La metodología cooperativa como instrumento de investigación en el diseño curricular para la adaptación de asignaturas en el espacio europeo de educación superior, en los ámbitos de enfermería y maestro de educación física

El objeto de estudio parte de un proceso de investigación acción (McKernan, 1999 y Eliot, 1993), el cual estamos llevando a cabo desde hace dos cursos, en el marco del plan piloto para la adaptación de los estudios de la UdG al Espacio Europeo deEducación Superior (EEES). La justificación se enmarca en la demanda del Espacio Europea de Educación Superior, mediante el desarrollo de una educación basada en competencias con el objetivo de partir de una información que responda a unas necesidades reales basadas del Proyecto Tunning. Esta aportación se refleja en una asignatura de libre elección de nuevaincorporación. Esta propuesta, da un énfasis especial en la interacción entre los dos estudios: educación y enfermería. La cooperación interdisciplinar nos ha permitido compartir, interactuar y dialogar de forma crítica para poder seguir avanzando en nuestra propuesta. Estamos plenamente convencidos que la Educación Física bien dosificada, la alimentación cualitativamente equilibrada y unas condiciones higiénicas correctas en un entorno favorable, son pilares de una buena educación para la salud

"The Waste Land", desde los espacios retóricos de inventio, dispositio y elocutio.

Con este poema publicado en 1922 la poesía contemporánea europea descubrirá nuevas vías de creación: desde la introducción de los espacios de la vida urbana hasta el rechazo del sentimentalismo idealista, sin olvidar la búsqueda de las intricadas concepciones de la mente.

First impressions matter: Signalling as a source of policy dynamics

We first establish that policymakers on the Bank of England's Monetary PolicyCommittee choose lower interest rates with experience. We then reject increasingconfidence in private information or learning about the structure of the macroeconomy as explanations for this shift. Instead, a model in which voters signal theirhawkishness to observers better fits the data. The motivation for signalling is consistent with wanting to control inflation expectations, but not career concerns orpleasing colleagues. There is also no evidence of capture by industry. The papersuggests that policy-motivated reputation building may be important for explainingdynamics in experts' policy choices.

What do outside experts bring to a committee? Evidence from the Bank of England

We test whether outside experts have information not available to insiders by usingthe voting record of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee. Memberswith more private information should vote more often against conventional wisdom,which we measure as the average belief of market economists about future interest rates. We find evidence that external members indeed have information notavailable to internals, but also use a quasi-natural experiment to show they mayexaggerate their expertise to obtain reappointment. This implies that an optimalcommittee, even outside monetary policy, should potentially include outsiders, butneeds to manage career concerns.

Estimating Bayesian decision problems with heterogeneous priors

In many areas of economics there is a growing interest in how expertise andpreferences drive individual and group decision making under uncertainty. Increasingly, we wish to estimate such models to quantify which of these drive decisionmaking. In this paper we propose a new channel through which we can empirically identify expertise and preference parameters by using variation in decisionsover heterogeneous priors. Relative to existing estimation approaches, our \Prior-Based Identification" extends the possible environments which can be estimated,and also substantially improves the accuracy and precision of estimates in thoseenvironments which can be estimated using existing methods.

The benefits of limited feedback in organizations

In most firms, managers periodically assess workers' performance. Evidence suggeststhat managers withhold information during these reviews, and some observersargue that this necessarily reduces surplus. This paper assesses the validity of thisargument when workers have career concerns. Disclosure has two effects: it exposesthe worker to uncertainty about future effort levels, but allows him to use current effortto influence his employer's beliefs about future effort. The surplus-maximizingdisclosure policy reveals output realizations in the center of the distribution, butnot in the tails. Thus, it is efficient for firms to reveal some but not all performanceinformation.