North-south trade and directed technical change

In a world where poor countries provide weak protection for intellectual propertyrights, market integration shifts technical change in favor of rich nations. Throughthis channel, free trade may amplify international income differences. At the sametime, integration with countries where intellectual property rights are weakly protectedcan slow down the world growth rate. A crucial implication of these results is thatprotection of intellectual property is most beneficial in open countries. This prediction,which is novel in the literature, finds support in the data on a panel of 53 countriesobserved in the years 1965-1990.

Globalization, Divergence and Stagnation

In a world where poor countries provide weak protection for intellectual property rights, market integration shifts technical change in favor of rich nations. Through this channel, free trade may amplify international income differences. At the same time, integration with countries where intellectual property rights are weakly protected can slow down the world growth rate. A crucial implication of these results is that protection of intellectual property is most beneficial in open countries. This prediction, which is novel in the literature, finds support in the data on a panel of 53 countries observed in the years 1965-1990.

North-South trade and directed technical change

In a world where poor countries provide weak protection for intellectual property rights (IPRs), market integration shifts technical change in favor of rich nations. Through this channel, free trade may amplify international income differences. At the same time, integration with countries where IPRs are weakly protected can slow down the world growth rate. An important implication of these results is that protection of intellectual property is most beneficial in open countries. This prediction, which is novel in the literature, is consistent with evidence from a panel of 53 countries observed in the years 1965-1990. The paper also provides empirical support for the mechanism linking North-South trade to the direction of technical change: an increase in import penetration from low-wage, low-IPRs, countries is followed by a sharp fall in R&D investment in a panel of US manufacturing sectors.

Competing engines of growth: Innovation and standardization

We study a dynamic general equilibrium model where innovation takes theform of the introduction of new goods whose production requires skilled workers.Innovation is followed by a costly process of standardization, whereby these newgoods are adapted to be produced using unskilled labor. Our framework highlightsa number of novel results. First, standardization is both an engine of growth anda potential barrier to it. As a result, growth is an inverse U-shaped function ofthe standardization rate (and of competition). Second, we characterize the growthand welfare maximizing speed of standardization. We show how optimal protection of intellectual property rights affecting the cost of standardization vary withthe skill-endowment, the elasticity of substitution between goods and other parameters. Third, we show that, depending on how competition between innovatingand standardizing firms is modelled and on parameter values, a new type of multiplicity of equilibria may arise. Finally, we study the implications of our model forthe skill-premium and we illustrate novel reasons for linking North-South trade tointellectual property rights protection.

Intellectual property rights and efficient firm organization

I show that intellectual property rights yield static efficiency gains, irrespective oftheir dynamic role in fostering innovation. I develop a property-rights model of firmorganization with two dimensions of non-contractible investment. In equilibrium, thefirst best is attained if and only if ownership of tangible and intangible assets is equallyprotected. If IP rights are weaker, firm structure is distorted and efficiency declines:the entrepreneur must either integrate her suppliers, which prompts a decline in theirinvestment; or else risk their defection, which entails a waste of her human capital. Mymodel predicts greater prevalence of vertical integration where IP rights are weaker,and a switch from integration to outsourcing over the product cycle. Both empiricalpredictions are consistent with evidence on multinational companies. As a normativeimplication, I find that IP rights should be strong but narrowly defined, to protect abusiness without holding up its potential spin-offs.

North-South convergence and the allocation of CO2 emissions

We postulate a two-region world, comprised of North (calibrated after the US) and South(calibrated after China). Our optimization results show the compatibility of the following threedesiderata:(1) Global CO2 emissions follow a conservative path that leads to the stabilizationof concentrations at 450 ppm.(2) North and South converge to a path of sustained growth at 1% per year (28.2%per generation) in 2075.(3) During the transition to the steady state, North also grows at 1% per year whileSouth s rates of growth are markedly higher.The transition paths require a drastic reduction of the share of emissions allocated to North,large investments in knowledge, both in North and South, as well as very large investments ineducation in South. Surprisingly, in order to sustain North s utility growth rate, some output mustbe transferred from South to North during the transition.Although undoubtedly subject to many caveats, our results support a degree of optimism byproviding prima facie evidence of the possibility of tackling climate change in a way that is fairboth across generations and across regions while allowing for positive rates of humandevelopment.

Property as an economic concept: Reconciling legal and economic conceptions of property rights in a Coasean framework

Adopting a simplistic view of Coase (1960), most economic analyses of property rightsdisregard both the key advantage that legal property rights (that is, in rem rights) provide torightholders in terms of enhanced enforcement, and the difficulties they pose to acquirers interms of information asymmetry about legal title. Consequently, these analyses tend to overstatethe role of "private ordering" and disregard the two key elements of property law: first, theessential conflict between property (that is, in rem) enforcement and transaction costs; and,second, the institutional solutions created to overcome it, mainly contractual registries capable ofmaking truly impersonal (that is, asset-based) trade viable when previous relevant transactionson the same assets are not verifiable by judges. This paper fills this gap by reinterpreting bothelements within the Coasean framework and thus redrawing the institutional foundations of bothproperty and corporate contracting.

Trade, Extent of the Market, and Economic Growth 1960-1996

We find that trade and domestic market size are robust determinants of economic growth over the 1960-1996 period when trade openness is measured as the US dollar value of imports and exports relative to GDP in PPP US$ ('real openness'). When trade openness is measured as the US dollar value of imports and exports relative to GDP in exchange rate US$ ('nominal openness') however, trade and the size of domestic markets are often non-robust determinants of growth. We argue that real openness is the more appropriate measure of trade and that our empirical results should be seen as evidence in favor of the extent-of-the-market hypothesis.

Trade, extent of the market and economic growth 1960-1996

We find that trade and domestic market size are robust determinants of economic growth overthe 1960-1996 period when trade openness is measured as the US dollar value of imports andexports relative to GDP in PPP US$ ('real openness'). When trade openness is measured asthe US dollar value of imports and exports relative to GDP in exchange rate US$ ('nominalopenness') however, trade and the size of domestic markets are often non-robust determinantsof growth. We argue that real openness is the more appropriate measure of trade and that ourempirical results should be seen as evidence in favor of the extent-of-the-market hypothesis.

Appropriate IPRs, Human Capital Composition and Economic Growth

We generalize a standard technology diffusion model by allowing for IPRs regimes to be endogenously defined by the development level of each country. Also we insert differences in the composition of human capital between North (leader) and South (followers) which shape the relative costs of innovation and imitation. Results show how an optimal growth trajectory is found for the follower country which initially imitates and that, once a "threshold development stage" is reached, optimally switches to innovation by fully enforcing IPRs achieving a higher proximity with the technology frontier in the long-run. Other scenarios, such as a premature increase in the enforcement of IPRs or a switch from imitation to innovation at early stages of development of the followers are found to be sub-optimal.

Explaining High Economic Growth in Small Tourism Countries with a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model

This paper shows that tourism specialisation can help to explain the observed high growth rates of small countries. For this purpose, two models of growth and trade are constructed to represent the trade relations between two countries. One of the countries is large, rich, has an own source of sustained growth and produces a tradable capital good. The other is a small poor economy, which does not have an own engine of growth and produces tradable tourism services. The poor country exports tourism services to and imports capital goods from the rich economy. In one model tourism is a luxury good, while in the other the expenditure elasticity of tourism imports is unitary. Two main results are obtained. In the long run, the tourism country overcomes decreasing returns and permanently grows because its terms of trade continuously improve. Since the tourism sector is relatively less productive than the capital good sector, tourism services become relatively scarcer and hence more expensive than the capital good. Moreover, along the transition the growth rate of the tourism economy holds well above the one of the rich country for a long time. The growth rate differential between countries is particularly high when tourism is a luxury good. In this case, there is a faster increase in the tourism demand. As a result, investment of the small economy is boosted and its terms of trade highly improve.

Economic growth and inequality: the role of fiscal policies

This paper analyses the impact of different instruments of fiscal policy on economic growth as well as on income inequality, using an unbalanced panel of 43 upper-middle and high income countries for the period 1972-2006. We consider and estimate two individual equations explaining growth and inequality in order to assess the incidence of different fiscal policies. Firstly, our approach considers imposing orthogonal assumptions between growth and inequality in both equations, and secondly, it allows growth to be included in the inequality equation, and inequality to be included in the growth equation. The empirical results suggest that an increase in the size of government measured through current expenditures and direct taxes diminishes economic growth while reducing inequality, being public investment the only fiscal policy that may break this trade-off between efficiency and equity, since increases in this item reduces inequality without harming output. Therefore, the results reflect that the trade-off between efficiency and equity that governments often confront when designing their fiscal policies may be avoided.

A global view of economic growth

This paper integrates in a unified and tractable framework some of the key insights of the field of international trade and economic growth. It examines a sequence of theoretical models that share a common description of technology and preferences but differ on their assumptions about trade frictions. By comparing the predictions of these models against each other, it is possible to identify a variety of channels through which trade affects the evolution of world income and its geographical distribution. By comparing the predictions of these models against the data, it is also possible to construct coherent explanations of income differences and long-run trends in economic growth.

Determinants of economic growth: Will data tell?

Many factors inhibiting and facilitating economic growth havebeen suggested. Can agnostics rely on international incomedata to tell them which matter? We find that agnostic priorslead to conclusions that are sensitive to differences acrossavailable income estimates. For example, the PWT 6.2 revisionof the 1960-96 income estimates in the PWT 6.1 leads tosubstantial changes regarding the role of government,international trade, demography, and geography. We concludethat margins of error in international income estimates appeartoo large for agnostic growth empirics.

The growth and diffusion of knowlegde and the theory of the firm

We analyze the implications of a market imperfection related to the inability to establish intellectual property rights, that we label {\it unverifiable communication}. Employees are able to collude with external parties selling ``knowledge capital'' of the firm. The firm organizer engages in strategic interaction simultaneously with employees and competitors, as she introduces endogenous transaction costs in the market for information between those agents. Incentive schemes and communication costs are the key strategic variables used by the firm to induce frictions in collusive markets. Unverifiable communication introduces severe allocative distortions, both at internal product development and at intended sale of information (technology transfer). We derive implications of the model for observable decisions like characteristics of the employment relationship (full employment, incompatibility with other jobs), firms' preferences over cluster characteristics for location decisions, optimal size at entry, in--house development vs sale strategies for innovations and industry evolution.