Retribution in a cheap-talk experiment

We use a two-person 3-stage game to investigate whether people chooseto punish or reward another player by sacrificing money to increase or decrease the other person's payoff. One player sends a message indicating an intended play, which is either favorable or unfavorable to the other player in the game. After the message, the sender and the receiver play a simultaneous 2x2 game. A deceptive message may be made, in an effort to induce the receiver to make a play favorable to the sender. Our focus is on whether receivers' rates of monetary sacrifice depend on the process and the perceived sender's intention,as is suggested by the literature on deception and proceduralsatisfaction. Models such as Rabin (1993), Sen (1997), and Charnessand Rabin (1999) also permit rates of sacrifice to be sensitive to the sender's perceived intention, while outcome-based models such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (1997) predict otherwise. We find that deception substantially increases the punishment rate as a response to an action that is unfavorable to the receiver. We also find that a small but significant percentage of subjects choose to reward a favorable action choice made by the sender.

A Fair and Secure Cluster Formation Process for Ad Hoc Networks

An efficient approach for organizing large ad hoc networks is to divide the nodesinto multiple clusters and designate, for each cluster, a clusterhead which is responsible forholding intercluster control information. The role of a clusterhead entails rights and duties.On the one hand, it has a dominant position in front of the others because it manages theconnectivity and has access to other node¿s sensitive information. But on the other hand, theclusterhead role also has some associated costs. Hence, in order to prevent malicious nodesfrom taking control of the group in a fraudulent way and avoid selfish attacks from suitablenodes, the clusterhead needs to be elected in a secure way. In this paper we present a novelsolution that guarantees the clusterhead is elected in a cheat-proof manner.

A comparative study of difficulties in accounting preparation and judgement in agriculture using fair value and historical cost for biological assets valuation

Este estudio realiza un investigación empírica comparando las dificultades que se derivan de la utilización del valor razonable (VR) y del coste histórico (CH) en el sector agrícola. Se analiza también la fiabilidad de ambos métodos de valoración para la interpretación de la información y la toma de decisiones por parte de los agentes que actúan en el sector. Mediante un experimento realizado con estudiantes, agricultores y contables que operan en el sector agrícola, se halla que estos tienen más dificultades, cometen mayores errores e interpretan peor la información contable realizada a CH que la realizada a VR. Entrevistas en profundidad con agricultores y contables agrícolas desvelan prácticas contables defectuosas derivadas de la necesidad de aplicar el CH en el sector en España. Dadas las complejidades del cálculo del coste de los activos biológicos y el predominio de pequeñas explotaciones en el sector en los países occidentales avanzados, el estudio concluye que la contabilidad a VR constituye una mejoría de utilización y desarrollo de la contabilidad en el sector que la confeccionada a CH. Asimismo, el CH transmite una peor representación de la situación real de las explotaciones agrícolas.

A comparative study of difficulties in accounting preparation and judgement in agriculture using fair value and historical cost accounting for biological assets valuation

This paper presents empirical research comparing the accounting difficulties that arise from the use of two valuation methods for biological assets, fair value (FV) and historical cost (HC) accounting, in the agricultural sector. It also compares how reliable each valuation method is in the decision-making process of agents within the sector. By conducting an experiment with students, farmers, and accountants operating in the agricultural sector, we find that they have more difficulties, make larger miscalculations and make poorer judgements with HC accounting than with FV accounting. In-depth interviews uncover flawed accounting practices in the agricultural sector in Spain in order to meet HC accounting requirements. Given the complexities of cost calculation for biological assets and the predominance of small family business units in advanced Western countries, the study concludes that accounting can be more easily applied in the agricultural sector under FV than HC accounting, and that HC conveys a less accurate grasp of the real situation of a farm.

Fair and efficient student placement with couples

We study situations of allocating positions or jobs to students or workers based on priorities. An example is the assignment of medical students to hospital residencies on the basis of one or several entrance exams. For markets without couples, e.g., for ``undergraduate student placement,'' acyclicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a fair and efficient placement mechanism (Ergin, 2002). We show that in the presence of couples, which introduces complementarities into the students' preferences, acyclicity is still necessary, but not sufficient (Theorem 4.1). A second necessary condition (Theorem 4.2) is ``priority-togetherness'' of couples. A priority structure that satisfies both necessary conditions is called pt-acyclic. For student placement problems where all quotas are equal to one we characterize pt-acyclicity (Lemma 5.1) and show that it is a sufficient condition for the existence of a fair and efficient placement mechanism (Theorem 5.1). If in addition to pt-acyclicity we require ``reallocation-'' and ``vacancy-fairness'' for couples, the so-called dictator-bidictator placement mechanism is the unique fair and efficient placement mechanism (Theorem 5.2). Finally, for general student placement problems, we show that pt-acyclicity may not be sufficient for the existence of a fair and efficient placement mechanism (Examples 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6). We identify a sufficient condition such that the so-called sequential placement mechanism produces a fair and efficient allocation (Theorem 5.3).

Does bounded rationality lead to individual heterogeneity? The impact of the experimentation process and of memory constraints

In this paper we explore the effect of bounded rationality on the convergence of individual behavior toward equilibrium. In the context of a Cournot game with a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium, firms are modeled as adaptive economic agents through a genetic algorithm. Computational experiments show that (1) there is remarkable heterogeneity across identical but boundedly rational agents; (2) such individual heterogeneity is not simply a consequence of the random elements contained in the genetic algorithm; (3) the more rational agents are in terms of memory abilities and pre-play evaluation of strategies, the less heterogeneous they are in their actions. At the limit case of full rationality, the outcome converges to the standard result of uniform individual behavior.

Procedurally fair and stable matching

We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair and stable mechanisms: employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999) and the random order mechanism (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990, Ma, 1996). For both mechanisms we give various examples of probability distributions on the set of stable matchings and discuss properties that differentiate employment by lotto and the random order mechanism. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism, that combines aspects of procedural and "endstate'' fairness. Aldershof et al. (1999) and Ma (1996) that exist on the probability distribution induced by both mechanisms. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism.

Fair procedures. Evidence from games involving lotteries

Procedural fairness plays a prominent role in the social discourse concerning the marketplace in particular, and social institutions in general. Random procedures are a simple case, and they have found application in several important social allocation decisions. We investigate random procedures in the laboratory. We find that an unbiased random procedure is an acceptable substitute for an unbiased allocation: similar patterns of acceptance and rejection result when either is inserted as a feasible proposal in a sequential battle-of-the-sexes. We also find that unbiasedness, known to be a crucial characteristic of allocation fairness, is important to procedural fairness: in the context of a random offer game, a biased outcome is more readily accepted when chosen by an unbiased random draw than by one that is biased. Procedural fairness is conceptually different than allocation fairness or attribution-based behavior, and none of the current models of fairness and reciprocity captures our results. Post hoc extension of one of these models (ERC) suggests that a deeper understanding of procedural fairness requires further investigation of competing fairness norms.

Cooperative vs. non-cooperative mechanisms in the EU decision making process

According to the account of the European Union (EU) decision making proposed in this paper, this is a bargaining process during which actors shift their policy positions with a view to reaching agreements on controversial issues.

From creative ideas to new emerging ventures: the process of identification and exploitation among finnish design entrepreneurs

This study focuses on identification and exploitation processes among Finnish design entrepreneurs (i.e. selfemployed industrial designers). More specifically, this study strives to find out what design entrepreneurs do when they create new ventures, how venture ideas are identified and how entrepreneurial processes are organized to identify and exploit such venture ideas in the given industrial context. Indeed, what does educated and creative individuals do when they decide to create new ventures, where do the venture ideas originally come from, and moreover, how are venture ideas identified and developed into viable business concepts that are introduced on the markets? From an academic perspective: there is a need to increase our understanding of the interaction between the identification and exploitation of emerging ventures, in this and other empirical contexts. Rather than assuming that venture ideas are constant in time, this study examines how emerging ideas are adjusted to enable exploitation in dynamic market settings. It builds on the insights from previous entrepreneurship process research. The interpretations from the theoretical discussion build on the assumption that the subprocesses of identification and exploitation interact, and moreover, they are closely entwined with each other (e.g. McKelvie & Wiklund, 2004, Davidsson, 2005). This explanation challenges the common assumption that entrepreneurs would first identify venture ideas and then exploit them (e.g. Shane, 2003). The assumption is that exploitation influences identification, just as identification influences exploitation. Based on interviews with design entrepreneurs and external actors (e.g. potential customers, suppliers and collaborators), it appears as identification and exploitation of venture ideas are carried out in close interaction between a number of actors, rather than alone by entrepreneurs. Due to their available resources, design entrepreneurs have a desire to focus on identification related activities and to find external actors that take care of exploitation related activities. The involvement of external actors may have a direct impact on decisionmaking and various activities along the processes of identification and exploitation, which is something that previous research does not particularly emphasize. For instance, Bhave (1994) suggests both operative and strategic feedback from the market, but does not explain how external parties are actually involved in the decisionmaking, and in carrying out various activities along the entrepreneurial process.

The Monetary policy rules and the inflation process in open emerging

This paper has three objectives. First, it aims at revealing the logic of interest rate setting pursued by monetary authorities of 12 new EU members. Using estimation of an augmented Taylor rule, we find that this setting was not always consistent with the official monetary policy. Second, we seek to shed light on the inflation process of these countries. To this end, we carry out an estimation of an open economy Philips curve (PC). Our main finding is that inflation rates were not only driven by backward persistency but also held a forward-looking component. Finally, we assess the viability of existing monetary arrangements for price stability. The analysis of the conditional inflation variance obtained from GARCH estimation of PC is used for this purpose. We conclude that inflation targeting is preferable to an exchange rate peg because it allowed decreasing the inflation rate and anchored its volatility.

Analysing the innovation process in the EU Integrated Programme, ISAFRUIT

ISAFRUIT is an integrated European Union Project focussed on increasing fruit consumption as a means to improve human health, through evaluating the fruit chain and addressing bottlenecks therein.The innovations which are being developed throughout the ISAFRUIT Project have been analysed to determine both the success factors and the obstacles in reaching the commercialisation stage. Only 9.58% of the deliverables planned within the Project were focussed on developing technological innovations.There is evidence, however, of successes in the development of new innovations arising from the ISAFRUIT Project, with several other potential innovations in the pipeline. Of the technologies identified, 67% are still at the “invention stage”; that is, the stage prior to bridging the so-called “valley of death”, the stage between an invention and an innovation. Those which are considered to have moved over the “valley of death” either had industry partners included in the Project, or had consulted with industry to ensure that the technology was relevant, or met a recognised industry need. Many of the technologies which made less progress did not have the same interactions with industry. A number of other issues were identified which prevented further progress towards innovation. The need for scientists to publish scientific papers, both for their career pathways and to increase their chances of future funding, was identified as one issue, although the filing of patents is now becoming more accepted and recognised. The patenting system is considered complex by many scientists and is not well-understood. Finally, agreements between partners on the sharing of intellectual property rights can cause a delay in the innovation process.