60 resultados para Counter-generic strategy
em Consorci de Serveis Universitaris de Catalunya (CSUC), Spain
Resumo:
Nobody would deny that we today live in a globalized world. Our digitalized living daily revises our worldwide mindmaps. Thanks to free trade and travel our material and social worlds have become global as well. This radical sociocultural change has since the last decade been preached all over the world with public institutions and business-interest organizations as megaphones. Since those carrying the globalization message mainly represent nations or super-nations such as the EU, the viewpoints of lower-level actors such as regions, localities, firms and individual citizens have seldom been considered. Paternalistically (super-)national bodies have instructured its subjects, not the least the many small firms that populate the (private) economy, what action to take. The basic message is: submit to the global forces – local is not beautiful any longer.
Resumo:
We estimate the effect of immigrant flows on native employment in WesternEurope, and then ask whether the employment consequences of immigrationvary with institutions that affect labor market flexibility. Reducedflexibility may protect natives from immigrant competition in the nearterm, but our theoretical framework suggests that reduced flexibility islikely to increase the negative impact of immigration on equilibriumemployment. In models without interactions, OLS estimates for a panel ofEuropean countries in the 1980s and 1990s show small, mostly negativeimmigration effects. To reduce bias from the possible endogeneity ofimmigration flows, we use the fact that many immigrants arriving after1991 were refugees from the Balkan wars. An IV strategy based onvariation in the number of immigrants from former Yugoslavia generateslarger though mostly insignificant negative estimates. We then estimatemodels allowing interactions between the employment response toimmigration and institutional characteristics including business entrycosts. These results, limited to the sample of native men, generallysuggest that reduced flexibility increases the negative impact ofimmigration. Many of the estimated interaction terms are significant,and imply a significant negative effect on employment in countrieswith restrictive institutions.
Resumo:
Peer-reviewed
Resumo:
For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. In order to prove this result, we also show that under this domain of preferences (which contains the domain of responsive preferences of the college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking Lemma holds as well. We exhibit an example showing that none of these three results remain true if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q-separable.
Resumo:
Counter automata are more powerful versions of finite state automata where addition and subtraction operations are permitted on a set of n integer registers, called counters. We show that the word problem of Zn is accepted by a nondeterministic m-counter automaton if and only if m &= n.
Resumo:
Un dels principals problemes de la interacció dels robots autònoms és el coneixement de l'escena. El reconeixement és fonamental per a solucionar aquest problema i permetre als robots interactuar en un escenari no controlat. En aquest document presentem una aplicació pràctica de la captura d'objectes, de la normalització i de la classificació de senyals triangulars i circulars. El sistema s'introdueix en el robot Aibo de Sony per a millorar-ne la interacció. La metodologia presentada s'ha comprobat en simulacions i problemes de categorització reals, com ara la classificació de senyals de trànsit, amb resultats molt prometedors.
Resumo:
"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."
Resumo:
A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. Group strategy-proofness is a very attractive requirement of incentive compatibility. But in many cases it is hard or impossible to find nontrivial social choice functions satisfying even the weakest condition of individual strategy-proofness. However, there are a number of economically significant domains where interesting rules satisfying individual strategy-proofness can be defined, and for some of them, all these rules turn out to also satisfy the stronger requirement of group strategy-proofness. This is the case, for example, when preferences are single-peaked or single-dipped. In other cases, this equivalence does not hold. We provide sufficient conditions defining domains of preferences guaranteeing that individual and group strategy-proofness are equivalent for all rules defined on the
Resumo:
In this article, we consider solutions starting close to some linearly stable invariant tori in an analytic Hamiltonian system and we prove results of stability for a super-exponentially long interval of time, under generic conditions. The proof combines classical Birkhoff normal forms and a new method to obtain generic Nekhoroshev estimates developed by the author and L. Niederman in another paper. We will mainly focus on the neighbourhood of elliptic fixed points, the other cases being completely similar.
Resumo:
We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin (1980)) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy-proof on the smaller domain. Our result identifies the specific nature of these discontinuities which allow to design non-onto social choice functions to deal with feasibility constraints.
Resumo:
In this article, we present a new approach of Nekhoroshev theory for a generic unperturbed Hamiltonian which completely avoids small divisors problems. The proof is an extension of a method introduced by P. Lochak which combines averaging along periodic orbits with simultaneous Diophantine approximation and uses geometric arguments designed by the second author to handle generic integrable Hamiltonians. This method allows to deal with generic non-analytic Hamiltonians and to obtain new results of generic stability around linearly stable tori.
Resumo:
This paper surveys the literature on strategy-proofness from a historical perspective. While I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main emphasis is on social choice models. This article has been prepared for the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 2, Edited by K. Arrow, A. Sen and K. Suzumura
Resumo:
Este trabajo tiene como propósito presentar y valorar, desde la perspectiva del alumnado participante, un proyecto de investigación-formación puesto en marcha durante el curso 2003-2004 en la elaboración del trabajo de tesina, fin de carrera, en la Escuela de Enfermería de Vitoria, dentro del programa de Licenciatura Europea de Enfermería. Constituye el punto de partida de un proyecto a largo plazo, iniciado con la intención de desarrollar principios teóricos y procedimientos prácticos que nos permitan sistematizar procesos formativos que, centrados en la investigación, articulen la teoría y la práctica e integren una perspectiva comunicativa y cooperativa.
Resumo:
This working paper shows the evolution of the Aceh conflict until its peaceful resolution in 2005. The key factors in the success of this peace process have been the confluence of several factors related to the internal and external dynamics of the country, including the new political leadership, the decreasing role of the military power, the international support and the meeting of the objectives of both groups, and so on. The end of the conflict in Aceh shows that the administrative decentralization and the promotion of the political participation of the main actors involved have made possible the development of a solid alternative to the arms strategy of conflict resolution used for years in Indonesia.