Ressenya de M. GLESSGEN (et al. ed.), 'Ex traditione innovatio. Miscellanea in honorem Max Pfister septuagenarii oblata'. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2002.

Certament ha de ser un motiu de satisfacció per a qualsevol mestre veure l"empremta deixada per l"obra pròpia juntament amb la que es reflecteix en la producció dels seus deixebles. En aquests volums editats en homenatge al professor Max Pfister amb motiu del seu setantè aniversari s"hi combinen encertadament aquestes dues facetes: els editors han estructurat aquest homenatge en dos volums. El primer recull escrits diversos del mateix Max Pfister de tema gal.loromànic o italoromànic; el segon articles de tema divers, però essencialment italoromànic, dels col.laboradors del LEI.

Anti-inflammatory effects of pancreatitis associated protein in inflammatory bowel disease

Background and aims: Increased pancreatitis associated protein (PAP) mRNA has been reported in active inflammatory bowel disease (IBD). The aims of the current study were to characterise PAP production in IBD and the effects of PAP on inflammation. Patients and methods: Serum PAP levels were determined in healthy controls (n¿=¿29), inflammatory controls (n¿=¿14), and IBD patients (n¿=¿171). Ex vivo PAP secretion in intestinal tissue was measured in 56 IBD patients and 13 healthy controls. Cellular origin of PAP was determined by immunohistochemistry. The effects of exogenous PAP on nuclear factor ¿B (NF¿B) activation, proinflammatory cytokine production, and endothelial adhesion molecule expression were also analysed ex vivo. Results: Patients with active IBD had increased serum PAP levels compared with controls, and these levels correlated with clinical and endoscopic disease severity. Ex vivo intestinal PAP synthesis was increased in active IBD and correlated with endoscopic and histological severity of inflammatory lesions. PAP localised to colonic Paneth cells. Incubation of mucosa from active Crohn¿s disease with PAP dose dependently reduced proinflammatory cytokines secretion. PAP prevented TNF-¿ induced NF¿B activation in monocytic, epithelial, and endothelial cells and reduced proinflammatory cytokine mRNA levels and adhesion molecule expression. Conclusions: PAP is synthesised by Paneth cells and is overexpressed in colonic tissue of active IBD. PAP inhibits NF¿B activation and downregulates cytokine production and adhesion molecule expression in inflamed tissue. It may represent an anti-inflammatory mechanism and new therapeutic strategy in IBD.

Experimental evidence on the multibidding mechanism

Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) and Veszteg (2004) propose the use of a multibidding mechanism for situations where agents have to choose a common project. Examples are decisions involving public goods (or public "bads"). We report experimental results to test the practical tractability and effectiveness of the multibidding mechanisms in environments where agents hold private information concerning their valuation of the projects. The mechanism performed quite well in the laboratory: it provided the ex post efficient outcome in roughly three quarters of the cases across the treatments; moreover, the largest part of the subject pool formed their bids according to the theoretical bidding behavior.

Bargaining failures and merger policy

In this paper we study the optimal ex-ante merger policy in a model where merger proposals are the result of strategic bargaining among alternative candidates. We allow for firm asymmetries and, in particular, we emphasize the fact that potential synergies generated by a merger may vary substantially depending on the identity of the participating firms. The model demonstrates that, under some circumstances, relatively inefficient mergers may take place. That is, a particular merger may materialize despite the existence of an alternative merger capable of generating higher social surplus and even higher profits. Such bargaining failures have important implications for the ex-ante optimal merger policy. We show that a more stringent policy than the ex-post optimal reduces the scope of these bargaining failures and raises expected social surplus. We use a bargaining model that is flexible, in the sense that its strategic structure does not place any exogenous restriction on the endogenous likelihood of feasible mergers.

The political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politiciansperceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters.To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknownand investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politiciansmake too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannotbe fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary tothe conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may,under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study howpolitical rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistentwith a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection.They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economicuncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.