Tracking the invisible hand: Convergence of double auctions to competitive equilibrium

Economics is the science of want and scarcity. We show that want andscarcity, operating within a simple exchange institution (double auction),are sufficient for an economy consisting of multiple inter--related marketsto attain competitive equilibrium (CE). We generalize Gode and Sunder's(1993a, 1993b) single--market finding to multi--market economies, andexplore the role of the scarcity constraint in convergence of economies to CE.When the scarcity constraint is relaxed by allowing arbitrageurs in multiple markets to enter speculative trades, prices still converge to CE,but allocative efficiency of the economy drops. \\Optimization by individual agents, often used to derive competitive equilibria,are unnecessary for an actual economy to approximately attain such equilibria.From the failure of humans to optimize in complex tasks, one need not concludethat the equilibria derived from the competitive model are descriptivelyirrelevant. We show that even in complex economic systems, such equilibriacan be attained under a range of surprisingly weak assumptions about agentbehavior.

Variable Very-High-Energy Gamma-Ray Emission from the Microquasar LS I +61 303

Microquasars are binary star systems with relativistic radio-emitting jets. They are potential sources of cosmic rays and can be used to elucidate the physics of relativistic jets. We report the detection of variable gamma-ray emission above 100 gigaelectron volts from the microquasar LS I 61 + 303. Six orbital cycles were recorded. Several detections occur at a similar orbital phase, which suggests that the emission is periodic. The strongest gamma-ray emission is not observed when the two stars are closest to one another, implying a strong orbital modulation of the emission or absorption processes.

Monte Carlo simulation of x-ray emission by kilovolt electron bombardment

A physical model for the simulation of x-ray emission spectra from samples irradiated with kilovolt electron beams is proposed. Inner shell ionization by electron impact is described by means of total cross sections evaluated from an optical-data model. A double differential cross section is proposed for bremsstrahlung emission, which reproduces the radiative stopping powers derived from the partial wave calculations of Kissel, Quarles and Pratt [At. Data Nucl. Data Tables 28, 381 (1983)]. These ionization and radiative cross sections have been introduced into a general-purpose Monte Carlo code, which performs simulation of coupled electron and photon transport for arbitrary materials. To improve the efficiency of the simulation, interaction forcing, a variance reduction technique, has been applied for both ionizing collisions and radiative events. The reliability of simulated x-ray spectra is analyzed by comparing simulation results with electron probe measurements.

The Analysis of interval censoring and double censoring via Markov chain Monte Carlo methods

L'Anàlisi de la supervivència s'utilitza en diferents camps per analitzar el temps transcorregut entre dos esdeveniments. El que distingeix l'anàlisi de la supervivència d'altres àrees de l'estadística és que les dades normalment estan censurades. La censura en un interval apareix quan l'esdeveniment final d'interès no és directament observable i només se sap que el temps de fallada està en un interval concret. Un esquema de censura més complex encara apareix quan tant el temps inicial com el temps final estan censurats en un interval. Aquesta situació s'anomena doble censura. En aquest article donem una descripció formal d'un mètode bayesà paramètric per a l'anàlisi de dades censurades en un interval i dades doblement censurades així com unes indicacions clares de la seva utilització o pràctica. La metodologia proposada s'ilustra amb dades d'una cohort de pacients hemofílics que es varen infectar amb el virus VIH a principis dels anys 1980's.

Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm's minimum acceptable price and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price, there exists a range of discount factors for which the monopoly outcome with equal sharing is sustainable in the uniform price auction, but not in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this out-come. We extend these results to the case where firms may set bids that are arbitrary step functions of price-quantity pairs with any finite number of price steps. Surprisingly, under the Maximum Accepted Price rule, firms need employ no more than two price steps to minimize the value of the discount factor

Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint

I consider the problem of assigning agents to objects where each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the true preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism will implement both in Nash and strong Nash the set of envy-free allocations. The distinguishing feature of the mechanism is that it treats the announced preferences as the true ones and selects an envy-free allocation with respect to the announced preferences.

Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions

We report on a series of experiments that examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric and asymmetric bidders. To study the extent of strategic behavior, we use an experimental design that elicits bidders' complete bid functions in each round (auction) of the experiment. In the aggregate, behavior is consistent with the basic equilibrium predictions for risk neutral or homogenous risk averse bidders (extent of bid shading, average seller's revenues and deviations from equilibrium). However, when we look at the extent of best reply behavior and the shape of bid functions, we find that individual behavior is not in line with the received equilibrium models, although it exhibits strategic sophistication.

Bidding at sequential first-price auctions with(out) supply uncertainty: a laboratory analysis

We report on a series of experiments that test the effects of an uncertain supply on the formation of bids and prices in sequential first-price auctions with private-independent values and unit-demands. Supply is assumed uncertain when buyers do not know the exact number of units to be sold (i.e., the length of the sequence). Although we observe a non-monotone behavior when supply is certain and an important overbidding, the data qualitatively support our price trend predictions and the risk neutral Nash equilibrium model of bidding for the last stage of a sequence, whether supply is certain or not. Our study shows that behavior in these markets changes significantly with the presence of an uncertain supply, and that it can be explained by assuming that bidders formulate pessimistic beliefs about the occurrence of another stage.

Auctions for government securities: a laboratory comparison of uniform, discriminatory and spanish designs

The Bank of Spain uses a unique auction format to sell government bonds, which can be seen as a hybrid of a uniform and a discriminatory auction. For winning bids above the average winning bid, buyers are charged the average winning bid, otherwise they pay their respective bids. We report on an experiment that compares this auction format to the discriminatory format, used in most other countries, and to the uniform format. Our design is based on a common value model with multi-unit supply and two-unit demand. The results show significantly higher revenue with the Spanish and the uniform formats than with the discriminatory one, while volatility of prices over time is significantly lower in the discriminatory format than in the Spanish and uniform cases. Actual price dispersion is significantly larger in the discriminatory than in the Spanish. Our data also exhibit the use of bid-spreading strategies in all three designs.

Implementing a double dividend: recycling ecotaxes towards lower labour taxes

In this paper we follow the tradition of applied general equilibrium modelling of the Walrasian static variety to study the empirical viability of a double dividend (green, welfare, and employment) in the Spanish economy. We consider a counterfactual scenario in which an ecotax is levied on the intermediate and final use of energy goods. Under a revenue neutral assumption, we evaluate the real income and employment impact of lowering payroll taxes. To appraise to what extent the model structure and behavioural assumptions may influence the results, we perform simulations under a range of alternative model and policy scenarios. We conclude that a double dividend –better environmental quality, as measured by reduced CO2 emissions, and improved levels of employment– may be an achievable goal of economic policy.

Asymmetric demand information in uniform and discriminatory call auctions: an experimental analysis motivated by electricity markets

We study the outcomes of experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty. Our study is motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. Our main aim is to compare the effect of asymmetric demand-information between sellers on the performance of the two auction institutions. In our baseline conditions all sellers have the same information, whereas in our treatment conditions some sellers have better information than others. In both information conditions we find that average transaction prices and price volatility are not significantly different under the two auction institutions. However, when there is asymmetric information among sellers the discriminatory auction is significantly less efficient. These results are not in line with the typical arguments made in favor of discriminatory pricing in electricity industries; namely, lower consumer prices and less price volatility. Moreover, our results provide some indication that discriminatory auctions reduce technical efficiency relative to uniform auctions.

A relative double commutant theorem for hereditary sub-C*-algebras

We prove a double commutant theorem for hereditary subalgebras of a large class of C*-algebras, partially resolving a problem posed by Pedersen[8]. Double commutant theorems originated with von Neumann, whose seminal result evolved into an entire field now called von Neumann algebra theory. Voiculescu proved a C*-algebraic double commutant theorem for separable subalgebras of the Calkin algebra. We prove a similar result for hereditary subalgebras which holds for arbitrary corona C*-algebras. (It is not clear how generally Voiculescu's double commutant theorem holds.)

Trade of permits for greenhouse gas emissions; bilateral trade need not be the answer

The Kyoto Protocol sets national quotas on CO2 emissions and allows international trade of these quotas. We argue that this trade is characterized by asymmetric, identity-dependent externalities, and show that bilateral trade may not be sufficient for an efficient allocation of emissions. We derive conditions under which bilateral trade does improve the allocation of permits. The conditions are strong. In this sense, we argue that, for emissions permits, market design matters.

Model structures on the category of small double categories

In this paper we obtain several model structures on DblCat, the category of small double categories. Our model structures have three sources. We first transfer across a categorification-nerve adjunction. Secondly, we view double categories as internal categories in Cat and take as our weak equivalences various internal equivalences defined via Grothendieck topologies. Thirdly, DblCat inherits a model structure as a category of algebras over a 2-monad. Some of these model structures coincide and the different points of view give us further results about cofibrant replacements and cofi brant objects. As part of this program we give explicit descriptions and discuss properties of free double categories, quotient double categories, colimits of double categories, and several nerves and categorifications.