Elections in 2009? Progress and obstacles in the construction of peace in the Ivory Coast

In 2002 in the Ivory Coast three months of armed conflict ended with the division of the country. Two regions were separated by an interposition line controlled by the French Forces Licorne. This significant peace process was maintained over time, but characterized for lack of mutual confidence and political immobility, which led to an impasse and the continuation of Laurent Gbagbo in the presidency. Moreover, the peace building process was less successful because the different political agreements failed to address some of the main national problems, such as land property and identity issues. The following paper aims first to analyze the main facts and causes that instigated the conflict since the coup d’état in 2002. Secondly, the paper will analyze the peace process and point out the key elements of the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement (2007): the creation of a new and unique armed forces structure, as well as the identification of the population and implementation of an electoral process. The main goal is to provide the International Catalan Institute for Peace (ICIP) a working tool in order to send an electoral observation mission to this African country by November 2009.

Uncertainty, electoral Incentives and political myopia

In this paper, we study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability where the key elements are informational frictions and uncertainty. We build a framework where political ability is ex-ante unknown and policy choices are not perfectly observable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians invest too little in costly policies with future returns in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reelection probability. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty reduces political myopia and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. We use the model to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximise social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of our theory are consistent with a number of stylised facts and with a new empirical observation documented in this paper: aggregate uncertainty, measured by economic volatility, is associated to better ...scal discipline in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Electoral Platforms, Implemented Policies, and Abstention

Recent studies of American politics evidence that political polarization of both the electorate and the political elite have moved 'almost in tandem for the past half century' (McCarty et al., 2003, p.2), and that party polarization has steadily increased since the 1970s. On the other hand, the empirical literature on party platforms and implemented policies has consistently found an imperfect but nonnegligible correlation between electoral platforms and governmental policies: while platforms tend to be polarized, policies are moderate or centrist. However, existing theoretical models of political competition are not manifestly compatible with these observations. In this paper, we distinguish between electoral platforms and implemented policies by incorporating a non-trivial policy-setting process. It follows that voters may care not only about the implemented policy but also about the platform they support with their vote. We find that while parties tend to polarize their positions, the risk of alienating their constituency prevents them from radicalizing. The analysis evidences that the distribution of the electorate, and not only the (expected) location of a pivotal voter, matters in determining policies. Our results are consistent with the observation of polarized platforms and moderate policies, and the alienation and indifference components of abstention.

Electoral platforms, implemented policies and abstention

Recent studies of American politics evidence that political polarization of both the electorate and the political elite have moved 'almost in tandem for the past half century' (McCarty et al., 2003, p.2), and that party polarization has steadily increased since the 1970s. On the other hand, the empirical literature on party platforms and implemented policies has consistently found an imperfect but nonnegligible correlation between electoral platforms and governmental policies: while platforms tend to be polarized, policies are moderate or centrist. However, existing theoretical models of political competition are not manifestly compatible with these observations.In this paper, we distinguish between electoral platforms and implemented policies by incorporating a non-trivial policy-setting process. It follows that voters may care not only about the implemented policy but also about the platform they support with their vote. We find that while parties tend to polarize their positions, the risk of alienating their constituency prevents them from radicalizing. The analysis evidences that the distribution of the electorate, and not only the (expected) location of a pivotal voter, matters in determining policies. Our results are consistent with the observation of polarized platforms and moderate policies, and the alienation and indifference components of abstention.

Uncertainty, electoral incentives and political myopia

We study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability where the key elements are informational frictions and uncertainty. We build aframework where political ability is ex-ante unknown and policy choices are not perfectlyobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians invest too little in costly policies withfuture returns in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reelection probability.Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty reduces political myopia and may, undersome conditions, increase social welfare. We use the model to study how political rewardscan be set so as to maximise social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limitto governments. The predictions of our theory are consistent with a number of stylised factsand with a new empirical observation documented in this paper: aggregate uncertainty, measured by economic volatility, is associated to better fiscal discipline in a panel of 20 OECDcountries.

Los Efectos del sistema electoral europeo en España: los partidos políticos de ámbito no estatal

A lo largo de este artículo se analizan los efectos del sistema electoral europeo en España sobre los partidos políticos de ámbito no estatal. Por un lado, se estudia el funcionamiento de la normativa electoral española, subrayando la sobrerepresentación de unos partidos políticos y la infrarepresentación de otros en función del ámbito territorial organizativo de la formación política. Por otro lado, se presentan datos sistemáticos y comparados que demuestran esta distorsión de la representación política –fruto de la normativa electoral-, y dibujamos la estrategia electoral que los partidos políticos afectados negativamente desarrollan: las coaliciones electorales. Pero, ¿en base a qué criterios se organizan tales coaliciones electorales? El enfoque multivariable –la circunscripción, la magnitud electoral y el número de eurodiputados españoles- nos va permitir responder a esta y otras preguntas. El objetivo es ahondar en el debate sobre la normativa electoral en la arena política europea.

El Comportament electoral dels espanyols al referèndum de la Constitució Europea

Aquest paper tracta dels resultats del referèndum sobre la Constitució Europea que es va celebrar a Espanya el 20 de febrer de 2005. Hi trobem un panorama general del context en el qual se celebrà la consulta, i, a través de l’anàlisi d’enquestes postelectorals, analitza la composició del vot afirmatiu i del negatiu, la posició dels diferents partits polítics i el comportament electoral dels diversos actors socials, dividits per classe social, religió, edat, gènere, territori, etc. També hi ha una anàlisi de l’abstenció i de la participació a Espanya en aquest cas.

The effect of candidate quality on electoral equilibrium: an experimental study

When two candidates of different quality compete in a one dimensional policy space, the equilibrium outcomes are asymmetric and do not correspond to the median. There are three main effects. First, the better candidate adopts more centrist policies than the worse candidate. Second, the equilibrium is statistical, in the sense that it predicts a probability distribution of outcomes rather than a single degenerate outcome. Third, the equilibrium varies systematically with the level of uncertainty about the location of the median voter. We test these three predictions using laboratory experiments, and find strong support for all three. We also observe some biases and show that they canbe explained by quantal response equilibrium.

El Sistema electoral a Austràlia: convivència en la complexitat democràtica

L’objectiu d’aquestes pàgines és descriure el desenvolupament del sistema electoral a Austràlia des de la perspectiva que comporta tant la seva complexitat com flexibilitat. Una complexitat a què s’ha acostumat el ciutadà australià fruit de la naturalesa federal del país. En comptes que les modificacions en les regles del joc democràtic facin perillar la credibilitat del poder polític, Austràlia sempre ha conservat una ferma evolució política a partir dels eixos de buscar la millor representació ciutadana. Aquesta diversitat i sofisticació constant no han portat a la ciutadania a una desinhibició de les regles democràtiques, sinó que s’ha combinat amb una participació electoral obligada dels ciutadans que els implica directament amb el seu sistema polític.