Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.

A generalized assignment game

The proposed game is a natural extension of the Shapley and Shubik Assignment Game to the case where each seller owns a set of different objets instead of only one indivisible object. We propose definitions of pairwise stability and group stability that are adapted to our framework. Existence of both pairwise and group stable outcomes is proved. We study the structure of the group stable set and we finally prove that the set of group stable payoffs forms a complete lattice with one optimal group stable payoff for each side of the market.

Does affirmative action reduce effort incentives? A contest game analysis

In this paper a contest game with heterogeneous players is analyzed in which heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination. Based on the normative perception of the heterogeneity there are two policy options to tackle this heterogeneity: either it is ignored and the contestants are treated equally, or affirmative action is implemented which compensates discriminated players. The consequences of these two policy options are analyzed for a simple two-person contest game and it is shown that the frequently criticized trade-off between affirmative action and total effort does not exist: Instead, affirmative action fosters effort incentives. A generalization to the n-person case and to a case with a partially informed contest designer yields the same result if the participation level is similar under each policy.

Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.

Model based fault diagnosis with application to an automotive engine

Report for the scientific sojourn at the University of Linköping between April to July 2007. Monitoring of the air intake system of an automotive engine is important to meet emission related legislative diagnosis requirements. During the research the problem of fault detection in the air intake system was stated as a constraint satisfaction problem over continuous domains with a big number of variables and constraints. This problem was solved using Interval-based Consistency Techniques. Interval-based consistency techniques are shown to be particularly efficient for checking the consistency of the Analytical Redundancy Relations (ARRs), dealing with uncertain measurements and parameters, and using experimental data. All experiments were performed on a four-cylinder turbo-charged spark-ignited SAAB engine located in the research laboratory at Vehicular System Group - University of Linköping.

The international trade as the sole engine of growth for an economy

Can international trade act as the sole engine of growth for an economy? If yes, what are the mechanisms through which trade operates in transmitting permanent growth? This paper answers these questions with two simple two-country models, in which only one country enjoys sustained growth in autarky. The models differ in the assumptions on technical change, which is either labour- or capital-augmenting. In both cases, the stagnant economy imports growth by trading. In the first model, growth is transmitted because of permanent increases in the trade volume. In the alternative framework, the stagnant economy imports sustained growth because its terms of trade permanently improve.

Desenvolupament d'un videojoc en 3D

La industria de los videojuegos crece exponencialmente y está ya superando a otras industrias punteras del ocio. En este proyecto, nos hemos planteado la realización de un videojuego con visualización en el espacio real 3D. Para la realización del videojuego se ha usado el siguiente software: Blender para diseñar los modelos 3D, C++ como lenguaje de programación para desarrollar el código y un conjunto de librerías básicas para desarrollar un videojuego llamadas Ogre3d (Motor Gráfico). La lógica del movimiento 3D y los choques entre las partículas del juego ha sido diseñada enteramente en este proyecto acorde con las necesidades del videojuego, y de forma compatible a los ficheros de Blender y a las librerías OGRE3D.

Dynamic stackelberg game with risk-averse players: optimal risk-sharing under asymmetric information

The objective of this paper is to clarify the interactive nature of the leader-follower relationship when both players are endogenously risk-averse. The analysis is placed in the context of a dynamic closed-loop Stackelberg game with private information. The case of a risk-neutral leader, very often discussed in the literature, is only a borderline possibility in the present study. Each player in the game is characterized by a risk-averse type which is unknown to his opponent. The goal of the leader is to implement an optimal incentive compatible risk-sharing contract. The proposed approach provides a qualitative analysis of adaptive risk behavior profiles for asymmetrically informed players in the context of dynamic strategic interactions modelled as incentive Stackelberg games.

The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents' utilities that are attainable at equilibrium.

On Cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria

We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Second, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.

Open Chess Game Analyzer

Aquest document detalla la feina que s'ha dut a terme per desenvolupar el projecte Open Chess Game Analyzer. La finalitat del mateix és desenvolupar un aplicatiu lliure que sigui capaç d'analitzar partides d'escacs a partir d'un fitxer PGN.

Camping Booking Engine (CBE)

Aplicació web desenvolupada en llenguatge Java per a lareserva online de parcel¿les de càmping.

Serious game de código abierto para la educación y entrenamiento en el procedimiento de artroscopia de rodilla

En esta memoria se describe el diseño a nivel conceptual de un serious game con el objetivo de ofrecer soluciones para la mejora del aprendizaje y adquisición de aptitudes y habilidades de los residentes-profesionales en las técnicas de artroscopia de rodilla, con el objetivo de comprobar la hipótesis de que los modelos de aprendizaje basados en videojuegos pueden servir de puente entre el cuerpo teórico de la especialidad y el ejercicio práctico, reduciendo los riesgos de las primeras intervenciones y acelerando la formación de los especialistas, en otras palabras, difuminando el umbral entre teoría y práctica y reduciendo los costos derivados del ejercicio práctico (económicos y temporales) y a su vez, paliando las necesidades formativas de estas.

Estudi i aplicació de llibreries de física per a motors de videojocs

En el món dels videojocs el realisme és un punt molt important a tenir en compte ja que dónamés sensació a l’usuari d’estar immers en el videojoc. Això passa en part per aconseguir realisme en la dinàmica dels objectes i fer que aquests segueixin les lleis de la física de Newton. Per això s’han desenvolupat diverses llibreries que s’anomenen “motors de física” (physics engines), que empren variables com la massa, la velocitat, la fricció i la resistència del vent. Els objectius d’aquest projecte seran l’estudi de diferents llibreries físiques existents, la seva comparació i com s’integren en els motors de jocs. A més a més , la generació de contingut amb comportament que respongui a les funcions definides a aquestes llibreries no és trivial i per aquest motiu també es desenvoluparà una aplicació per generar murs de forma semiautomàtica que respongui a impactes. Per assolir aquests objectius caldrà: d’ una banda, comparar els cossos rígids, unions i funcionament en general de diferents llibreries físiques: Newton Game Dynamics, NVIDIA PhysX Technology, Open Dynamics Engine, Bullet PhysicsLibrary, Tokamak Physics Engine i Havok i d’ altra banda, implementar una aplicació que donant-li una imatge en planta d’una paret o conjunt de parets en format vectorial i les mides d’un maó, generi murs que puguin reaccionar de forma adequada quan rebin l’impacte d’una massa determinada. L’aplicació s’implementarà en C++ i amb l’entorn de desenvolupament Microsoft Visual Studio 2005. La visualització serà amb OpenGL

Proposal for the analysis of a video game, a film, and their relationship : Silent Hill as a subject of the horror genre

Aquest treball de recerca fa un estudi comparatiu del videojoc de terror amb el seu homòleg cinematogràfic. L’objectiu és arribar a saber si els dos mitjans de comunicació usen les mateixes tècniques per transmetre les seves històries i per crear suspens. Aquesta investigació és només una part d'un estudi més ampli amb el que es pretén tenir un coneixement més aprofundit de les emocions de la gent i les reaccions que els provoca un videojoc de terror en comparació amb la visualització de l'adaptació cinematogràfica del corresponent videojoc.