Lending to the borrower from hell: Debt and default in the age of Philip II, 1556-1598

What sustained borrowing without third-party enforcement, in the early days of sovereignlending? Philip II of Spain accumulated towering debts while stopping all payments tohis lenders four times. How could the sovereign borrow much and default often? Weargue that bankers ability to cut off Philip II s access to smoothing services was key. Aform of syndicated lending created cohesion among his Genoese bankers. As a result,lending moratoria were sustained through a cheat the cheater mechanism (Kletzer andWright, 2000). Our paper thus lends empirical support to a recent literature emphasizingthe role of bankers incentives for continued sovereign borrowing.

Banks, government bonds, and default: what do the data say?

We use data from Bankscope to analyze the holdings of public bonds by over 18,000 banks located in 185 countries and the role of these bonds in 18 sovereign debt crises over the period 1998-2012. We find that: (i) banks hold a sizeable share of their assets in government bonds (about 9% on average), particularly in less financially developed countries; (ii) during sovereign crises, banks on average increase their bondholdings by 1% of their assets, but this increase is concentrated among larger and more profitable banks, and; (iii) the correlation between a bank's holdings of public bonds and its future loans is positive in normal times, but turns negative during defaults. A 10% increase in bank bond-holdings during default is associated with a 3.2% reduction in future loans, and bonds bought in normal times account for 75% of this effect. Our results are consistent with the view that there is a liquidity benefit for banks to hold public bonds in normal times, which is critical for understanding bank fragility during sovereign crises.

Valoración de credit default swaps: una aplicación del modelo de Hull-White al mercado español

En este trabajo se presenta una aplicación empírica del modelo de Hull-White (2000) al mercado de renta fija español. Este modelo proporciona la expresión por el cálculo de los pagos hechos por el comprador de un credit default swap (CDS), bajo la hipótesis de que no existe riesgo de contrapartida. Se supone, además, que la curva cupón cero, la tasa de recuperación constante y el momento del suceso de crédito son independientes. Se utilizan bonos del Banco Santander Central Hispano para mesurar la probabilidad neutra al riesgo de quiebra y, bajo hipótesis de no arbitraje, se calculan las primas de un CDS, por un bono subyacente con la misma calificación crediticia que la entidad de referencia. Se observa que las primas se ajustan bien a los spreads crediticios del mercado, que se acostumbran a utilizar como alternativa a las mismas.

Valoración de credit default swaps: una aplicación del modelo de Hull-White al mercado español

En este trabajo se presenta una aplicación empírica del modelo de Hull-White (2000) al mercado de renta fija español. Este modelo proporciona la expresión por el cálculo de los pagos hechos por el comprador de un credit default swap (CDS), bajo la hipótesis de que no existe riesgo de contrapartida. Se supone, además, que la curva cupón cero, la tasa de recuperación constante y el momento del suceso de crédito son independientes. Se utilizan bonos del Banco Santander Central Hispano para mesurar la probabilidad neutra al riesgo de quiebra y, bajo hipótesis de no arbitraje, se calculan las primas de un CDS, por un bono subyacente con la misma calificación crediticia que la entidad de referencia. Se observa que las primas se ajustan bien a los spreads crediticios del mercado, que se acostumbran a utilizar como alternativa a las mismas.

Sovereign default, domestic banks and financial institutions

We present a model of sovereign debt in which, contrary to conventional wisdom, government defaultsare costly because they destroy the balance sheets of domestic banks. In our model, better financial institutionsallow banks to be more leveraged, thereby making them more vulnerable to sovereign defaults.Our predictions: government defaults should lead to declines in private credit, and these declines should belarger in countries where financial institutions are more developed and banks hold more government bonds.In these same countries, government defaults should be less likely. Using a large panel of countries, we findevidence consistent with these predictions.

Task-induced deactivation from rest extends beyond the default mode brain network

Activity decreases, or deactivations, of midline and parietal cortical brain regions are routinely observed in human functional neuroimaging studies that compare periods of task-based cognitive performance with passive states, such as rest. It is now widely held that such task-induced deactivations index a highly organized"default-mode network" (DMN): a large-scale brain system whose discovery has had broad implications in the study of human brain function and behavior. In this work, we show that common task-induced deactivations from rest also occur outside of the DMN as a function of increased task demand. Fifty healthy adult subjects performed two distinct functional magnetic resonance imaging tasks that were designed to reliably map deactivations from a resting baseline. As primary findings, increases in task demand consistently modulated the regional anatomy of DMN deactivation. At high levels of task demand, robust deactivation was observed in non-DMN regions, most notably, the posterior insular cortex. Deactivation of this region was directly implicated in a performance-based analysis of experienced task difficulty. Together, these findings suggest that task-induced deactivations from rest are not limited to the DMN and extend to brain regions typically associated with integrative sensory and interoceptive processes.