42 resultados para Executive-Legislative Relations
em Consorci de Serveis Universitaris de Catalunya (CSUC), Spain
Resumo:
The search for political determinants of intergovernmental fiscal relations has shaped much of the recent literature on the economic viability of federalism. This study assesses the explanatory power of two competing views about intergovernmental transfers; one emphasizing the traditional neoclassical approach to federal-subnational fiscal relations and the other suggesting that transfers are contingent on the political fortunes and current political vulnerability of each level of government. The author tests these models using data from Argentina, a federation exhibiting one of the most decentralised fiscal systems in the world and severe imbalances in the territorial distribution of legislative and economic resources. It is shown that overrespresented provinces ruled by governors who belong to opposition parties can bring into play their political overrepresentation to attract shares of federal transfers beyond social welfare criteria and to shield themselves from unwanted reforms to increase fiscal co-responsibilty. This finding suggests that decision makers in federal countries must pay close heed to the need to synchronize institutional reforms and fiscal adjustment.
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In this paper we study a class of cooperative sequencing games that arise from one-machine sequencing situations in which chain precedence relations are imposed on the jobs. It is shown that these sequencing games are convex.
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We test hypotheses on the dual role of boards of directors for a sample of large international commercial banks. We find an inverted U shaped relation between bank performance and board size that justifies a large board and imposes an efficient limit to the board’s size; a positive relation between the proportion of non-executive directors and performance; and a proactive role in board meetings. Our results show that bank boards’ composition and functioning are related to directors’ incentives to monitor and advise management. All these relations hold after we control for bank business, institutional differences, size, market power in the banking industry, bank ownership and investors’ legal protection.
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We study how personal relations affect performance in organizations. In the experimental game we use a manager has to assign different degrees of decision power to two employees. These two employees then have to make distributive decisions which affect themselves and the manager. Our focus is on the effects on managers' assignment of decision power and on employees' distributive decisions of one of the employees and the manager knowing each other personally. Our evidence shows that managers tend to favor employees that they personally know and that these employees tend, more than other employees, to favor the manager in their distributive decisions. However, this behavior does not affect the performance of the employees that do not know the manager. All these effects are independent of whether the employees that know the manager are more or less productive than those who do not know the manager. The results shed light on discrimination and nepotism and its consequences for the performance of family firms and other organizations.
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This document includes the results of the research undertaken by the authors on the attempts to organise a Popular Olympiad in Barcelona in 1936.
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We report preliminary findings from analysis of a database under construction. The paper explores the legislative process in search for some of the alleged consequences of cabinet coalitions in a presidential system. Coalition effects should be less evident in the success of executive initiatives: strategic behavior hampers this intuitive measure of performance. Better measures, because less subject to strategic considerations, are the odds of passage of legislators' bills and the time proposals take to be approved. Thus measured, coalition effects are discernible. Analysis of the universe of proposals processed in the fragmented Uruguayan Parliament between 1985 and 2000 reveals that coalition, observed about half the period, swells success rates of coalition members by 60% on average (and by as much as 150% for those close to the president). Event history analysis shows that coalitions cut the wait for an executive bill by 3 months, 1/6th the average wait. The reverse effect is felt on the duration of legislators' bills.
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Report for the scientific sojourn at the University of Linköping between April to July 2007. Monitoring of the air intake system of an automotive engine is important to meet emission related legislative diagnosis requirements. During the research the problem of fault detection in the air intake system was stated as a constraint satisfaction problem over continuous domains with a big number of variables and constraints. This problem was solved using Interval-based Consistency Techniques. Interval-based consistency techniques are shown to be particularly efficient for checking the consistency of the Analytical Redundancy Relations (ARRs), dealing with uncertain measurements and parameters, and using experimental data. All experiments were performed on a four-cylinder turbo-charged spark-ignited SAAB engine located in the research laboratory at Vehicular System Group - University of Linköping.
Resumo:
Essay elaborated by Shaelyne Johnson, undergraduate student of Global Studies at the University of California-Santa Barbara, during her internship at CEO-UAB for the academic course 2008/2009. She compares the organisational structure, goals and objectives of the institutions in the Olympic Movement and the European Integration, in order to find connections between both movements which were caused by globalization. The paper begins with an introduction of the changing world nowadays, followed by an overview on the structural similarities in the historical unfolding between these two parallel movements and, before concluding, new means for international relations are considered. This document is available in English through the digital library at the CEO-UAB Portal of Olympic Studies and the digital repository RECERCAT.
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This paper examines the effects of the current financial crisis on the correlations of four international banking stocks. We find that in the beginning of the crisis banks generally show a transition to a higher correlation followed by a dramatic decline towards the end of 2008. These findings are consistent with both traditional contagion theory and the more recent network theory of contagion. JEL classifications: C51; G15 Keywords: Financial Crises; Contagion; Interbank Markets.
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This paper studies party discipline in a congress within a political agency framework with retrospective voting. Party discipline serves as an incentive device to induce office- motivated congress members to perform in line with the party leadership's objective of controlling both the executive and the legislative branches of government. I show fi rst that the same party is more likely to control both branches of government (i.e., uni ed government) the stronger the party discipline in the congress is. Second, the leader of the governing party imposes more party discipline under uni ed government than does the opposition leader under divided government. Moreover, the incumbents' aggregate performance increases with party discipline, so a representative voter becomes better off. JEL classi cation: D72. Keywords: Party discipline; Political agency; Retrospective voting; Office-motivated politicians.
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"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt"
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"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."
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"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt"