Financial integration, productivity and capital accumulation

Understanding the mechanism through which financial globalization affects economic performance is crucial for evaluating the costs and benefits of opening financial markets. This paper is a first attempt at disentangling the effects of financial integration on the two main determinants of economic performance: productivity (TFP) and investments. I provide empirical evidence from a sample of 93 countries observed between 1975 and 1999. The results suggest that financial integration has a positive direct effect on productivity, while it spurs capital accumulation only with some delay and indirectly, since capital follows the rise in productivity. I control for indirect effects of financial globalization through banking crises. Such episodes depress both investments and TFP, though they are triggered by financial integration only to a minor extent.

Financial integration, productivity and capital accumulation

Understanding the mechanism through which financial globalization affect economic performance is crucial for evaluating the costs and benefits of opening financial markets. This paper is a first attempt at disentangling the effects of financial integration on the two main determinants of economic performance: productivity (TFP)and investments. I provide empirical evidence from a sample of 93 countries observed between 1975 and 1999. The results suggest that financial integration has a positive direct effect on productivity, while it spurs capital accumulation only with some delay and indirectly, since capital follows the rise in productivity. I control for indirect effects of financial globalization through banking crises. Such episodes depress both investments and TFP, though they are triggered by financial integration only to a minor extent. The paper also provides a discussion of a simple model on the effects of financial integration, and shows additional empirical evidence supporting it.

Term structure of interest rates. European financial integration

In this paper we estimate, analyze and compare the term structures of interest rates in six different countries over the period 1992-2004. We apply the Nelson-Siegel model to obtain the term structures of interest rates at weekly intervals. A total of 4,038 curves are estimated and analyzed. Four European Monetary Union countries¿Spain, France, Germany and Italy¿are included. The UK is also included as a European non-member of the Monetary Union. Finally the US completes the analysis. The goal is to determine the differences in the shapes of the term structure of interest rates among these countries. Likewise, we can determine the most usual term structure shapes that appear for each country.*****

Financial Integration, Trade Openness and International Transmission

[cat] Com afecten l’obertura comercial i financera a la volatilitat macroeconòmica? La literatura existent, tant empírica com teòrica, no ha assolit encara un consens. Aquest article usa un model microfonamentat de dos països simètrics amb entrada endògena d’empreses per estudiar-ho. L’anàlisis es du a terme per tres règims econòmics diferents amb diferents nivells d’integració internacional: una economia tancada, una autarquia financera i una integració plena. Es consideren diversos nivells d’obertura comercial, en forma de biaix domèstic de la demanda i l’economia pot patir pertorbacions en la productivitat del treball i en innovació. El model conclou que la incertesa macroeconòmica, representada principalment per la volatilitat del consum, la producció i la relació real d’intercanvi internacional, depèn del grau d’obertura i del tipus de pertorbació.

Term structure of interest rates. European financial integration

In this paper we estimate, analyze and compare the term structures of interest rates in six different countries over the period 1992-2004. We apply the Nelson-Siegel model to obtain the term structures of interest rates at weekly intervals. A total of 4,038 curves are estimated and analyzed. Four European Monetary Union countries¿Spain, France, Germany and Italy¿are included. The UK is also included as a European non-member of the Monetary Union. Finally the US completes the analysis. The goal is to determine the differences in the shapes of the term structure of interest rates among these countries. Likewise, we can determine the most usual term structure shapes that appear for each country.*****

Financial Integration, Trade Openness and International Transmission

[cat] Com afecten l’obertura comercial i financera a la volatilitat macroeconòmica? La literatura existent, tant empírica com teòrica, no ha assolit encara un consens. Aquest article usa un model microfonamentat de dos països simètrics amb entrada endògena d’empreses per estudiar-ho. L’anàlisis es du a terme per tres règims econòmics diferents amb diferents nivells d’integració internacional: una economia tancada, una autarquia financera i una integració plena. Es consideren diversos nivells d’obertura comercial, en forma de biaix domèstic de la demanda i l’economia pot patir pertorbacions en la productivitat del treball i en innovació. El model conclou que la incertesa macroeconòmica, representada principalment per la volatilitat del consum, la producció i la relació real d’intercanvi internacional, depèn del grau d’obertura i del tipus de pertorbació.

Fiscal policy and interest rates: the role of financial and economic integration

It is commonly believed that a fiscal expansion raises interest rates. However, these crowding out effects of deficits have been found to be small or non-existent. One explanation is that financial integration offsets interest rate differentials on globalised bond markets. This paper measures the degree of integration of government bond markets, using spatial modelling techniques to take this spillover on financial markets into account. Our main finding is that the crowding out effect on domestic interest rates is significant, but is reduced by spillover across borders. This spillover is important in major crises or in periods of coordinated policy actions. This result is generally robust to various measures of cross-country linkages. We find spillover to be much stronger among EU countries.

Stock market integration between new EU member states and the Euro-zone

This paper measures the degree in stock market integration between five Eastern European countries and the Euro-zone. A potentially gradual transition in correlations is accommodated by smooth transition conditional correlation models. We find that the correlation between stock markets has increased from 2001 to 2007. In particular, the Czech and Polish markets show a higher correlation to the Euro-zone. However, this is not a broad-based phenomenon across Eastern Europe. We also find that the increase in correlations is not a reflection of a world-wide phenomenon of financial integration but appears to be specific to the European market. JEL classifications: C32; C51; F36; G15 Keywords: Multivariate GARCH; Smooth Transition Conditional Correlation; Stock Return Comovement; New EU Members.

Interbank market integration under asymmetric information

We argue that the main barrier to an integrated international interbankmarket is the existence of asymmetric information between differentcountries, which may prevail in spite of monetary integration or successfulcurrency pegging. In order to address this issue, we study the scope forinternational interbank market integration with unsecured lending whencross-country information is noisy. We find not only that an equilibriumwith integrated markets need not always exist, but also that when it does,the integrated equilibrium may coexist with one of interbank marketsegmentation. Therefore, market deregulation, per se, does not guaranteethe emergence of an integrated interbank market. The effect of a repo marketwhich, a priori, was supposed to improve efficiency happens to be morecomplex: it reduces interest rate spreads and improves upon the segmentationequilibrium, but\ it may destroy the unsecured integrated equilibrium, sincethe repo market will attract the best borrowers. The introduction of othertransnational institutional arrangements, such as multinational banking,correspondent banking and the existence of "too-big-to-fail" banks mayreduce cross country interest spreads and provide more insurance againstcountry wide liquidity shocks. Still, multinational banking, as theintroduction of repos, may threaten the integrated interbank marketequilibrium.

Designing institutions for financial stability: Regulation and supervision by objective for the Euro area

In this paper, we discuss pros and cons ofdifferent models for financial market regulationand supervision and we present a proposal forthe re-organisation of regulatory and supervisoryagencies in the Euro Area. Our arguments areconsistent with both new theories and effectivebehaviour of financial intermediaries inindustrialized countries. Our proposed architecturefor financial market regulation is based on theassignment of different objectives or "finalities"to different authorities, both at the domesticand the European level. According to thisperspective, the three objectives of supervision- microeconomic stability, investor protectionand proper behaviour, efficiency and competition- should be assigned to three distinct Europeanauthorities, each one at the centre of a Europeansystem of financial regulators and supervisorsspecialized in overseeing the entire financialmarket with respect to a single regulatoryobjective and regardless of the subjective natureof the intermediaries. Each system should bestructured and organized similarly to the EuropeanSystem of Central Banks and work in connectionwith the central bank which would remain theinstitution responsible for price and macroeconomicstability. We suggest a plausible path to buildour 4-peak regulatory architecture in the Euro area.

Sovereign Risk, Anonymous Markets, and the Effects of Globalization

The goal of this paper is to study the e¤ects of globalization on the workings of financial markets. We adopt a "technological" view of globalization, which consists of an exogenous reduction in the cost of shipping goods across di¤erent regions of the world. We model financial markets where agents anonymously trade securities issued by every other agent in the world. In the absence of frictions, we show how globalization creates trade opportunities among residents of different regions of the world, thereby raising welfare. In the presence of sovereign risk, however, there emerge two crucial interactions between trade among residents within a region and trade among residents of di¤erent regions. First, the more residents within a region trade with each other, the more they can trade with residents of other regions. Second, the possibility of trade with residents of other regions sometimes leads a government to not enforce payments by its residents, destroying trade opportunities among residents within the region. The net effect on welfare of this process of creation and destruction of trade opportunities is ambiguous. We argue that there are no policies governments can take to avoid the negative effects of globalization on trade among domestic residents. In a dynamic extension, we analyze how our results are a¤ected by reputational considerations.

Institutions, Public Debt and Foreign Finance

We study the role of domestic financial institutions in sustaining capital flows to the private and public sector of a country whose government can default on its debt. As in recent public debt crises, in our model public defaults weaken banks' balance sheets, disrupting domestic financial markets. This effect leads to a novel complementarity between private capital inflows and public borrowing, where the former sustain the latter by boosting the government's cost of default. Our key message is that, by shaping the direction of private capital flows, financial institutions determine whether financial integration improves or reduces government discipline. We explore the implications of this complementarity for financial liberalization and debt-financed bailouts of banks. We present some evidence consistent with complementarity.

Financial convergence in transition economies: EU enlargement

This paper analyses the financial impact of the enlargement of the European Union (EU) to include 10 new Central and Eastern European Nations (CEEN) on firms’ business and financial structures. To this end, we employ quantitative analytic techniques and financial ratios. In this context, we hope to discover whether firms in the new EU member States tend to converge with business in the Europe of the 15 in terms of the structure of firms’ financial statements. We examine the extent to which the increasing integration of the former may foster the convergence of productive structures. The methodology followed consists of an analysis of the evolution of 12 financial ratios in a sample of firms obtained from the AMADEUS data base. To that end, we perform a Dynamic Factor Analysis that identifies the determining factors of the joint evolution of deviations in the financial ratios with respect to the average value of firms in the EU-15. This analysis allows us to analyse the convergence in each of the CEEN nations with respect to the EU-15.

Financial development, labor and market regulations and growth

This paper investigates the importance that market regulation and financial imperfections have on firm growth. We analyse institutions af- fecting labor market as Employment Protection Laws (EP) and Product Market Regulation (PM). We show that together with the beneficial effects of financial development, a firm will get less financing, and thus investless, in a weak financial market (finance effect), the strictness of product and labor market regulations also affect firm growth (labor effect). In particular, we show that the stricter the rules the more detrimental the influence on growth in sectoral value added for a large number of countries. We also show that the labor effect overcomes the positive finance effect.

Governance mechanisms in Spanish financial intermediaries

This paper examines the governance of Spanish Banks around two main issues. First, does a poor economic performance activate those governance interventions that favor the removal of executive directors and the merger of non-performing banks? And second, does the relationship between governance intervention and economic performance vary with the ownership form of the bank? Our results show that a bad performance does activate governance mechanisms in banks, although for the case of Savings Banks intervention is confined to a merger or acquisition. Nevertheless, the distinct ownership structure of Savings Banks does not fully protect non-performing banks from disappearing. Product-market competition compensates for those weak internal governance mechanisms that result from an ownership form which gives voice to several stakeholder groups.