Principis deontològics dels professionals de la informació i la documentació: el codi de l'European Council of Information Associations (ECIA)

Qualsevol professió té, o hauria de tenir, un codi de regles ètiques que els seus membres normalment respecten i que fan servir com a guia en el cas que hagin de prendre decisions moralment difícils. Durant la reunió celebrada el novembre de 1998 a Lisboa, les associacions membres de l'ECIA van acordar adoptar un codi ètic que fos vàlid per als professionals de tots els països de la Unió Europea. Aquest codi no pot ser més que un enunciat de principis generals i deixa en mans de cada associació la facultat de desenvolupar-lo per tal que respongui a necessitats especials o nacionals. Un primer projecte fou presentat i discutit a la reunió de l'ECIA de març de 1999. La present revisió incorpora les modificacions proposades aleshores, elements provinents de codis d'altres organitzacions que foren presentats en la reunió a la consideració de l'autor, així com alguns aclariments.

Equation of state of hot, dense stellar matter. Finite temperature nuclear Thomas-Fermi approach

The properties of hot, dense stellar matter are investigated with a finite temperature nuclear Thomas-Fermi model.

Dark energy equation of state and anthropic selection

We explore the possibility that the dark energy is due to a potential of a scalar field and that the magnitude and the slope of this potential in our part of the Universe are largely determined by anthropic selection effects. We find that, in some models, the most probable values of the slope are very small, implying that the dark energy density stays constant to very high accuracy throughout cosmological evolution. In other models, however, the most probable values of the slope are such that the slow roll condition is only marginally satisfied, leading to a recollapse of the local universe on a time scale comparable to the lifetime of the Sun. In the latter case, the effective equation of state varies appreciably with the redshift, leading to a number of testable predictions.

Shrouded costs of government: The political economy of state and local public pensions

Why do public-sector workers receive so much of their compensation in the formof pensions and other benefits? This paper presents a political economy model inwhich politicians compete for taxpayers' and government employees' votes by promising compensation packages, but some voters cannot evaluate every aspect of promisedcompensation. If pension packages are "shrouded", so that public-sector workers better understand their value than ordinary taxpayers, then compensation will be highlyback-loaded. In equilibrium, the welfare of public-sector workers could be improved,holding total public-sector costs constant, if they received higher wages and lowerpensions. Centralizing pension determination has two offsetting effects on generosity:more state-level media attention helps taxpayers better understand pension costs, andthat reduces pension generosity; but a larger share of public-sector workers will votewithin the jurisdiction, which increases pension generosity. A short discussion of pensions in two decentralized states (California and Pennsylvania) and two centralizedstates (Massachusetts and Ohio) suggests that centralization appears to have modestlyreduced pensions, but, as the model suggests, this is unlikely to be universal.