On the choice of an exchange rate regime: target zones revisited

From the classical gold standard up to the current ERM2 arrangement of the European Union, target zones have been a widely used exchange regime in contemporary history. This paper presents a benchmark model that rationalizes the choice of target zones over the rest of regimes: the fixed rate, the free float and the managed float. It is shown that the monetary authority may gain efficiency by reducing volatility of both the exchange rate and the interest rate at the same time. Furthermore, the model is consistent with some known stylized facts in the empirical literature that previous models were not able to produce, namely, the positive relation between the exchange rate and the interest rate differential, the degree of non-linearity of the function linking the exchage rate to fundamentals and the shape of the exchange rate stochastic distribution.

Environmental regulation: choice of instruments under imperfect compliance

Compliance is an important issue in environmental regulation. In this paper, we discuss some of the key elements of the problem and analyze a situation where emissions are not random and firms are risk-neutral. We study the firm's decision on emissions and compliance when the environmental regulation is based on standards and the enforcement agency audits the firm with a certain probability. We then compare total emissions when environmental regulation is based on different instruments: standards, taxes, and tradable permits. We show that when compliance is an issue, environmental taxes are superior to the other instruments. We also analyze the (static) efficiency of the solution.

On the intersection of free subgroups in free products of groups

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

The choice of banking firm: Are the interest rate a significant criteria?

The objective of the research is to know the factors that in Spain determine the choice of banking organization. The obtained results indicate that the dimension of the network of branches is the reason more valued. In spite of the increasing symmetry of the Spanish banking market, the preferences of the clients of the savings banks and those of the banks are not absolutely coincident, being the proximity - the main reason for election- much more valued by the former than by the latter. The existence of divergences in the preferences has also been detected according to the region and the typology of city of residence.

Is the Spanish Inheritance and Gift Tax incompatible with the free movement of workers and capital?: The reasoned opinion of the EU Commission IP/10/513

The aim of my speech is answering to the question if the Spanish Inheritance and Gift Tax is incompatible with the free movement of workers and capital. We are going to pay special attention to the European Commission’s request to Spain to change its Inheritance and Gift Tax provisions for Non-Residents or Assets held abroad. In order to answer to the question mentioned above five points will be explained. At first place I am going to describe the infrengement procedure established in the Article 258 that the EU Commission can follow when a Member State doesn’t comply with Community Law. At second place, we are going to explain what is the content of the EU Commission delivered on 5th of may 2010 regarding the spanish Inheritance and Gift Tax. Then, we will analise what establishes the Community Law regarding the freedom of workers and capital and how they are understood by the EU Court of Justice in similar cases. Finally, we are going to provide possible amendments that Spain could undertake.

Assessing the Political Viability of Labour Market Reform: The Case of Employment Protection

We analyze the political support for employment protection legislation. Unlike my previous work on the same topic, this paper pays a lot of attention to the role of obsolescence in the growth process. In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employees trade off lower living standards (because employment protection maintains workers in less productive activities) against longer job duration. The support for employment protection will then depend on the value of the latter relative to the cost of the former. We highlight two key deeterminants of this trade-off: first, the workers' bargaining power, second, the economy's growth rate-more precisely its rate of creative destruction.

The effects of employment uncertainty and wealth shocks on the labor supply and claiming behavior of older American workers

Unemployment rates in developed countries have recently reached levels not seenin a generation, and workers of all ages are facing increasing probabilities of losingtheir jobs and considerable losses in accumulated assets. These events likely increasethe reliance that most older workers will have on public social insurance programs,exactly at a time that public finances are suffering from a large drop in contributions.Our paper explicitly accounts for employment uncertainty and unexpectedwealth shocks, something that has been relatively overlooked in the literature, butthat has grown in importance in recent years. Using administrative and householdlevel data we empirically characterize a life-cycle model of retirement and claimingdecisions in terms of the employment, wage, health, and mortality uncertainty facedby individuals. Our benchmark model explains with great accuracy the strikinglyhigh proportion of individuals who claim benefits exactly at the Early RetirementAge, while still explaining the increased claiming hazard at the Normal RetirementAge. We also discuss some policy experiments and their interplay with employmentuncertainty. Additionally, we analyze the effects of negative wealth shocks on thelabor supply and claiming decisions of older Americans. Our results can explainwhy early claiming has remained very high in the last years even as the early retirementpenalties have increased substantially compared with previous periods, andwhy labor force participation has remained quite high for older workers even in themidst of the worse employment crisis in decades.

Choice of partners in multiple two-person prisoner's dilemma games: An experimental study

We examine the effect of unilateral and mutual partner selection in the context of prisoner's dilemmas experimentally. Subjects play simultaneously several finitely repeated two-person prisoner's dilemma games. We find that unilateral choice is the best system. It leads to low defection and fewer singles than with mutual choice. Furthermore, with the unilateral choice setup we are able to show that intendingdefectors are more likely to try to avoid a match than intending cooperators. We compare our results of multiple games with single game PD-experiments and find no difference in aggregate behavior. Hence the multiple game technique is robust and might therefore be an important tool in the future for testing the use of mixed strategies.

Health care provider choice in the case of patient-initiated contacts. An extended version of discrete choice of model demand

This paper analyzes the nature of health care provider choice inthe case of patient-initiated contacts, with special reference toa National Health Service setting, where monetary prices are zeroand general practitioners act as gatekeepers to publicly financedspecialized care. We focus our attention on the factors that mayexplain the continuously increasing use of hospital emergencyvisits as opposed to other provider alternatives. An extendedversion of a discrete choice model of demand for patient-initiatedcontacts is presented, allowing for individual and town residencesize differences in perceived quality (preferences) betweenalternative providers and including travel and waiting time asnon-monetary costs. Results of a nested multinomial logit model ofprovider choice are presented. Individual choice betweenalternatives considers, in a repeated nested structure, self-care,primary care, hospital and clinic emergency services. Welfareimplications and income effects are analyzed by computingcompensating variations, and by simulating the effects of userfees by levels of income. Results indicate that compensatingvariation per visit is higher than the direct marginal cost ofemergency visits, and consequently, emergency visits do not appearas an inefficient alternative even for non-urgent conditions.

Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies

The origins of electoral systems have received scant attention in the literature. Looking at the history of electoral rules in the advanced world in the last century, this paper shows that the existing wide variation in electoral rules across nations can be traced to the strategic decisions that the current ruling parties, anticipating the coordinating consequences of different electoral regimes, make to maximize their representation according to the following conditions. On the one hand, as long as the electoral arena does not change substantially and the current electoral regime serves the ruling parties well, the latter have no incentives to modify the electoral regime. On the other hand, as soon as the electoral arena changes (due to the entry of new voters or a change in their preferences), the ruling parties will entertain changing the electoral system, depending on two main conditions: the emergence of new parties and the coordinating capacities of the old ruling parties. Accordingly, if the new parties are strong, the old parties shift from plurality/majority rules to proportional representation (PR) only if the latter are locked into a 'non-Duvergerian' equilibrium; i.e. if no old party enjoys a dominant position (the case of most small European states)--conversely, they do not if a Duvergerian equilibrium exists (the case of Great Britain). Similarly, whenever the new entrants are weak, a non-PR system is maintained, regardless of the structure of the old party system (the case of the USA). The paper discusses as well the role of trade and ethnic and religious heterogeneity in the adoption of PR rules.

Assesing the political viability of labour market reform: The case of employment protection

We analyze the political support for employment protection legislation.Unlike my previous work on the same topic, this paper pays a lot ofattention to the role of obsolescence in the growth process.In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employeestrade off lower living standards (because employment protectionmaintains workers in less productive activities) against longer jobduration. The support for employment protection will then depend onthe value of the latter relative to the cost of the former. Wehighlight two key deeterminants of this trade-off: first, the workers'bargaining power, second, the economy's growth rate-more preciselyits rate of creative destruction.

Effects of employment protection and product market regulations on the Italian labor market

Labor market regulations have often being blamed for high and persistentunemployment in Europe, but evidence on their impact remains mixed. Morerecently, attention has turned to the impact of product market regulationson employment growth. This paper analyzes how labor and product marketregulations interact to affect turnover and employment. We present a matchingmodel which illustrates how barriers to entry in the product market mitigatethe impact of labor market deregulation. We, then, use the Italian SocialSecurity employer-employee panel to study the interaction between barriersto entry and dismissal costs. We exploit the fact that costs for unjustdismissals in Italy increased for firms below 15 employees relative to biggerfirms after 1990. We find that the increase in dismissal costs after 1990decreased accessions and separations in small relative to big firms,especially for women. Moreover, consistent with our model, we find evidencethat the increase in dismissal costs had smaller effects on turnover for womenin sectors faced with strict product market regulations.

The political economy of employment protection

This paper develops a model of job creation and job destruction in agrowing economy with embodied technical progress, that we use toanalyze the political support for employment protection legislationssuch as the ones that are observed in most European countries.We analyze the possibility of Condorcet cycles due to the fact thatworkers about to become unemployed prefer both an increase and areduction in firing costs over the status quo. Despite this problem, we show the existence of local, and sometimes global majority winners.In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employeestrade off lower living standards (because employment protectionmaintains workers in less productive activities) against longer job duration. We show that the gains from, and consequently the politicalsupport for employment protection (as defined by maximunjob tenure) are larger, the lower the rate of creative destruction and the largerthe worker's bargaining power. Numerical simulations suggest a hump-shaped response of firing costs to these variables, as well as negative impact of exogeneous turnover on employment protection.

The choice of the form of representation in multinational banking: Evidence from Spain

This paper investigates foreign direct investment in the bankingsector. The attention has been addressed to test the importanceof OLI advantages as the determinants of the bank's decisionto invest in foreign locations. Nevertheless, since banks canexpand their activities abroad through different organizationalforms that imply different levels of foreign involvement, theissue of the form of representation has been tackled. Theresults show the importance of OLI advantages in the form ofrepresentation in multinational banking.

The choice of titling system in land

This paper analyzes the choice of the socially optimal titling systemassuming rational individual choices about recording, assurance andregistration decisions. It focuses on the enforcement of propertyrights on land under private titling and the two existing publictitling systems, recording and registration. When the reduction in theexpected costs of eviction compensates the higher cost of initialregistration, it is more efficient to introduce a registration systemrather than a recording system. The development of private "titleassurance" improves the standing of recording as compared toregistration. This improvement depends, however, on the efficiency ofthe assurance technology and, also, on corrective taxation that isneeded to align individual optimization, which disregards the transferelement in eviction, with social objectives.