The Simple Economics of Conglomeration with Bankruptcy Costs: Separate or Joint Financing?

Which projects should be financed through separate non-recourse loans (or limited- liability companies) and which should be bundled into a single loan? In the pres- ence of bankruptcy costs, this conglomeration decision trades off the benefit of co- insurance with the cost of risk contamination. This paper characterize this tradeoff for projects with binary returns, depending on the mean, variability, and skewness of returns, the bankruptcy recovery rate, the correlation across projects, the number of projects, and their heterogeneous characteristics. In some cases, separate financing dominates joint financing, even though it increases the interest rate or the probability of bankruptcy.

The economics of organized crime and optimal law enforcement

This paper extends the optimal law enforcement literature to organized crime.We model the criminal organization as a vertical structure where the principal extracts some rents from the agents through extortion. Depending on the principal's information set, threats may or may not be credible. As long as threats are credible, the principal is able to fully extract rents.In that case, the results obtained by applying standard theory of optimal law enforcement are robust: we argue for a tougher policy. However, when threats are not credible, the principal is not able to fully extract rents and there is violence. Moreover, we show that it is not necessarily true that a tougher law enforcement policy should be chosen when in presence of organized crime.

On the justice of voting systems

What are the best voting systems in terms of utilitarianism? Or in terms of maximin, or maximax? We study these questions for the case of three alternatives and a class of structurally equivalent voting rules. We show that plurality, arguably the most widely used voting system, performs very poorly in terms of remarkable ideals of justice, such as utilitarianism or maximin, and yet is optimal in terms of maximax. Utilitarianism is bestapproached by a voting system converging to the Borda count, while the best way to achieve maximin is by means of a voting system converging to negative voting. We study the robustness of our results across different social cultures, measures of performance, and population sizes.

The economics of infertility

Infertility is a growing issue that affects thousands of Spanish couples; increasingly there are more and more people who cannot raise a family by themselves. Instead they have to resort to ART, adoption -local or international- or surrogacy abroad, a practice that many couples consider but that isn’t legalized in Spain. In this paper we have broken down each option in detail by analysing the market, differentiating its variants and specific steps, calculating its “price” and suggesting possible improvements that could be made from an economic perspective. We end our paper with the “SWOT” analysis of a hypothetical surrogacy market in Spain by calculating an estimated price, using the US as a reference, and the degree of acceptance it would have, based on the results of random surveys.

Voting with preferences over margins of victory

This paper analyzes a two-alternative voting model with the distinctive feature that voters have preferences over margins of victory. We study voting contests with a finite as well as an infinite number of voters, and with and without mandatory voting. The main result of the paper is the existence and characterization of a unique equilibrium outcome in all those situations. At equilibrium, voters who prefer a larger support for one of the alternatives vote for such alternative.The model also provides a formal argument for the conditional sincerity voting condition in Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) and the benefit of voting function in Llavador (2006). Finally, we offer new insights on explaining why some citizens may vote strategically for an alternative different from the one declared as the most preferred.

The survival of the welfare state

This paper provides an analytical characterization of Markov perfectequilibria in a politico-economic model with repeated voting, whereagents vote over distortionary income redistribution. The key featureof the theory is that the future constituency of redistributive policiesdepends positively on the current level of redistribution, since thisaffects both private investments and the future distribution of voters.Agents vote rationally and fullly anticipate the effects of their politicalchoice on both private incentives and future voting outcomes. The modelfeatures multiple equilibria. In "pro-welfare" equilibria, both welfarestate policies and their effects on distribution persist forever. In"anti-welfare equilibria", even a majority of beneficiaries ofredistributive policies vote strategically so as to induce the formationof a future majority that will vote for zero redistribution.

On the origins of electoral systems and political parties. The role of elections in multi-member districts

The old, understudied electoral system composed of multi-member districts, open ballot and plurality rule is presented as the most remote scene of the origin of both political parties and new electoral systems. A survey of the uses of this set of electoral rules in different parts of the world during remote and recent periods shows its wide spread. A model of voting by this electoral system demonstrates that, while it can produce varied and pluralistic representation, it also provides incentives to form factional or partisan candidacies. Famous negative reactions to the emergence of factions and political parties during the 18th and 19th centuries are reinterpreted in this context. Many electoral rules and procedures invented since the second half of the 19th century, including the Australian ballot, single-member districts, limited and cumulative ballots, and proportional representation rules, derived from the search to reduce the effects of the originating multi-member district system in favor of a single party sweep. The general relations between political parties and electoral systems are restated to account for the foundational stage here discussed.

Immigration and the survival of the welfare state

This paper analyzes the political sustainability of the welfare state in a model where immigration policy is also endogenous. In the model, the skills of the native population are affected by immigration and skill accumulation. Moreover, immigrants affect future policies, once they gain the right to vote. The main finding is that the long-run survival of redistributive policies is linked to an immigration policy specifying both skill and quantity restrictions. In particular, in steady state the unskilled majority admits a limited inflow of unskilled immigrants in order to offset growth in the fraction of skilled voters and maintain a high degree of income redistribution.Interestingly, equilibrium immigration policy shifts from unrestricted skilled immigration,when the country is skill-scarce, to restricted unskilled immigration, as the fraction of native skilled workers increases. The analysis also suggests a new set of variables that may help explain international differences in immigration restrictions.

Candidate stability and voting correspondences

We study the incentives of candidates to enter or to exit elections in order to strategically affect the outcome of a voting correspondence. We extend the results of Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (2000), who only considered single-valued voting procedures by admitting that the outcomes of voting may consist of sets of candidates. We show that, if candidates form their preferences over sets according to Expected Utility Theory and Bayesian updating, every unanimous and non dictatorial voting correspondence violates candidate stability. When candidates are restricted to use even chance prior distributions, only dictatorial or bidictatorial rules are unanimous and candidate stable. We also analyze the implications of using other extension criteria to define candidate stability that open the door to positive results.

Open source software expectations in retail businesses of Igualada : an exploratory study

The emergence of open source software in the last years has become a common topic of study in different fields, from the most technical characteristics to the economical aspects. This paper examines the current status about the literature dealing with economics of open source and explores the uses, infrastructure and expectations of retail businesses and institutions of the town of Igualda about it. This qualitative case study finds out that the current equipment and level of uses of ICTs are low and that the current situation of the town stores is receptive to a potential introduction of open source software.

Turnout, political preferences and information: Experimental evidence from Perú

Electoral institutions that encourage citizens to vote are widely used around the world. Yet littleis known about the effects of such institutions on voter participation and the composition of the electorate.In this paper, I combine a field experiment with a change in Peruvian voting laws to identify theeffect of monetary (dis-)incentives on voting. Using the random variation in the fine for abstention andan objective measure of turnout at the individual level, I estimate the elasticity of voting with respectto cost to be -0.21. Consistent with the theoretical model presented, the reduction in turnout inducedby the reduction in the fine is driven by voters who (i) are in the center of the political spectrum, (ii)are less interested in politics, and (iii) hold less political information. However, voters who respondto changes in the cost of abstention do not have different preferences for policies than those who voteregardless of the cost. Further, involvement in politics, as measured by the decision to acquire politicalinformation, seems to be independent of the level of the fine. Additional results indicate that thereduction in the fine does not affect the incidence of vote buying, but increases the price paid for avote.

An economic theory of church strictness

This paper makes several contributions to the growing literatureon the economics of religion. First, we explicitly introduce spatial-location models into the economics of religion. Second, we offer a newexplanation for the observed tendency of state (monopoly) churches tolocate toward the "low-tension" end of the "strictness continuum" (ina one-dimensional product space): This result is obtained through theconjunction of "benevolent preferences" (denominations care about theaggregate utility of members) and asymmetric costs of going to a moreor less strict church than one prefers.We also derive implications regarding the relationship between religiousstrictness and membership. The driving forces of our analysis, religiousmarket interactions and asymmetric costs of membership, high-light newexplanations for some well-established stylized facts. The analysis opensthe way to new empirical tests, aimed at confronting the implications ofour model against more traditional explanations.

Sweet diversity: Colonial goods and the rise of European living standards after 1492

When did overseas trade start to matter for living standards? Traditional real-wage indices suggest that living standards in Europe stagnated before 1800. In this paper, we argue thatwelfare rose substantially, but surreptitiously, because of an influx of new goods as a result ofoverseas trade. Colonial luxuries such as tea, coffee, and sugar transformed European diets afterthe discovery of America and the rounding of the Cape of Good Hope. These goods became household items in many countries by the end of the 18th century. We use three different methodsto calculate welfare gains based on price data and the rate of adoption of these new colonialgoods. Our results suggest that by 1800, the average Englishman would have been willing to forego 10% or more of his income in order to maintain access to sugar and tea alone. These findings are robust to a wide range of alternative assumptions, data series, and valuation methods.

Anàlisi dels fluxos d'aigua, energia i mobilitat a cinc nuclis turístics de Menorca

Menorca és una illa del Mediterrani occidental i una important destinació turística. El turisme estival és un pilar de l’economia de l’illa i té implicacions en tots els aspectes d’aquesta. Una bona part dels turistes es concentren en nuclis turístics costaners dedicats a una única activitat (l’allotjament de turistes). En aquest projecte s’estudien els consums i els potencials de captació d’aigua i energia de cinc nuclis turístics menorquins i alguns dels seus establiments turístics i se n’avalua el potencial d’autosuficiència. També es fa un estudi de mobilitat dels turistes, a partir del qual es quantifica el cost energètic de la mobilitat i les emissions de CO2 que se’n deriven. Les eines utilitzades han estat enquestes i Sistemes d’Informació Geogràfica. Els resultats mostren que el consum hídric per persona és molt variable (de 98 a 466 litres diaris). El consum elèctric per persona és més homogeni que el d’aigua (entre 5 i 10 kWh·persona-1·dia-1 a nivell de nucli turístic) i presenta valors superiors en allotjaments del tipus hotel que del tipus apartaments. Els trajectes d’anada i tornada a l’illa amb avió o vaixell representen més del 80% del cost energètic total de les vacances a Menorca (aprox. 1 MWh per estada) i de les emissions de CO2 associades. Els turistes espanyols recorren un 180% més de distància en desplaçaments a l’interior de l’illa que els d’altres nacionalitats. L’aprofitament d’aigües pluvials podria cobrir menys del 25% de les necessitats hídriques de la majoria d’allotjaments turístics i entre el 28 i el 36% de les necessitats hídriques totals dels nuclis turístics, mantenint-se els nivells actuals de consum. La captació d’energia solar fotovoltaica in situ podria arribar a suplir entre el 50 i el 90% del consum d’energia elèctrica en els nuclis turístics i fins al 100% del mateix en alguns allotjaments turístics.