Fiscal decentralization in Spain: An asymmetric transition to democracy

Asymmetric fiscal decentralization, by which we mean different fiscal arrangements between the central government and different groups of, or individual, lower-level governments, may be justified from an economic efficiency perspective. As argued by Tiebout (1956), Oates (1972) and others, a decentralized system of regional and local governments is better able to accommodate differences in tastes for public goods and services. This efficiency argument calls for decentralization of fiscal authority to regional and local governments, but not necessarily asymmetric decentralization. However, when the differences in tastes for public goods and services arise out of differences in history, culture and language across regions of a country, asymmetric treatment may be justified. History, culture and language may influence how a group of people (a region) views autonomy, independence and fiscal authority. Some regions may have had experience with autonomous government in the past, they may have a culture that is strongly reliant upon (or leery of) the central government, or they may be fearful of losing their separate languages if they do not have special arrangements. To accommodate differences in taste for independence, autonomy, and fiscal authority, it may be necessary to have different fiscal arrangements between the central government and the different regions comprising the country.

Sticky income inequality in the Spanish transition (1973-1990)

This paper investigates the evolution of income inequality in Spain during its transition to democracy, suggesting a method for the correction of under-reporting of earnings and profits in the Household Budget Surveys’ data. The contribution is twofold: the methodological proposal, based on income expenditure discrepancy and scaling-up to National Accounts, improves on previous work, and can be convenient for similar historical sources in other countries. Secondly, its application results in an alternative history of the distribution of income in this case, changing the levels and also the observed trend. Previous literature asserted a substantial equalization, related to the democratization process, while after the adjustment inequality in disposable income is shown to have been quite persistent.

The Spanish cadet in the European military context a comparative analysis of the professional socialisation

Research on the attitudes, motivations and social and political behavior of European cadets have been made throughout the last decade. Nowadays Spain also joins those surveys. Thru the analysis of polling data, we can consider the different attitudes of Spanish cadets in relation with the other European ones. The conclusion is that although the Spanish political transition to democracy has not ended already in the military teaching system, there are a lot of similarities among Spanish and European cadets.

Transition modes and institutional outcomes in El Salvador and Guatemala

Institutions affect key dimensions of the political process –policy, stability, and conflict. The choice of institutions is thus consequential. I argue that transition modes affect the choice of institutions in predictable and systematic ways. The more balanced power is between the two main bargaining forces –regime elite and opposition– the likelier that the resulting institutions will be pluralistic. Contrarily, the more unbalanced power is in favour of regime elites vis a vis the opposition, the likelier that institutions will be majoritarian. The argument is tested for El Salvador and Guatemala.

Capitalism, unemployment and the transition to the contemporary pattern of growth

A new model of unemployment based on an idea of Marx is presented and used to interpret the development of the British economy from the beginning of capitalism to the present. It is shown that unemployment may be created purposely by capitalists in order to weaken the bargaining position of the workers. This mechanism leads to complex temporal pattern of unemployment and can explain why wages took almost a century and a half to react to the growing capital to labour ratio that characterised early British capitalism.