The Determinants of Entry are not Independent of Start-up Size: Some evidence from Spanish manufacturing

In this paper we explore the determinants of firm start-up size of Spanish manufacturing industries. The industries' barriers to entry affect the ability of potential entrants to enter the markets and the size range at which they decide to enter. In order to examine the relationships between barriers to entry and size we applied the quantile regression techniques. Our results indicate that the variables that characterize the structure of the market, the variables that are related to the behaviour of the incumbent firms and the rate of growth of the industries generate different barriers depending on the initial size of the entrants. Keywords: Entry, regression quantiles, start-up size. JEL classification: L110, L600

A territorial approach to firm entry: The effect of city size

This paper concerns the effects of territorial factors on the processes involved in the creation of manufacturing firms in Spanish cities. Most contributions have focused on regional factors rather than urban ones. Here we assume that it is possible to identify certain urban factors that attract new firms. We use data for the entry of firms in Spanish manufacturing industries between 1994 and 2002. This paper contributes to the existing literature on market entry. Key words: cities, regions, firm entry and Spanish economy. JEL: R0, R12, L60

Firm Size and Short-Term Dynamics in Aggregate Entry and Exit

Much of the research on industry dynamics focuses on the interdependence between the sectorial rates of entry and exit. This paper argues that the size of firms and the reaction-adjustment period are important conditions missed in this literature. I illustrate the effects of this omission using data from the Spanish manufacturing industries between 1994 and 2001. Estimates from systems of equations models provide evidence of a conical revolving door phenomenon and of partial adjustments in the replacement-displacement of large firms. KEYWORDS: aggregation, industry dynamics, panel data, symmetry, simultaneity. JEL CLASSIFICATION: C33, C52, L60, L11

Entry and market selection of firms: a laboratory study

We study competition in experimental markets in which two incumbents face entry by three other firms. Our treatments vary with respect to three factors: sequential vs. block or simultaneous entry, the cost functions of entrants and the amount of time during which incumbents are protected from entry. Before entry incumbents are able to collude in all cases. When all firms' costs are the same entry always leads consumer surplus and profits to their equilibrium levels. When entrants are more efficient than incumbents, entry leads consumer surplus to equilibrium. However, total profits remain below equilibrium, due to the fact that the inefficient incumbents produce too much and efficient entrants produce too little. Market behavior is satisfactory from the consumers' standpoint, but does not yield adequate signals to other potential entrants. These results are not affected by whether entry is simultaneous or sequential. The length of the incumbency phase does have some subtle effects.

Assessing excess profits from different entry regulations

Entry regulations affecting professional services such as pharmacies are common practice in many European countries. We assess the impact of entry regulations on profits estimating a structural model of entry using the information provided by a policy experiment. We use the case of different regional policies governing the opening of new pharmacies in Spain to show that structural models of entry ought to be estimated with data from policy experiments to pin down how entry regulations change payoffs functions of the incumbents. Contrary to the public interest rationales, regulations are not boosting only small town pharmacies payoffs nor increasing all pharmacies payoffs alike. The gains from regulations are very unevenly distributed,suggesting that private interests are shaping the current mix of entry and markup regulations.

A New open economy macroeconomic model with endogenous portfolio diversification and firms entry

This paper provides a new benchmark for the analysis of the international diversi…cation puzzle in a tractable new open economy macroeconomic model. Building on Cole and Obstfeld (1991) and Heathcote and Perri (2009), this model speci…es an equilibrium model of perfect risk sharing in incomplete markets, with endogenous portfolios and number of varieties. Equity home bias may not be a puzzle but a perfectly optimal allocation for hedging risk. In contrast to previous work, the model shows that: (i) optimal international portfolio diversi…cation is driven by home bias in capital goods, independently of home bias in consumption, and by the share of income accruing to labour. The model explains reasonably well the recent patterns of portfolio allocations in developed economies; and (ii) optimal portfolio shares are independent of market dynamics.

Regional Determinants of Firm Entry in a Developing Country

Regional policies aiming to attract new firms are largely based on evidence that originates from Europe, the USA and Japan. This may raise doubts about the usefulness of such policies when applied to developing economies. This paper addresses this issue by providing estimates of the determinants of firm entry in the Argentinean provinces. We find that most of the determinants used in previous studies analysing developed countries are still relevant. However, there is a need for additional explanatory variables that reflect the specificities of developing economies. Key words: firm entry, regional economics, Argentina. JEL: R12; R30; C33

Excess Entry, Ambiguity Seeking, and Competence: An Experimental Investigation

Excess entry refers to the high failure rate of new entrepreneurial ventures. Economic explanations suggest 'hit and run' entrants and risk-seeking behavior. A psychological explanation is that people (entrepreneurs) are overconfident in their abilities (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999). Characterizing entry decisions as ambiguous gambles, we alternatively suggest following Heath and Tversky (1991) that people seek ambiguity when the source of uncertainty is related to their competence. Overconfidence, as such, plays no role. This hypothesis is confirmed in an experimental study that also documents the phenomenon of reference group neglect. Finally, we emphasize the utility that people gain from engaging in activities that contribute to a sense of competence. This is an important force in economic activity that deserves more explicit attention.

Red tape and delayed entry

Does cutting red tape foster entrepreneurship in industries with the potential to expand? We address this question by combining the time needed to comply with government entry procedures in 45 countries with industry-level data on employment growth and growth in the number of establishments during the 1980s. Our main empirical finding is that countries where it takes less time to register new businesses have seen more entry in industries that experienced expansionary global demand and technology shifts. Our estimates take into account that proxying global industry shifts using data from only one country or group of countries with similar entry regulations will in general yield biased results.

Entry regulation and intersectoral reallocation

We study how restrictions on firm entry affect intersectoral factor reallocation when openeconomies experience global economic shocks. In our theoretical framework, countries trade freelyin a range of differentiated sectors that are subject to country-specific and global shocks. Entryrestrictions are modeled as an upper bound on the introduction of new differentiated goods followingshocks. Prices and quantities adjust to clear international goods markets, and wages adjustto clear national labor markets. We show that in general equilibrium, countries with tighter entryrestrictions see less factor reallocation compared to the frictionless benchmark. In our empiricalwork, we compare sectoral employment reallocation across countries in the 1980s and 1990s withproxies for frictionless benchmark reallocation. Our results indicate that the gap between actualand frictionless reallocation is greater in countries where it takes longer to start a firm.

Information acquisition and entry

Before firms decide whether to enter a new market or not, they havethe opportunity to buy information about several variables that might affectthe profitability of this market. Our model differs from the existing literatureon endogenous information acquisition in two respects: (1) there is uncertaintyabout more than one variable, and (2) information is acquired secretly. Whenthe cost of acquiring information is small, entry decisions will be as ifthere was perfect information. Equilibria where each firm acquires only asmall amount of information are more robust than the socially undesirableequilibria where all firms gather all information. Examples illustrate theimportance of assumptions (1) and (2).

Generic entry into a regulated pharmaceutical market

The aim of this paper is to analyse empirically entry decisions by generic firms intomarkets with tough regulation. Generic drugs might be a key driver of competitionand cost containment in pharmaceutical markets. The dynamics of reforms ofpatents and pricing across drug markets in Spain are useful to identify the impact ofregulations on generic entry. Estimates from a count data model using a panel of 86active ingredients during the 1999 2005 period show that the drivers of genericentry in markets with price regulations are similar to less regulated markets: genericfirms entries are positively affected by the market size and time trend, and negativelyaffected by the number of incumbent laboratories and the number of substitutesactive ingredients. We also find that contrary to what policy makers expected, thesystem of reference pricing restrains considerably the generic entry. Short run brandname drug price reductions are obtained by governments at the cost of long runbenefits from fostering generic entry and post-patent competition into the markets.

Free entry does not imply zero profits

Traditional economic wisdom says that free entry in a market will drive profits down to zero. This conclusion is usually drawn under the assumption of perfect information. We assumethat a priori there exists imperfect information about theprofitability of the market, but that potential entrants maylearn the demand curve perfectly at negligible cost byengaging in market research. Even if in equilibrium firmslearn the demand perfectly, profits may be strictly positivebecause of insufficient entry. The mere fact that it will notbecome common knowledge that every entrant has perfectinformation about demand causes this surprising result. Belief means doubt. Knowing means certainty. Introduction to the Kabalah.