also an extension to incompleteinformation of Nash's demand game, or a simple version ofthe so-called sealed bid double auction. For both gamesselection by evolutionary learning is in favor of Bayesianequilibria where some types of players fail to coordinate, such that the outcome is inefficient.

Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertaintyabout the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have beenused in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problemsof equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment each subject receives anoisy signal about the true payoffs. This game has a unique strategyprofile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominatedstrategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcomecoincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome ofthe underlying coordination game. The behavior of the subjects convergesto the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that subjects do not apply through"a priori" reasoning the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.Instead, they adapt to the responses of other players. Thus, the lengthof the learning phase clearly varies for the different signals. We alsotest behavior in a game without uncertainty as a benchmark case. The gamewith uncertainty is inspired by the "global" games of Carlsson and VanDamme (1993).