Mixed and Hybrid Models of Public Service Delivery

This symposium presents research from different contexts to improve our collective understanding of a variety of aspects of mixed forms of service delivery, be they mixed contracting at the level of the market (which is more common in the U.S.), or mixed management and ownership at the level of the firm (which is more common in Europe). The articles included in this special symposium examine the factors that give rise to mixed forms of service delivery (e.g., economic and fiscal stress, regulatory flexibility, geography, management) and how these factors impact their design and operation. Articles also explore the performance of mixed forms of service delivery relative to more conventional arrangements like contracted or direct service delivery. The articles contribute to a better theoretical and conceptual understanding of mixed/hybrid forms of services delivery.

Privatization, cooperation and costs of solid waste services in small towns

This paper analyzes the cost implications of privatization and cooperation in the provision of solid waste services for a sample of small municipalities. In conducting this empirical analysis, a survey is first designed and administered to municipalities in the Spanish region of Aragon, and then an estimation of the determinants of service costs is undertaken, considering the possible endogeneity of delivery choices. Our findings indicate that cooperation is more effective than privatization in saving costs. Both production forms can enable small municipalities to cut costs by exploiting scale economies. However, the fact that inter-municipal cooperation involves lower transaction costs and is less likely to be affected by competition problems would seem to account for the fact that it is a more effective way of reducing costs.

Empirical analysis of solid management waste costs: Some evidence from Galicia, Spain

This paper analyses the factors that determine solid waste service costs. The empirical analysis is based on information derived from a survey conducted in a sample of Galician municipalities. The results reveal economies of scale in municipalities of fewer than 50,000 inhabitants, such that cooperation between these municipalities could lead to cost savings. It also appears that private delivery is not cheaper than public delivery. Finally, designating a larger proportion of the total waste volume to recycling does not imply greater costs.

The Effect of a Physical Activity Program on the Total Number of Primary Care Visits in Inactive Patients: A 15-Month Randomized Controlled Trial

Abstract Background: Effective promotion of exercise could result in substantial savings in healthcare cost expenses in terms of direct medical costs, such as the number of medical appointments. However, this is hampered by our limited knowledge of how to achieve sustained increases in physical activity. Objectives: To assess the effectiveness of a Primary Health Care (PHC) based physical activity program in reducing the total number of visits to the healthcare center among inactive patients, over a 15-month period. Research Design: Randomized controlled trial. Subjects: Three hundred and sixty-two (n = 362) inactive patients suffering from at least one chronic condition were included. One hundred and eighty-three patients (n = 183; mean (SD); 68.3 (8.8) years; 118 women) were randomly allocated to the physical activity program (IG). One hundred and seventy-nine patients (n = 179; 67.2 (9.1) years; 106 women) were allocated to the control group (CG). The IG went through a three-month standardized physical activity program led by physical activity specialists and linked to community resources. Measures: The total number of medical appointments to the PHC, during twelve months before and after the program, was registered. Self-reported health status (SF-12 version 2) was assessed at baseline (month 0), at the end of the intervention (month 3), and at 12 months follow-up after the end of the intervention (month 15). Results: The IG had a significantly reduced number of visits during the 12 months after the intervention: 14.8 (8.5). The CG remained about the same: 18.2 (11.1) (P = .002). Conclusions: Our findings indicate that a 3-month physical activity program linked to community resources is a shortduration, effective and sustainable intervention in inactive patients to decrease rates of PHC visits. Trial Registration: ClinicalTrials.gov NCT00714831

Intermunicipal cooperation and privatization of solid waste services among small municipalities in Spain

The aim of this paper is to analyze the effects of intermunicipal cooperation and privatization on the delivery costs of urban solid waste services. The results of our empirical analysis, which we conducted among a sample of very small municipalities, indicate that small towns that cooperate incur lower costs for their waste collection service. Cooperation also raises collection frequency and improves the quality of the service in small towns. By contrast, the form of production, whether it is public or private, does not result in systematic differences in costs. Interestingly, the degree of population dispersion has a significant positive relation with service costs. No evidence of scale economies is found because, it would seem, small municipalities exploit them by means of intermunicipal cooperation.

Estimation of lung cancer diagnosis and treatment costs based on a patient-level analysis in Catalonia (Spain)

Background: Assessing of the costs of treating disease is necessary to demonstrate cost-effectiveness and to estimate the budget impact of new interventions and therapeutic innovations. However, there are few comprehensive studies on resource use and costs associated with lung cancer patients in clinical practice in Spain or internationally. The aim of this paper was to assess the hospital cost associated with lung cancer diagnosis and treatment by histology, type of cost and stage at diagnosis in the Spanish National Health Service. Methods: A retrospective, descriptive analysis on resource use and a direct medical cost analysis were performed. Resource utilisation data were collected by means of patient files from nine teaching hospitals. From a hospital budget impact perspective, the aggregate and mean costs per patient were calculated over the first three years following diagnosis or up to death. Both aggregate and mean costs per patient were analysed by histology, stage at diagnosis and cost type. Results: A total of 232 cases of lung cancer were analysed, of which 74.1% corresponded to non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC) and 11.2% to small cell lung cancer (SCLC); 14.7% had no cytohistologic confirmation. The mean cost per patient in NSCLC ranged from 13,218 Euros in Stage III to 16,120 Euros in Stage II. The main cost components were chemotherapy (29.5%) and surgery (22.8%). Advanced disease stages were associated with a decrease in the relative weight of surgical and inpatient care costs but an increase in chemotherapy costs. In SCLC patients, the mean cost per patient was 15,418 Euros for limited disease and 12,482 Euros for extensive disease. The main cost components were chemotherapy (36.1%) and other inpatient costs (28.7%). In both groups, the Kruskall-Wallis test did not show statistically significant differences in mean cost per patient between stages. Conclusions: This study provides the costs of lung cancer treatment based on patient file reviews, with chemotherapy and surgery accounting for the major components of costs. This cost analysis is a baseline study that will provide a useful source of information for future studies on cost-effectiveness and on the budget impact of different therapeutic innovations in Spain.

Direct and indirect subsidies in markets with system goods in the presence of externalities. Preliminary version

This paper derives a model of markets with system goods and two technological standards. An established standard incurs lower unit production costs but causes a negative externality. The paper derives the conditions for policy intervention and compares the effect of direct and indirect cost-reducing subsidies in two markets with system goods in the presence of externalities. If consumers are committed to the technology by purchasing one of the components, direct subsidies are preferable. For a medium-low cost difference between technological standards and a low externality cost it is optimal to provide a direct subsidy only to the first technology adopter. As the higher the externality cost raises, the more technology adopters should be provided with direct subsidies. This effect is robust in all extensions. In the absence of consumers commitment to a technological standard indirect and direct subsidies are both desirable. In this case, the subsidy to the first adopter is lower then the subsidy to the second adopter. Moreover, for the low cost difference between technological standards and low externality cost the fi rst fi rm chooses a superior standard without policy intervention. Finally, a perfect compatibility between components based on different technological standards enhances an advantage of indirect subsidies for medium-high externality cost and cost difference between technological standards. Journal of Economic Literature Classi fication Numbers: C72, D21, D40, H23, L13, L22, L51, O25, O33, O38. Keywords: Technological standards; complementary products; externalities; cost-reducing subsidies; compatibility.

Doctors without borders: The returns to an occupational license for Soviet immigrant physicians in Israel

Re-licensing requirements for professionals that move across borders arewidespread. In this paper, we measure the returns to an occupationallicense using novel data on Soviet trained physicians that immigrated toIsrael. An immigrant re-training assignment rule used by the IsraelMinistry of Health provides an exogenous source of variation inre-licensing outcomes. Instrumental variables and quantile treatmenteffects estimates of the returns to an occupational license indicate excesswages due to occupational entry restrictions and negative selectioninto licensing status. We develop a model of optimal license acquisitionwhich suggests that the wages of high-skilled immigrant physicians in thenonphysician sector outweigh the lower direct costs that these immigrantsface in acquiring a medical license. Licensing thus leads to lower averagequality of service. However, the positive earnings effect of entry restrictionsfar outweighs the lower practitioner quality earnings effect that licensinginduces.

Does direct democracy reduce the size of government? New evidence from historical data, 1890-2000

Using historical data for all Swiss cantons from 1890 to 2000, we estimate the causal effect of direct democracy on government spending. The main innovation in this paper is that we use fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity and instrumental variables to address the potential endogeneity of institutions. We find that the budget referendum and lower costs to launch a voter initiative are effective tools in reducing canton level spending. However, we find no evidence that the budget referendum results in more decentralized government or a larger local government. Our instrumental variable estimates suggest that a mandatory budget referendum reduces the size of canton spending between 13 and 19 percent. A 1 percent lower signature requirement for the initiative reduces canton spending by up to 2 percent.

Health care provider choice in the case of patient-initiated contacts. An extended version of discrete choice of model demand

This paper analyzes the nature of health care provider choice inthe case of patient-initiated contacts, with special reference toa National Health Service setting, where monetary prices are zeroand general practitioners act as gatekeepers to publicly financedspecialized care. We focus our attention on the factors that mayexplain the continuously increasing use of hospital emergencyvisits as opposed to other provider alternatives. An extendedversion of a discrete choice model of demand for patient-initiatedcontacts is presented, allowing for individual and town residencesize differences in perceived quality (preferences) betweenalternative providers and including travel and waiting time asnon-monetary costs. Results of a nested multinomial logit model ofprovider choice are presented. Individual choice betweenalternatives considers, in a repeated nested structure, self-care,primary care, hospital and clinic emergency services. Welfareimplications and income effects are analyzed by computingcompensating variations, and by simulating the effects of userfees by levels of income. Results indicate that compensatingvariation per visit is higher than the direct marginal cost ofemergency visits, and consequently, emergency visits do not appearas an inefficient alternative even for non-urgent conditions.

Análisis del comportamiento de los resultados en 'full' y 'direct costing'

In this paper we perform a mathematical analyse of profits and losses indirect and full costing. They are compared in different situations, mainlythe utilisation of productive capacity and the existence of beginninginventories. Direct costing was conceived as a system of cost accountingwhich would show profits as a function of sales. In full costing profitsdepend on available combinations of sales, production, costs of beginninginventories, etc., and information displayed in financial statements displayappears incongruent. Differences in profits with full and direct costingincrease when full costing allocates fixed costs according to normalproduction, in some cases differences, and financial statements would showmore incongruent performance. It is concluded about the importance thatprofit and loss statement expresses profits in both costing systems.

Location of multiple server common service centers or public facilities for minimizing general congestion and travel cost functions

We propose a model and solution methods, for locating a fixed number ofmultiple-server, congestible common service centers or congestible publicfacilities. Locations are chosen so to minimize consumers congestion (orqueuing) and travel costs, considering that all the demand must be served.Customers choose the facilities to which they travel in order to receiveservice at minimum travel and congestion cost. As a proxy for thiscriterion, total travel and waiting costs are minimized. The travel costis a general function of the origin and destination of the demand, whilethe congestion cost is a general function of the number of customers inqueue at the facilities.

Estimates of patient costs related with population morbidity: Can indirect costs affect the results?

A number of health economics works require patient cost estimates as a basic information input.However the accuracy of cost estimates remains in general unspecified. We propose to investigate howthe allocation of indirect costs or overheads can affect the estimation of patient costs in order to allow forimprovements in the analysis of patient costs estimates. Instead of focusing on the costing method, thispaper proposes to highlight changes in variance explained observed when a methodology is chosen. Wecompare three overhead allocation methods for a specific Spanish population adjusted using the ClinicalRisk Groups (CRG), and we obtain different series of full-cost group estimates. As a result, there aresignificant gains in the proportion of the variance explained, depending upon the methodology used.Furthermore, we find that the global amount of variation explained by risk adjustment models dependsmainly on direct costs and is independent of the level of aggregation used in the classification system.

Auction theory, sequential local service privatization, and the effects of geographical scale economies on effective competition

A sequential weakly efficient two-auction game with entry costs, interdependence between objects, two potential bidders and IPV assumption is presented here in order to give some theoretical predictions on the effects of geographical scale economies on local service privatization performance. It is shown that the first object seller takes profit of this interdependence. The interdependence externality rises effective competition for the first object, expressed as the probability of having more than one final bidder. Besides, if there is more than one final bidder in the first auction, seller extracts the entire bidder¿s expected future surplus differential between having won the first auction and having lost. Consequences for second object seller are less clear, reflecting the contradictory nature of the two main effects of object interdependence. On the one hand, first auction winner becomes ¿stronger¿, so that expected payments rise in a competitive environment. On the other hand, first auction loser becomes relatively ¿weaker¿, hence (probably) reducing effective competition for the second object. Additionally, some contributions to static auction theory with entry cost and asymmetric bidders are presented in the appendix

Public and Private Production in a Mixed Delivery System: Regulation, Competition and Costs

Academics and policy makers are increasingly shifting the debate concerning the best form of public service provision beyond the traditional dilemma between pure public and pure private delivery modes, because, among other reasons, there is a growing body of evidence that casts doubt on the existence of systematic cost savings from privatization, while any competition seems to be eroded over time. In this paper we compare the relative merits of public and private delivery within a mixed delivery system. We study the role played by ownership, transaction costs, and competition on local public service delivery within the same jurisdiction. Using a stochastic cost frontier, we analyze the public-private urban bus system in the Barcelona Metropolitan Area. Our results suggest that private firms tendering the service have higher delivery costs than those incurred by the public firm, especially when transaction costs are taken into account. Tenders, therefore, do not help to reduce delivery costs. Our results suggest that under a mixed delivery scheme, which permits the co-existence of public and private production, the metropolitan government and the regulator can use private delivery to contain costs in the public firm and, at the same time, benefit from the greater flexibility of private firms for dealing with events not provided for under contract.