An investigation on the pay-off to generic competences for core employees in Catalan manufacturing firms

The aim of this paper is to measure the returns to human capital. We use a unique data set consisting of matched employer-employee information. Data on individuals' human capital include a set of 26 competences that capture the utilization of workers' skills in a very detailed way. Thus, we can expand the concept of human capital and discuss the type of skills that are more productive in the workplace and, hence, generate a higher payoff for the workers. The rich information on firm's and workplace characteristics allows us to introduce a broad range of controls and to improve previous research in this field. This paper gives evidence that the returns to generic competences differ depending on the position of the worker in the firm. Only numeracy skills are reward independent of the occupational status of the worker. The level of technology used by the firm in the production process does not directly increase workers’ pay, but it influences the pay-off to some of the competences. JEL Classification: J24, J31

Pensions and procrastination : how can employers help their employees save for the future?

In this paper I show that employees tend to procrastinate when they are expected to decide whether or not they would like to save using the defined contribution pension scheme offered by their employer. By auto-enrolling the employees or asking them to decide before a given deadline, employers can mitigate some of the problems caused by employee procrastination. However both of these mechanisms present their own problems, caused by default stickiness and other issues, so I discuss how employers can decide which is the right mechanism to use depending on the characteristics of their employees, and how to minimize the problems these mechanisms can cause.

Uptake and factors that influence the use of ‘sit less, move more’ occupational intervention strategies in Spanish office employees

Background Little is known about the types of ‘sit less, move more’ strategies that appeal to office employees, or what factors influence their use. This study assessed the uptake of strategies in Spanish university office employees engaged in an intervention, and those factors that enabled or limited strategy uptake. Methods The study used a mixed method design. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with academics and administrators (n = 12; 44 ± 12 mean SD age; 6 women) at three points across the five-month intervention, and data used to identify factors that influenced the uptake of strategies. Employees who finished the intervention then completed a survey rating (n = 88; 42 ± 8 mean SD age; 51 women) the extent to which strategies were used [never (1) to usually (4)]; additional survey items (generated from interviewee data) rated the impact of factors that enabled or limited strategy uptake [no influence (1) to very strong influence (4)]. Survey score distributions and averages were calculated and findings triangulated with interview data. Results Relative to baseline, 67% of the sample increased step counts post intervention (n = 59); 60% decreased occupational sitting (n = 53). ‘Active work tasks’ and ‘increases in walking intensity’ were the strategies most frequently used by employees (89% and 94% sometimes or usually utilised these strategies); ‘walk-talk meetings’ and ‘lunchtime walking groups’ were the least used (80% and 96% hardly ever or never utilised these strategies). ‘Sitting time and step count logging’ was the most important enabler of behaviour change (mean survey score of 3.1 ± 0.8); interviewees highlighted the motivational value of being able to view logged data through visual graphics in a dedicated website, and gain feedback on progress against set goals. ‘Screen based work’ (mean survey score of 3.2 ± 0.8) was the most significant barrier limiting the uptake of strategies. Inherent time pressures and cultural norms that dictated sedentary work practices limited the adoption of ‘walk-talk meetings’ and ‘lunch time walking groups’. Conclusions The findings provide practical insights into which strategies and influences practitioners need to target to maximise the impact of ‘sit less, move more’ occupational intervention strategies.

Self-reported sitting time and physical activity: interactive associations with mental well-being and productivity in office employees

Abstract Background: Little is known about how sitting time, alone or in combination with markers of physical activity (PA), influences mental well-being and work productivity. Given the need to develop workplace PA interventions that target employees’ health related efficiency outcomes; this study examined the associations between self-reported sitting time, PA, mental well-being and work productivity in office employees. Methods: Descriptive cross-sectional study. Spanish university office employees (n = 557) completed a survey measuring socio-demographics, total and domain specific (work and travel) self-reported sitting time, PA (International Physical Activity Questionnaire short version), mental well-being (Warwick-Edinburg Mental Well-Being Scale) and work productivity (Work Limitations Questionnaire). Multivariate linear regression analyses determined associations between the main variables adjusted for gender, age, body mass index and occupation. PA levels (low, moderate and high) were introduced into the model to examine interactive associations. Results: Higher volumes of PA were related to higher mental well-being, work productivity and spending less time sitting at work, throughout the working day and travelling during the week, including the weekends (p < 0.05). Greater levels of sitting during weekends was associated with lower mental well-being (p < 0.05). Similarly, more sitting while travelling at weekends was linked to lower work productivity (p < 0.05). In highly active employees, higher sitting times on work days and occupational sitting were associated with decreased mental well-being (p < 0.05). Higher sitting times while travelling on weekend days was also linked to lower work productivity in the highly active (p < 0.05). No significant associations were observed in low active employees. Conclusions: Employees’ PA levels exerts different influences on the associations between sitting time, mental well-being and work productivity. The specific associations and the broad sweep of evidence in the current study suggest that workplace PA strategies to improve the mental well-being and productivity of all employees should focus on reducing sitting time alongside efforts to increase PA.

Patterns of impact resulting from a 'sit less, move more' web-based program in sedentary office employees

Purpose Encouraging office workers to ‘sit less and move more’ encompasses two public health priorities. However, there is little evidence on the effectiveness of workplace interventions for reducing sitting, even less about the longer term effects of such interventions and still less on dual-focused interventions. This study assessed the short and mid-term impacts of a workplace web-based intervention (Walk@WorkSpain, W@WS; 2010-11) on self-reported sitting time, step counts and physical risk factors (waist circumference, BMI, blood pressure) for chronic disease. Methods Employees at six Spanish university campuses (n=264; 42±10 years; 171 female) were randomly assigned by worksite and campus to an Intervention (used W@WS; n=129; 87 female) or a Comparison group (maintained normal behavior; n=135; 84 female). This phased, 19-week program aimed to decrease occupational sitting time through increased incidental movement and short walks. A linear mixed model assessed changes in outcome measures between the baseline, ramping (8 weeks), maintenance (11 weeks) and followup (two months) phases for Intervention versus Comparison groups.A significant 2 (group) × 2 (program phases) interaction was found for self-reported occupational sitting (F[3]=7.97, p=0.046), daily step counts (F[3]=15.68, p=0.0013) and waist circumference (F[3]=11.67, p=0.0086). The Intervention group decreased minutes of daily occupational sitting while also increasing step counts from baseline (446±126; 8,862±2,475) through ramping (+425±120; 9,345±2,435), maintenance (+422±123; 9,638±3,131) and follow-up (+414±129; 9,786±3,205). In the Comparison group, compared to baseline (404±106), sitting time remained unchanged through ramping and maintenance, but decreased at follow-up (-388±120), while step counts diminished across all phases. The Intervention group significantly reduced waist circumference by 2.1cms from baseline to follow-up while the Comparison group reduced waist circumference by 1.3cms over the same period. Conclusions W@WSis a feasible and effective evidence-based intervention that can be successfully deployed with sedentary employees to elicit sustained changes on “sitting less and moving more”.

The Barcelonnettes: an example of network-entrepreneurs in XIX century Mexico. An explanation based on a theory of bounded rational choice with social embeddedness

A theory of network-entrepreneurs or "spin-off system" is presented in this paper for the creation of firms based on the community’s social governance. It is argued that firm’s capacity for accumulation depends on the presence of employees belonging to the same social/ethnic group with expectations of "inheriting" the firm and becoming entrepreneurs once they have been selected for their merits and loyalty towards their patrons. Such accumulation is possible because of the credibility of the patrons’ promises of supporting newcomers due to high social cohesion and specific social norms prevailing in the community. This theory is exemplified through the case of the Barcelonnettes, a group of immigrants from the Alps in the South of France (Provence) who came to Mexico in the XIX Century.

Internal promotion versus external recruitment: evidence in industrial plants

An analysis is carried out in a sample of 738 industrial plants of the determining factors in the use of internal promotion of blue-collar workers to middle managers and skilled technicians as against their external recruitment. The use of internal promotion is positively correlated with variables indicative of the efforts made by plants to measure employees' skills, and to a lesser extent, with the level of specificity of investments in human capital made by blue-collar workers. Contrary to what was expected, variables related with the use and efficiency of other incentive systems have no significant influence on the increased or decreased use of internal promotion. These results are initial evidence that internal promotions are used to protect and favour specific investments, especially those made by firms in order to discover their workers' skills.

Access as a motivational device: implications for human resource management

This paper analyzes the employment relationship on the basis of the notion of access. We argue that the degree of access provided by a job is an incentive to activate the employee’s self-actualization needs. We investigate the effect of access on the workers’ performance through an agency model and provide a number of propositions with practical implications for personnel policies. Our results are consistent with the intuition emerged from the real business practice as well as with many of the arguments on the substitutive role between monetary and non-monetary incentives frequently reported in the literature.

It's what you say not what you pay

We study manager-employee interactions in experiments set in a corporate environment where payoffs depend on employees coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak-link game. In the absence of managerial intervention subjects invariably slip into coordination failure. To overcome a history of coordination failure, managers have two instruments at their disposal, increasing employees' financial incentives to coordinate and communication with employees. We find that communication is a more effective tool than incentive changes for leading organizations out of performance traps. Examining the content of managers' communication, the most effective messages specifically request a high effort, point out the mutual benefits of high effort, and imply that employees are being paid well.

Observability and overcoming coordination failure in organizations

Many organizations suffer poor performance because its members fail to coordinate on efficient patterns of behavior. In previous research, we have shown that financial incentives can be used to find a way out of such performance traps. Here we examine the sensitivity of this result to the ability of people to observe others' choices. Our experiments are set in a corporate environment where subjects' payoffs depend on coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by the employees of an experimental firm is a weak-link game. Treatments vary along two dimensions. First, subjects either start with low financial incentives for coordination, which typically leads to coordination failure, and then are switched to higher incentives or start with high incentives, which typically yield effective coordination, and are switched to low incentives. Second, as the key treatment variable, subjects either observe the effort levels chosen by all employees in their experimenta

A change would do you good . . . An experimental study on how to overcome coordination failure in organizations

Many organizations suffer poor performance because individuals within the organization fail to coordinate on efficient patterns of behavior. Using controlled laboratory experiments, we study how financial incentives can be used to find a way out of such performance traps. Our experiments are set in a corporate environment where subjects' payoffs depend on coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak-link game. In an initial phase, the benefits of coordination are low relative to the cost of increased effort. Play in this initial phase typically converges to an inefficient outcome with employees failing to coordinate at high effort levels. The experimental design then explores the effects of varying the financial incentives to coordinate at a higher effort level. We find that an increase in the benefits of coordination leads to improved coordination, but, surprisingly, large increases have no more impact than small increases. Once subj

Inequity version and team incentives

We study optimal contracts in a simple model where employees are averse to inequity as modelled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). A "selfish" employer can profitably exploit such preferences among its employees by offering contracts which create inequity off-equilibrium and thus, they would leave employees feeling envy or guilt when they do not meet the employer's demands. Such contracts resemble team and relative performance contracts, and thus we derive conditions under which it may be beneficial to form work teams of employees with distributional concerns who were previously working individually. Similar results are obtained for status-seeking and efficiency concerns preferences.

Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives

The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analysed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used. JEL classification numbers: D82, J21, L13, L22. Keywords: Cournot competition, Contract delegation, Moral hazard, Entry, Market size, Wage cost.

Personal relations and their effect on behavior in an organizational setting: an experimental study

We study how personal relations affect performance in organizations. In the experimental game we use a manager has to assign different degrees of decision power to two employees. These two employees then have to make distributive decisions which affect themselves and the manager. Our focus is on the effects on managers' assignment of decision power and on employees' distributive decisions of one of the employees and the manager knowing each other personally. Our evidence shows that managers tend to favor employees that they personally know and that these employees tend, more than other employees, to favor the manager in their distributive decisions. However, this behavior does not affect the performance of the employees that do not know the manager. All these effects are independent of whether the employees that know the manager are more or less productive than those who do not know the manager. The results shed light on discrimination and nepotism and its consequences for the performance of family firms and other organizations.

Information networks and worker recruitment

This paper studies experimentally how the existence of social information networks affects the ways in which firms recruit new personnel. Through such networks firms learn about prospective employees' performance in previous jobs. Assuming individualistic preferences social networks are predicted not to affect overall labor market behavior, while with social preferences the prediction is that when bilaterally negotiated: (i) wages will be higher and (ii) that workers in jobs with incomplete contracts will respond with higher effort. Our experimental results are consistent with the social preferences view, both for the case of excess demand and excess supply of labor. In particular, the presence of information networks leads to more efficient allocations.