Circulation of a Meaban-like virus in yellow-legged gulls and seabird ticks in the western Mediterranean Basin

In recent years, a number of zoonotic flaviviruses have emerged worldwide, and wild birds serve as their major reservoirs. Epidemiological surveys of bird populations at various geographical scales can clarify key aspects of the eco-epidemiology of these viruses. In this study, we aimed at exploring the presence of flaviviruses in the western Mediterranean by sampling breeding populations of the yellow-legged gull (Larus michahellis), a widely distributed, anthropophilic, and abundant seabird species. For 3 years, we sampled eggs from 19 breeding colonies in Spain, France, Algeria, and Tunisia. First, ELISAs were used to determine if the eggs contained antibodies against flaviviruses. Second, neutralization assays were used to identify the specific flaviviruses present. Finally, for colonies in which ELISA-positive eggs had been found, chick serum samples and potential vectors, culicid mosquitoes and soft ticks (Ornithodoros maritimus), were collected and analyzed using serology and PCR, respectively. The prevalence of flavivirus-specific antibodies in eggs was highly spatially heterogeneous. In northeastern Spain, on the Medes Islands and in the nearby village of L'Escala, 56% of eggs had antibodies against the flavivirus envelope protein, but were negative for neutralizing antibodies against three common flaviviruses: West Nile, Usutu, and tick-borne encephalitis viruses. Furthermore, little evidence of past flavivirus exposure was obtained for the other colonies. A subset of the Ornithodoros ticks from Medes screened for flaviviral RNA tested positive for a virus whose NS5 gene was 95% similar to that of Meaban virus, a flavivirus previously isolated from ticks of Larus argentatus in western France. All ELISA-positive samples subsequently tested positive for Meaban virus neutralizing antibodies. This study shows that gulls in the western Mediterranean Basin are exposed to a tick-borne Meaban-like virus, which underscores the need of exploring the spatial and temporal distribution of this flavivirus as well as its potential pathogenicity for animals and humans.

Estudi del contingut de 210Pb en plomes d'Apus apus

A l’atmosfera hi trobem radionúclids de la sèrie del 238U com el 222Rn, 210Pb i 210Po. L’objectiu principal d’aquest estudi és determinar el contingut i distribució de 210Pb en plomes d’aus migratòries i estudiar el seu potencial ús com a traçador de corrents migratòries, gràcies a que les plomes són estructures útils per a realitzar estudis de biomonitorització. Per a realitzar l’estudi s’ha escollit com a espècie migratòria el falciot comú (Apus apus). Els resultats mostren que el 210Pb no es distribueix uniformement entre individus adults i joves, ni entre les diferents plomes de l’ala dels ocells. La major concentració de 210Pb es troba en les plomes primàries dels individus adults i en l’hemibandera externa de la ploma. Les concentracions de 210Pb oscil·len entre els 43 i 1065 Bq·kg-1, amb una concentració mitjana de 586 Bq·kg-1. El fet de detectar 210Pb només en les plomes primàries de l’ala implica que la incorporació de 210Pb a l’ocell és via adsorció del 210Pb present a l’atmosfera. Es pot afirmar que el 210Pb present a l’atmosfera és arrossegat per les ales de les aus i queda adsorbit a les plomes.

Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.

The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents' utilities that are attainable at equilibrium.

Proposal for the analysis of a video game, a film, and their relationship : Silent Hill as a subject of the horror genre

Aquest treball de recerca fa un estudi comparatiu del videojoc de terror amb el seu homòleg cinematogràfic. L’objectiu és arribar a saber si els dos mitjans de comunicació usen les mateixes tècniques per transmetre les seves històries i per crear suspens. Aquesta investigació és només una part d'un estudi més ampli amb el que es pretén tenir un coneixement més aprofundit de les emocions de la gent i les reaccions que els provoca un videojoc de terror en comparació amb la visualització de l'adaptació cinematogràfica del corresponent videojoc.

Under-achievement and the glass ceiling: Evidence from a TV game show

We use a Colombian TV game show to test gender differences in competitivebehavior where there is no opportunity for discrimination and females face no genderspecificexternal constraints. Each game started with six contestants who had toanswer general knowledge questions in private. There were five rounds of questionsand, at the end of each, one participant was eliminated. Despite equality in startingnumbers, women earn less than men and exit the game at a faster rate. In particular,there are more voluntary withdrawals by women than men. We draw an analogybetween the game and the process by which employees rise through the levels of acorporation. As such, we note that glass ceilings may result, in part, from women sown behavior and this raises the issue of how women are socialized to behave. At thesame time, our results illustrate that maintaining and promoting gender diversity at thelower/middle ranks of organizations is necessary to obtain gender diversity at the top.

A note on the coincidence between Stackelberg and Nash equilibria in a differential game between government and firms

[cat] A Navas i Marín Solano es va demostrar la coincidència entre els equilibris de Nash i de Stackelberg per a una versi´o modificada del joc diferencial proposat por Lancaster (1973). Amb l’objectiu d’obtenir una solució interior, es van imposar restriccions importants sobre el valors dels paràmetres del model. En aquest treball estenem aquest resultat, en el límit en que la taxa de descompte és igual a zero, eliminant les restriccions i considerant totes les solucions possibles.

A note on the coincidence between Stackelberg and Nash equilibria in a differential game between government and firms

[cat] A Navas i Marín Solano es va demostrar la coincidència entre els equilibris de Nash i de Stackelberg per a una versi´o modificada del joc diferencial proposat por Lancaster (1973). Amb l’objectiu d’obtenir una solució interior, es van imposar restriccions importants sobre el valors dels paràmetres del model. En aquest treball estenem aquest resultat, en el límit en que la taxa de descompte és igual a zero, eliminant les restriccions i considerant totes les solucions possibles.

Cooperation and game theory, free software or the #15m movement: Two examples for universities

Closing talk of the Open Access Week 2011 at the UOC, by Josep Jover. Why do altruistic strategies beat selfish ones in the spheres of both free software and the #15m movement? The #15m movement, like software but unlike tangible goods, cannot be owned. It can be used (by joining it) by an indeterminate number of people without depriving anyone else of the chance to do the same. And that turns everything on its head: how universities manage information and what their mission is in this new society. In the immediate future, universities will be valued not for the information they harbour, which will always be richer and more extensive beyond their walls, but rather for their capacity to create critical masses, whether of knowledge research, skill-building, or networks of peers... universities must implement the new model or risk becoming obsolete.

A Game to Promote Understanding about UCD Methods and Process

The User-centered design (UCD) game is a tool forhuman-computer interaction practitioners to demonstrate the key user-centered design methodsand how they interrelate in the design process in an interactive and participatory manner. The target audiences are departments and institutions unfamiliar with UCD but whose work is related to the definition, creation, and update of a product or service.

On the structure of cooperative and competitive solutions for a generalized assignment game

We study cooperative and competitive solutions for a many- to-many generalization of Shapley and Shubik (1972)'s assignment game. We consider the Core, three other notions of group stability and two al- ternative definitions of competitive equilibrium. We show that (i) each group stable set is closely related with the Core of certain games defined using a proper notion of blocking and (ii) each group stable set contains the set of payoff vectors associated to the two definitions of competitive equilibrium. We also show that all six solutions maintain a strictly nested structure. Moreover, each solution can be identified with a set of ma- trices of (discriminated) prices which indicate how gains from trade are distributed among buyers and sellers. In all cases such matrices arise as solutions of a system of linear inequalities. Hence, all six solutions have the same properties from a structural and computational point of view.

Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.

A generalized assignment game

The proposed game is a natural extension of the Shapley and Shubik Assignment Game to the case where each seller owns a set of different objets instead of only one indivisible object. We propose definitions of pairwise stability and group stability that are adapted to our framework. Existence of both pairwise and group stable outcomes is proved. We study the structure of the group stable set and we finally prove that the set of group stable payoffs forms a complete lattice with one optimal group stable payoff for each side of the market.

Does affirmative action reduce effort incentives? A contest game analysis

In this paper a contest game with heterogeneous players is analyzed in which heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination. Based on the normative perception of the heterogeneity there are two policy options to tackle this heterogeneity: either it is ignored and the contestants are treated equally, or affirmative action is implemented which compensates discriminated players. The consequences of these two policy options are analyzed for a simple two-person contest game and it is shown that the frequently criticized trade-off between affirmative action and total effort does not exist: Instead, affirmative action fosters effort incentives. A generalization to the n-person case and to a case with a partially informed contest designer yields the same result if the participation level is similar under each policy.