A Model-to-model analysis of the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma: genetic algorithms vs. evolutionary dynamics

We study the properties of the well known Replicator Dynamics when applied to a finitely repeated version of the Prisoners' Dilemma game. We characterize the behavior of such dynamics under strongly simplifying assumptions (i.e. only 3 strategies are available) and show that the basin of attraction of defection shrinks as the number of repetitions increases. After discussing the difficulties involved in trying to relax the 'strongly simplifying assumptions' above, we approach the same model by means of simulations based on genetic algorithms. The resulting simulations describe a behavior of the system very close to the one predicted by the replicator dynamics without imposing any of the assumptions of the analytical model. Our main conclusion is that analytical and computational models are good complements for research in social sciences. Indeed, while on the one hand computational models are extremely useful to extend the scope of the analysis to complex scenar

A critical application of securitization theory: overcoming the normative dilemma of writing security

This article addresses the normative dilemma located within the application of `securitization,’ as a method of understanding the social construction of threats and security policies. Securitization as a theoretical and practical undertaking is being increasingly used by scholars and practitioners. This scholarly endeavour wishes to provide those wishing to engage with securitization with an alternative application of this theory; one which is sensitive to and self-reflective of the possible normative consequences of its employment. This article argues that discussing and analyzing securitization processes have normative implications, which is understood here to be the negative securitization of a referent. The negative securitization of a referent is asserted to be carried out through the unchallenged analysis of securitization processes which have emerged through relations of exclusion and power. It then offers a critical understanding and application of securitization studies as a way of overcoming the identified normative dilemma. First, it examines how the Copenhagen School’s formation of securitization theory gives rise to a normative dilemma, which is situated in the performative and symbolic power of security as a political invocation and theoretical concept. Second, it evaluates previous attempts to overcome the normative dilemma of securitization studies, outlining the obstacles that each individual proposal faces. Third, this article argues that the normative dilemma of applying securitization can be avoided by firstly, deconstructing the institutional power of security actors and dominant security subjectivities and secondly, by addressing countering or alternative approaches to security and incorporating different security subjectivities. Examples of the securitization of international terrorism and immigration are prominent throughout.

Complementarities between mathematical and computational modeling: the case of the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

We study the properties of the well known Replicator Dynamics when applied to a finitely repeated version of the Prisoners' Dilemma game. We characterize the behavior of such dynamics under strongly simplifying assumptions (i.e. only 3 strategies are available) and show that the basin of attraction of defection shrinks as the number of repetitions increases. After discussing the difficulties involved in trying to relax the 'strongly simplifying assumptions' above, we approach the same model by means of simulations based on genetic algorithms. The resulting simulations describe a behavior of the system very close to the one predicted by the replicator dynamics without imposing any of the assumptions of the mathematical model. Our main conclusion is that mathematical and computational models are good complements for research in social sciences. Indeed, while computational models are extremely useful to extend the scope of the analysis to complex scenarios hard to analyze mathematically, formal models can be useful to verify and to explain the outcomes of computational models.

A One-Shot Prisoners Dilemma with Procedural Utility

This article introduces a model of rationality that combines procedural utility over actions with consequential utility over payoffs. It applies the model to the Prisoners Dilemma and shows that empirically observed cooperative behaviors can be rationally explained by a procedural utility for cooperation. The model characterizes the situations in which cooperation emerges as a Nash equilibrium. When rational individuals are not solely concerned by the consequences of their behavior but also care for the process by which these consequences are obtained, there is no one single rational solution to a Prisoners Dilemma. Rational behavior depends on the payoffs at stake and on the procedural utility of individuals. In this manner, this model of procedural utility reflects how ethical considerations, social norms or emotions can transform a game of consequences.

Choice of partners in multiple two-person prisoner's dilemma games: An experimental study

We examine the effect of unilateral and mutual partner selection in the context of prisoner's dilemmas experimentally. Subjects play simultaneously several finitely repeated two-person prisoner's dilemma games. We find that unilateral choice is the best system. It leads to low defection and fewer singles than with mutual choice. Furthermore, with the unilateral choice setup we are able to show that intendingdefectors are more likely to try to avoid a match than intending cooperators. We compare our results of multiple games with single game PD-experiments and find no difference in aggregate behavior. Hence the multiple game technique is robust and might therefore be an important tool in the future for testing the use of mixed strategies.

Multiple prisoner's dilemma games with (out) an outside option: An experimental study

Experiments in which subjects play simultaneously several finite prisoner's dilemma supergames with and without an outside optionreveal that: (i) subjects use probabilistic start and endeffect behaviour, (ii) the freedom to choose whether to play the prisoner's dilemma game enhances cooperation, (iii) if the payoff for simultaneous defection is negative, subjects' tendency to avoid losses leads them to cooperate; while this tendency makes them stick to mutual defection if its payoff is positive.

A one-shot Prisoners’ Dilemma with procedural utility

This article introduces a model of rationality that combines procedural utility over actions with consequential utility over payoffs. It applies the model to the Prisoners Dilemma and shows that empirically observed cooperative behaviors can be rationally explained by a procedural utility for cooperation. The model characterizes the situations in which cooperation emerges as a Nash equilibrium. When rational individuals are not solely concerned by the consequences of their behavior but also care for the process by which these consequences are obtained, there is no one single rational solution to a Prisoners Dilemma. Rational behavior depends on the payoffs at stake and on the procedural utility of individuals. In this manner, this model of procedural utility reflects how ethical considerations, social norms or emotions can transform a game of consequences.

Efficacy of a dilemma-focused intervention for unipolar depression: study protocol for a multicenter randomized controlled trial

Background Depression is one of the more severe and serious health problems because of its morbidity, disabling effects and for its societal and economic burden. Despite the variety of existing pharmacological and psychological treatments, most of the cases evolve with only partial remission, relapse and recurrence. Cognitive models have contributed significantly to the understanding of unipolar depression and its psychological treatment. However, success is only partial and many authors affirm the need to improve those models and also the treatment programs derived from them. One of the issues that requires further elaboration is the difficulty these patients experience in responding to treatment and in maintaining therapeutic gains across time without relapse or recurrence. Our research group has been working on the notion of cognitive conflict viewed as personal dilemmas according to personal construct theory. We use a novel method for identifying those conflicts using the repertory grid technique (RGT). Preliminary results with depressive patients show that about 90% of them have one or more of those conflicts. This fact might explain the blockage and the difficult progress of these patients, especially the more severe and/or chronic. These results justify the need for specific interventions focused on the resolution of these internal conflicts. This study aims to empirically test the hypothesis that an intervention focused on the dilemma(s) specifically detected for each patient will enhance the efficacy of cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) for depression. Design A therapy manual for a dilemma-focused intervention will be tested using a randomized clinical trial by comparing the outcome of two treatment conditions: combined group CBT (eight, 2-hour weekly sessions) plus individual dilemma-focused therapy (eight, 1-hour weekly sessions) and CBT alone (eight, 2-hour group weekly sessions plus eight, 1-hour individual weekly sessions). Method Participants are patients aged over 18 years meeting diagnostic criteria for major depressive disorder or dysthymic disorder, with a score of 19 or above on the Beck depression inventory, second edition (BDI-II) and presenting at least one cognitive conflict (implicative dilemma or dilemmatic construct) as assessed using the RGT. The BDI-II is the primary outcome measure, collected at baseline, at the end of therapy, and at 3- and 12-month follow-up; other secondary measures are also used. Discussion We expect that adding a dilemma-focused intervention to CBT will increase the efficacy of one of the more prestigious therapies for depression, thus resulting in a significant contribution to the psychological treatment of depression. Trial registration ISRCTN92443999; ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT01542957.

Efficacy of a dilemma-focused intervention for unipolar depression: study protocol for a multicenter randomized controlled trial

Background Depression is one of the more severe and serious health problems because of its morbidity, disabling effects and for its societal and economic burden. Despite the variety of existing pharmacological and psychological treatments, most of the cases evolve with only partial remission, relapse and recurrence. Cognitive models have contributed significantly to the understanding of unipolar depression and its psychological treatment. However, success is only partial and many authors affirm the need to improve those models and also the treatment programs derived from them. One of the issues that requires further elaboration is the difficulty these patients experience in responding to treatment and in maintaining therapeutic gains across time without relapse or recurrence. Our research group has been working on the notion of cognitive conflict viewed as personal dilemmas according to personal construct theory. We use a novel method for identifying those conflicts using the repertory grid technique (RGT). Preliminary results with depressive patients show that about 90% of them have one or more of those conflicts. This fact might explain the blockage and the difficult progress of these patients, especially the more severe and/or chronic. These results justify the need for specific interventions focused on the resolution of these internal conflicts. This study aims to empirically test the hypothesis that an intervention focused on the dilemma(s) specifically detected for each patient will enhance the efficacy of cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) for depression. Design A therapy manual for a dilemma-focused intervention will be tested using a randomized clinical trial by comparing the outcome of two treatment conditions: combined group CBT (eight, 2-hour weekly sessions) plus individual dilemma-focused therapy (eight, 1-hour weekly sessions) and CBT alone (eight, 2-hour group weekly sessions plus eight, 1-hour individual weekly sessions). Method Participants are patients aged over 18 years meeting diagnostic criteria for major depressive disorder or dysthymic disorder, with a score of 19 or above on the Beck depression inventory, second edition (BDI-II) and presenting at least one cognitive conflict (implicative dilemma or dilemmatic construct) as assessed using the RGT. The BDI-II is the primary outcome measure, collected at baseline, at the end of therapy, and at 3- and 12-month follow-up; other secondary measures are also used. Discussion We expect that adding a dilemma-focused intervention to CBT will increase the efficacy of one of the more prestigious therapies for depression, thus resulting in a significant contribution to the psychological treatment of depression. Trial registration ISRCTN92443999; ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT01542957.

Effects of punishment in a mobile population playing the prisoner’s dilemma game

We deal with a system of prisoner’s dilemma players undergoing continuous motion in a two-dimensional plane. In contrast to previous work, we introduce altruistic punishment after the game. We find punishing only a few of the cooperator-defector interactions is enough to lead the system to a cooperative state in environments where otherwise defection would take over the population. This happens even with soft nonsocial punishment (where both cooperators and defectors punish other players, a behavior observed in many human populations). For high enough mobilities or temptations to defect, low rates of social punishment can no longer avoid the breakdown of cooperation

Frames and games

Decision-makers are sometimes influenced by the way in which choice situations are presented to them or "framed" This can be seen as an important challenge to the social sciences, since strong and pervasive framing effects would make it difficult to study human behavior in a synthetic or theoretic manner. We present results from experiments with dilemma games designed to shed light on the effects of several frame variations. We study, among others, the particular public bad frame used by Andreoni (1995) and two more naturalistic frames involving stories. Our results show that none of the frame manipulations have a significant effect on average behavior, but we do find some effects on extreme behavior. We also find that incentives do matter where frames do not matter.

Is it redistribution or centralization? On the determinants of government investment in infrastructure

The dilemma efficiency versus equity, together with political partisan interests, has received increasing attention to explain the territorial allocation of investments. However, centralization intended to introduce or reinforce hierarchization in the political system has not been object as of now of empirical analysis. Our main contribution to the literature is providing evidence that meta-political objectives related to the ordering of political power and administration influence regional investment. In this way, we find evidence that network mode’s (roads and railways) investment programs are influenced by the centralization strategy of investing near to the political capital, while investment effort in no-network modes (airports and ports) appears to be positively related to distance. Since investment in surface transportation infrastructures is much higher than that in airports and ports, and taken into account that regions surrounding the political capital are poorer than the average, we suggest that centralization rather than redistribution has been the driver for the concentration of public investment on these regions.

EU's democracy promotion policy in the Mediterranean: Squaring the stability – democracy circle?

Why does the EU have an ambiguous and inconsistent democracy promotion (DP) policy towards the Mediterranean countries? This paper argues that the EU´s DP is determined by a crucial conflict of interests conceptualised as a stability – democracy dilemma. The EU has been attempting to promote democracy, but without risking the current stability and in connivance with incumbent autocratic regimes. In view of this dilemma, the four main characteristics of the EU´s DP promotion are explored, namely: gradualism, a strong notion of partnership-building, a narrow definition of civil society, and a strong belief in economic liberalisation. A fifth feature, relation of the EU with moderate Islamists, is analysed in the paper as it represents the most striking illustration of its contradictions. The paper concludes by arguing that the definition of a clear DP by the EU that considered engagement with moderate Islamists would represent a major step towards squaring its stability – democracy circle.

Research joint ventures in an international economy

D'Aspremont and Jacquemin's (1988) model is extended to studyalternative configurations of research agreements in a two--country integratedworld economy. Under unambiguous conditions on spillovers we show that:1) Allowing national firms to cooperate in R\&D confers them an advantageover foreign rivals, an effect similar to R\&D subsidies. 2) In a policygame, each government would allow national cooperative agreements. 3) Contraryto other trade policies which lead to a ``prisoners' dilemma'' result,welfare in both countries increases when they both allow R\&D cooperation.4) Welfare is even higher if a generalized (international) coalition isformed.

Long-run selection and the work ethic

That individuals contribute in social dilemma interactions even when contributing is costly is a well-established observation in the experimental literature. Since a contributor is always strictly worse off than a non-contributor the question is raised if an intrinsic motivation to contribute can survive in an evolutionary setting. Using recent results on deterministic approximation of stochastic evolutionary dynamics we give conditions for equilibria with a positive number of contributors to be selected in the long run.