A characterization of cooperative TU-games with large monotonic core

[cat] El concepte de joc cooperatiu amb large core és introduït per Sharkey (1982) i el de Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme és definit per Sprumont (1990). Inspirat en aquests conceptes, Moulin (1990) introdueix la noció de large monotonic core donant una caracterització per a jocs de tres jugadors. En aquest document provem que tots els jocs amb large monotonic core són convexes. A més, donem un criteri efectiu per determinar si un joc té large monotonic core o no, i daquí obtenim una caracterització pel cas de quatre jugadors.

A characterization of cooperative TU-games with large monotonic core

[cat] El concepte de joc cooperatiu amb large core és introduït per Sharkey (1982) i el de Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme és definit per Sprumont (1990). Inspirat en aquests conceptes, Moulin (1990) introdueix la noció de large monotonic core donant una caracterització per a jocs de tres jugadors. En aquest document provem que tots els jocs amb large monotonic core són convexes. A més, donem un criteri efectiu per determinar si un joc té large monotonic core o no, i daquí obtenim una caracterització pel cas de quatre jugadors.

International Institutions as Solutions to Underlying Games of Cooperation

This Working Paper was presented at the international workshop "Game Theory in International Relations at 50", organized and coordinated by Professor Jacint Jordana and Dr. Yannis Karagiannis at the Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals on May 22, 2009. The day-long Workshop was inspired by the desire to honour the ground-breaking work of Professor Thomas Schelling in 1959-1960, and to understand where the discipline International Relations lies today vis-à-vis game theory.

When "hope springs eternal": The role of chance in risk taking

In most naturally occurring situations, success depends on both skill and chance. We contrastexperimental market entry decisions where payoffs depend on skill as opposed tocombinations of skill and chance. Our data show differential attitudes toward chance by thosewhose self-assessed skills are low and high. Making chance more important induces greateroptimism for the former who start taking more risk, while the latter maintain a belief that highlevels of skill are sufficient to overcome the vagaries of chance. Finally, although weobserved excess entry (i.e., too many participants entered markets), this could not beattributed to overconfidence.

Consistency and the core of multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball es demostra que en el domini dels jocs d’assignació equilibrats multisectorials (Quint, 1991), el core és l’única solució no buida que satisfà derived consistency i projection consistency. També es caracteritza el core en tota la classe dels jocs d’assignació multisectorials amb els axiomes de singleness best, individual antimonotonicity i derived consistency. Com a casos particulars, s’obtenen dues noves axiomàtiques del core per als jocs d’assignació bilaterals (Shapley and Shubik, 1972).

Consistency and the core of multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball es demostra que en el domini dels jocs d’assignació equilibrats multisectorials (Quint, 1991), el core és l’única solució no buida que satisfà derived consistency i projection consistency. També es caracteritza el core en tota la classe dels jocs d’assignació multisectorials amb els axiomes de singleness best, individual antimonotonicity i derived consistency. Com a casos particulars, s’obtenen dues noves axiomàtiques del core per als jocs d’assignació bilaterals (Shapley and Shubik, 1972).

A method for decision making with the OWA operator

A new method for decision making that uses the ordered weighted averaging (OWA) operator in the aggregation of the information is presented. It is used a concept that it is known in the literature as the index of maximum and minimum level (IMAM). This index is based on distance measures and other techniques that are useful for decision making. By using the OWA operator in the IMAM, we form a new aggregation operator that we call the ordered weighted averaging index of maximum and minimum level (OWAIMAM) operator. The main advantage is that it provides a parameterized family of aggregation operators between the minimum and the maximum and a wide range of special cases. Then, the decision maker may take decisions according to his degree of optimism and considering ideals in the decision process. A further extension of this approach is presented by using hybrid averages and Choquet integrals. We also develop an application of the new approach in a multi-person decision-making problem regarding the selection of strategies.

A method for decision making with the OWA operator

A new method for decision making that uses the ordered weighted averaging (OWA) operator in the aggregation of the information is presented. It is used a concept that it is known in the literature as the index of maximum and minimum level (IMAM). This index is based on distance measures and other techniques that are useful for decision making. By using the OWA operator in the IMAM, we form a new aggregation operator that we call the ordered weighted averaging index of maximum and minimum level (OWAIMAM) operator. The main advantage is that it provides a parameterized family of aggregation operators between the minimum and the maximum and a wide range of special cases. Then, the decision maker may take decisions according to his degree of optimism and considering ideals in the decision process. A further extension of this approach is presented by using hybrid averages and Choquet integrals. We also develop an application of the new approach in a multi-person decision-making problem regarding the selection of strategies.

Approximate knowledge of rationality and correlated equilibria

We extend Aumann's theorem [Aumann 1987], deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality, by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. Wereplace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker one, joint p-belief of rationality, where agents believe the other agents are rational with probability p or more. We show that behavior in this case constitutes a kind of correlated equilibrium satisfying certain p-belief constraints, and that it varies continuously in the parameters p and, for p sufficiently close to one,with high probability is supported on strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Finally, we extend the analysis to characterizing rational expectations of interimtypes, to games of incomplete information, as well as to the case of non-common priors.

The evolution of conventions under incomplete information

We formulate an evolutionary learning process in the spirit ofYoung (1993a) for games of incomplete information. The process involves trembles. For many games, if the amount of trembling is small, play will be in accordance with the games' (semi-strict) Bayesian equilibria most of the time. This supports the notion of Bayesian equilibrium. Further, often play will most of the time be in accordance with exactly one Bayesian equilibrium. This gives a selection among the Bayesian equilibria. For two specific games of economic interest wecharacterize this selection. The first is an extension to incomplete information of the prototype strategic conflict known as Chicken. The second is an incomplete information bilateral monopoly, which is also an extension to incompleteinformation of Nash's demand game, or a simple version ofthe so-called sealed bid double auction. For both gamesselection by evolutionary learning is in favor of Bayesianequilibria where some types of players fail to coordinate, such that the outcome is inefficient.

Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertaintyabout the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have beenused in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problemsof equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment each subject receives anoisy signal about the true payoffs. This game has a unique strategyprofile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominatedstrategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcomecoincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome ofthe underlying coordination game. The behavior of the subjects convergesto the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that subjects do not apply through"a priori" reasoning the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.Instead, they adapt to the responses of other players. Thus, the lengthof the learning phase clearly varies for the different signals. We alsotest behavior in a game without uncertainty as a benchmark case. The gamewith uncertainty is inspired by the "global" games of Carlsson and VanDamme (1993).

Observational methodology in football: Development of an instrument to study the offensiva game in football.

The following paper introduces a new approach to the analysis of offensive game in football. Therefore, the main aim of this study was to create an instrument for collecting information for the analysis of offensive action and interactions game. The observation instrument that was used to accomplish the main objective of this work consists of a combination of format fields (FC) and systems of categories (SC). This methodology is a particular strategy of the scientific method that has as an objective to analyse the perceptible behaviour that occurs in habitual contexts, allowing them to be formally recorded and quantified and using an ad hoc instrument in order to obtain a behaviour systematic registration that, since they have been transformed in quantitative data with the necessary reliability and validity determined level, will allow analysis of the relations between these behaviours. The codifications undertaken to date in various games of football have shown that it serves the purposes for which it was developed, allowing more research into the offensive game methods in football.

Endogenous depth of reasoning

We introduce a model of strategic thinking in games of initial response. Unlike standard level-k models, in this framework the player's `depth of reasoning' is endogenously determined, andit can be disentangled from his beliefs over his opponent's cognitive bound. In our approach,individuals act as if they follow a cost-benefit analysis. The depth of reasoning is a function ofthe player's cognitive abilities and his payoffs. The costs are exogenous and represent the gametheoretical sophistication of the player; the benefit instead is related to the game payoffs. Behavioris in turn determined by the individual's depth of reasoning and his beliefs about the reasoningprocess of the opponent. Thus, in our framework, payoffs not only affect individual choices inthe traditional sense, but they also shape the cognitive process itself. Our model delivers testableimplications on players' chosen actions as incentives and opponents change. We then test themodel's predictions with an experiment. We administer different treatments that vary beliefs overpayoffs and opponents, as well as beliefs over opponents' beliefs. The results of this experiment,which are not accounted for by current models of reasoning in games, strongly support our theory.Our approach therefore serves as a novel, unifying framework of strategic thinking that allows forpredictions across games.

Phylogeography of competing sexual and parthenogenetic forms of a freshwater flatworm: patterns and explanations

Background: Models of the maintenance of sex predict that one reproductive strategy, sexual or parthenogenetic, should outcompete the other. Distribution patterns may reflect the outcome of this competition as well as the effect of chance and historical events. We review the distribution data of sexual and parthenogenetic biotypes of the planarian Schmidtea polychroa. Results: S. polychroa lives in allopatry or sympatry across Europe except for Central and North-Western Europe, where sexual individuals have never been reported. A phylogenetic relationship between 36 populations based on a 385 bp fragment of the mitochondrial cytochrome oxidase I gene revealed that haplotypes were often similar over large geographic distances. In North Italian lakes, however, diversity was extreme, with sequence differences of up to 5% within the same lake in both sexuals and parthenogens. Mixed populations showed "endemic" parthenogenetic lineages that presumably originated from coexisting sexuals, and distantly related ones that probably result from colonization by parthenogens independent from sexuals. Conclusions: Parthenogens originated repeatedly from sexuals, mainly in Italy, but the same may apply to other Mediterranean regions (Spain, Greece). The degree of divergence between populations suggests that S. polychroa survived the ice ages in separate ice-free areas in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe and re-colonised Europe after the retreat of the major glaciers. Combining these results with those based on nuclear markers, the data suggest that repeated hybridisation between sexuals and parthenogenetic lineages in mixed populations maintains high levels of genetic diversity in parthenogens. This can explain why parthenogens persist in populations that were originally sexual. Exclusive parthenogenesis in central and western populations suggests better colonisation capacity, possibly because of inbreeding costs as well

Una Aproximació a la construcció significativa del coneixement matemàtic a l'ESO

This study displays and analyzes the contents of the Mathematics subject in ESO’s second cycle from a constructivist perspective. This analysis has been carried out by contrasting two groups of participants (control group and experimental group). These groups were formed by a sample of 240 students between the ages of 14 and 16 from four different educational centres of the Osona area. Research – Action methodology has been employed, combining quantitative techniques (statistical study with the SPSS package) with qualitative analysis (transcriptions of interviews and discussion group). This study has been carried out after years of classroom observation, reflection and action. The theoretical framework employed is a cognitive one, based on Ausubel’s Significative Learning Theory. Quantitative analysis shows how the researcher’s design improves, on the one hand, the students’ academic motivation and, on the other hand, their comprehensive memory, enabling them to achieve a more significant learning of the subjects’ contents. Furthermore, our analysis shows that the proposed method is more comprehensive than those employed by teachers collaborating with control groups. The main aim of the qualitative analysis is that of identifying the elements which configure the programme and contribute to an improvement of the aspects mentioned above. The key elements here are: co-operation as the basis of group dynamics; the employment, in some cases, of easily handled materials; the type of interaction between teacher and students, where, through open discussion, students are lead by teaching staff towards the course objectives; induction, that is, deducing formulae by initially using examples which are close to the students’ knowledge and experience or taken from everyday life (what we could call “down-top” mathematics). We should add here that the qualitative analysis does not only corroborate the results obtained by quantitative techniques, but also displays an increase of motivation in teaching staff. Teachers did show a positive attitude and welcomed the use and development of these materials in the next academic year. Finally, we discuss possible directions for further research.