Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?

La tesis principal de Butler en Frames of War es que los marcos interpretativos por medio de los cuales nos es posible entender la violencia son parte material y esencial del propio acto de librar una guerra. Del mismo modo que un contenido y su envoltorio a veces no pueden separarse, lo que entendemos como"contenido" (el hecho bélico) está necesariamente enmarcado y no es posible aproximarse a él ajeno a los marcos que lo vehiculan. El marco es una estrategia activa de contención que no sólo contiene lo que es sino también su justificación y su interpretación, y en un contexto de guerra el marco dictamina, además de la justificación, la distinción entre las vidas que merecen ser preservadas y lloradas, y las que no.

The aftermath of Civil War

Using an event-study methodology, this paper analyzes the aftermath of civil war in a cross-section of countries. It focuses on those experiences where the end of conflict marks the beginning of a relatively lasting peace. The paper considers 41 countries involved in internal wars in the period 1960-2003. In order to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the aftermath of war, the paper considers a host of social areas represented by basic indicators of economic performance, health and education, political development, demographic trends, and conflict and security issues. For each of these indicators, the paper first compares the post- and pre-war situations and then examines their dynamic trends during the post-conflict period. It conducts this analysis both in absolute and relative terms, the latter in relation to control groups of otherwise similar countries. The paper concludes that, even though war has devastating effects and its aftermath can be immensely difficult, when the end of war marks the beginning of lasting peace, recovery and improvement are indeed achieved.

Conflict prevention and decentralized governance: some remarks about the state of the art in theory and practice

Is there a link between decentralized governance and conflict prevention? This article tries to answer the question by presenting the state of the art of the intersection of both concepts. Provided that social conflict is inevitable and given the appearance of new threats and types of violence, as well as new demands for security based on people (human security), our societies should focus on promoting peaceful changes. Through an extensive analysis of the existing literature and the study of several cases, this paper suggests that decentralized governance can contribute to these efforts by transforming conflicts, bringing about power-sharing and inclusion incentives of minority groups. Albeit the complexity of assessing its impact on conflict prevention, it can be contended that decentralized governance might have very positive effects on the reduction of causes that bring about conflicts due to its ability to foster the creation of war/violence preventors. More specifically, this paper argues that decentralization can have a positive impact on the so-called triggers and accelerators (short- and medium-term causes).

Poor, hungry and ignorant: Numeracy and the impact of high food prices in industrializing Britain, 1780-1850

This paper uses the ability to recall one s age correctly as an indicator of numeracy.We show that low levels of nutrition impaired numeracy in industrializing England, 1780-1850.Numeracy declined markedly among those born during the war years, especially where wheatwas dear. England s nascent welfare state mitigated the negative effect of high food prices oncognitive skills. Nutrition during early development mattered for labor market outcomes:individuals born in periods or countries with high age heaping were more likely to sort intooccupations with limited intellectual requirements.

Growth accounting in items of turbulence and death: efficiency, technology, capital accumulation and human capital 1929-1950

We employ a non-parametrical approach to growth accounting (Data Envelopment Analysis,DEA) to disentangle the proximate sources of labour productivity growth in 41 nationsbetween 1929 and 1950 by decomposing productivity growth into four components:technological change; efficiency catch-up (movements towards the production frontier),capital accumulation and human capital accumulation. We show that efficiency catch-upgenerally explains productivity growth, whereas technological change and factoraccumulation were limited and distorted by the effects of war. War clearly hamperedefficiency. Moreover, an unbalanced ratio of human capital to physical capital (a gap to thetechnological leader) was crucial for efficiency catching-up.

El mirall de la guerra

Treball que fa un estudi iconogràfic i mitològic del quadre

State capacity and military conflict

In 1500, Europe was composed of hundreds of statelets and principalities, with weak central authority,no monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, and overlapping jurisdictions. By 1800, only ahandful of powerful, centralized nation states remained. We build a model that explains both the emergenceof capable states and growing divergence between European powers. We argue that the impactof war was crucial for state building, and depended on: i) the financial cost of war, and ii) a country sinitial level of domestic political fragmentation. We emphasize the role of the "Military Revolution",which raised the cost of war. Initially, this caused more cohesive states to invest in state capacity, whilemore divided states rationally dropped out of the competition, causing divergence between Europeanstates. As the cost of war escalated further, all states engaged in a "race to the top" towards greater statebuilding.

The Three Horsemen of Growth: Plague, War and Urbanization in Early Modern Europe

How did Europe overtake China? We construct a simple Malthusian model with two sectors, and use it to explain how European per capita incomes and urbanization rates could surge ahead of Chinese ones. That living standards could exceed subsistence levels at all in a Malthusian setting should be surprising. Rising fertility and falling mortality ought to have reversed any gains. We show that productivity growth in Europe can only explain a small fraction of rising living standards. Population dynamics - changes of the birth and death schedules - were far more important drivers of the longrun Malthusian equilibrium. The Black Death raised wages substantially, creating important knock-on effects. Because of Engel's Law, demand for urban products increased, raising urban wages and attracting migrants from rural areas. European cities were unhealthy, especially compared to Far Eastern ones. Urbanization pushed up aggregate death rates. This effect was reinforced by more frequent wars (fed by city wealth) and disease spread by trade. Thus, higher wages themselves reduced population pressure. Without technological change, our model can account for the sharp rise in European urbanization as well as permanently higher per capita incomes. We complement our calibration exercise with a detailed analysis of intra-European growth in the early modern period. Using a panel of European states in the period 1300-1700, we show that war frequency can explain a good share of the divergent fortunes within Europe.

International commodity prices, growth and the outbreak of Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa

To learn more about the effect of economic conditions oncivil war, we examine whether Sub-Saharan civil wars aremore likely to start following downturns in the internationalprice of countries main export commodities. The data showa robust effect of commodity price downturns on the outbreakof civil wars. We also find that Sub-Saharan countries aremore likely to see civil wars following economic downturnsin their main OECD export destinations.

The colonial origins of Civil War

The dominant hypothesis in the literature that studies conflict is that poverty is the main cause of civil wars. We instead analyze the effect of institutions on civil war, controlling for income per capita. In our set up, institutions are endogenous and colonial origins affect civil wars through their legacy on institutions. Our results indicate that institutions, proxied by the protection of property rights, rule of law and the efficiency of the legal system, are a fundamental cause of civil war. In particular, an improvement in institutions from the median value in the sample to the 75th percentile is associated with a 38 percentage points reduction in the incidence of civil wars. Moreover, once institutions are included as explaining civil wars, income does not have any effect on civil war, either directly or indirectly.

Malthusian dynamism and the rise of Europe: Make war, not love

This paper argues that Malthusian regimes are capable of sustained changes in per capita incomes. Shifting mortality and fertility schedules can lead to different steady-state income levels, with long periods of growth during the transition. Europe checked the downward pressure on wages through late marriage, which reduced fertility, and a mortality regime that combined high death rates with high incomes. We argue that both emerged as a result of the Black Death.

The three horsemen of riches: Plague, war and urbanization in early modern Europe

How did Europe escape the "Iron Law of Wages?" We construct a simple Malthusian model withtwo sectors and multiple steady states, and use it to explain why European per capita incomes andurbanization rates increased during the period 1350-1700. Productivity growth can only explain a smallfraction of the rise in output per capita. Population dynamics changes of the birth and death schedules were far more important determinants of steady states. We show how a major shock to population cantrigger a transition to a new steady state with higher per-capita income. The Black Death was such ashock, raising wages substantially. Because of Engel's Law, demand for urban products increased, andurban centers grew in size. European cities were unhealthy, and rising urbanization pushed up aggregatedeath rates. This effect was reinforced by diseases spread through war, financed by higher tax revenues.In addition, rising trade also spread diseases. In this way higher wages themselves reduced populationpressure. We show in a calibration exercise that our model can account for the sustained rise in Europeanurbanization as well as permanently higher per capita incomes in 1700, without technological change.Wars contributed importantly to the "Rise of Europe", even if they had negative short-run effects. We thustrace Europe s precocious rise to economic riches to interactions of the plague shock with the belligerentpolitical environment and the nature of cities.

Gone with the Wind and the Southern Way of Life: the Civil War as described in Margaret Mitchell’s Novel

This essay examines the American Civil War of 1861 – 1865, which is also known as the bloodiest war that the United States has ever experienced. The pretext for the war was the abolition of slavery in the South, and after many battles the Southern states lost: as a consequence, they experienced major changes in their economic and social life. This interesting piece from American history can be traced out throughout the characters’ lives in the novel Gone with the Wind which has been thoroughly analyzed in order to draw nearer and to comprehend the changes in the Southern way of life before and after the war. The author, Margaret Mitchell, was born in Atlanta, Georgia, and grew up with the stories about the war. As a result, Gone with the Wind studies not only its causes, but also the years after its end – a period which is not generally a subject of history and receives little attention – and the effects that such reversals have on former planters and slaves. From the position of contemporaneity, the reader can see that such changes in a society do not end with the laying down of an act, or in this case the end of the war, but they continue during many years; thus, the modern world can draw conclusions and lessons for events that are happening at the moment.

Does land titling matter? The role of land property rights in the war on illicit crops in Colombia

This paper analyzes the role of formalization of land property rights in the war against illicit crops in Colombia. We argue that as a consequence of the increase of state presence and visibility during the period of 2000 and 2009, municipalities with a higher level of formalization of their land property rights saw a greater reduction in the area allocated to illicit crops. We hypothesize that this is due to the increased cost of growing illicit crops on formal land compared to informal, and due to the possibility of obtaining more benets in the newly in- stalled institutional environment when land is formalized. We exploit the variation in the level of formalization of land property rights in a set of municipalities that had their rst cadastral census collected in the period of 1994-2000; this selection procedure guarantees reliable data and an unbiased source of variation. Using fixed effects estimators, we found a signicant negative relationship between the level of formalization of land property rights and the number of hectares allocated to coca crops per municipality. These results remain robust through a number of sensitivity analyses. Our ndings contribute to the growing body of evidence on the positive effects of formal land property rights, and e ective policies in the war on drugs in Colombia.