Development of a population-based cost-effectiveness model of chronic graft versus host disease in Spain

Chronic graft-versus-host disease (cGvHD) is the leading cause of late nonrelapse mortality (transplant-related mortality) after hematopoietic stem cell transplant. Given that there are a wide range of treatment options for cGvHD, assessment of the associated costs and efficacy can help clinicians and health care providers allocate health care resources more efficiently. OBJECTIVE: The purpose of this study was to assess the cost-effectiveness of extracorporeal photopheresis (ECP) compared with rituximab (Rmb) and with imatinib (Imt) in patients with cGvHD at 5 years from the perspective of the Spanish National Health System. METHODS: The model assessed the incremental cost-effectiveness/utility ratio of ECP versus Rmb or Imt for 1000 hypothetical patients by using microsimulation cost-effectiveness techniques. Model probabilities were obtained from the literature. Treatment pathways and adverse events were evaluated taking clinical opinion and published reports into consideration. Local data on costs (2010 Euros) and health care resources utilization were validated by the clinical authors. Probabilistic sensitivity analyses were used to assess the robustness of the model. RESULTS: The greater efficacy of ECP resulted in a gain of 0.011 to 0.024 quality-adjusted life-year in the first year and 0.062 to 0.094 at year 5 compared with Rmb or Imt. The results showed that the higher acquisition cost of ECP versus Imt was compensated for at 9 months by greater efficacy; this higher cost was partially compensated for ( 517) by year 5 versus Rmb. After 9 months, ECP was dominant (cheaper and more effective) compared with Imt. The incremental cost-effectiveness ratio of ECP versus Rmb was 29,646 per life-year gained and 24,442 per quality-adjusted life-year gained at year 2.5. Probabilistic sensitivity analysis confirmed the results. The main study limitation was that to assess relative treatment effects, only small studies were available for indirect comparison. CONCLUSION: ECP as a third-line therapy for cGvHD is a more cost-effective strategy than Rmb or Imt.

Implantación de la ISO 14001 en una planta de tratamiento de vehículos fuera de uso (VFU)

Nos hemos propuesto implantar la ISO 14001 en un centro autorizado de tratamiento de vehículos fuera de uso, denominado Recycling Gandía, S.L., con el fin de que dicho centro pueda obtener una ventaja competitiva, respecto de otros centros ubicados próximamente, dada la fuerte competencia existente. Con la implantación de un Sistema de Gestión Medioambiental y más concretamente la ISO 14001, se puede conseguir una mejora de la imagen de la empresa, un ahorro de costes, se pueden mejorar las relaciones con la Administración e incluso con las entidades financieras, se puede contribuir a la motivación de los trabajadores, se asegura el cumplimiento de la legislación ambiental. La actividad que nos ocupa, se dedica a la recepción y descontaminación de vehículos al final de su vida útil, reutilizando piezas o componentes de recambio., Los objetivos del presente trabajo van a ser fundamentalmente, el implantar el Manual de Gestión Ambiental en la planta de tratamiento de vehículos fuera de uso y el describir todos los procedimientos genéricos a seguir. Como conclusiones de este trabajo, tendremos las auditorías con las no conformidades detectadas, así como el compromiso adquirido en todos los niveles y departamentos de la empresa, lo cual se traducirá en una mejor satisfacción de los clientes y por tanto un aumento en el número de vehículos a tratar.

Outpatient Quick Diagnosis Units for the evaluation of suspected severe diseases: an observational, descriptive study

Background: Hospitals in countries with public health systems have recently adopted organizational changes to improve efficiency and resource allocation, and reducing inappropriate hospitalizations has been established as an important goal. AIMS: Our goal was to describe the functioning of a Quick Diagnosis Unit in a Spanish public university hospital after evaluating 1,000 consecutive patients. We also aimed to ascertain the degree of satisfaction among Quick Diagnosis Unit patients and the costs of the model compared to conventional hospitalization practices. DESIGN: Observational, descriptive study. METHODS: Our sample comprised 1,000 patients evaluated between November 2008 and January 2010 in the Quick Diagnosis Unit of a tertiary university public hospital in Barcelona. Included patients were those who had potentially severe diseases and would normally require hospital admission for diagnosis but whose general condition allowed outpatient treatment. We analyzed several variables, including time to diagnosis, final diagnoses and hospitalizations avoided, and we also investigated the mean cost (as compared to conventional hospitalization) and the patients' satisfaction. RESULTS: In 88% of cases, the reasons for consultation were anemia, anorexia-cachexia syndrome, febrile syndrome, adenopathies, abdominal pain, chronic diarrhea and lung abnormalities. The most frequent diagnoses were cancer (18.8%; mainly colon cancer and lymphoma) and Iron-deficiency anemia (18%). The mean time to diagnosis was 9.2 days (range 1 to 19 days). An estimated 12.5 admissions/day in a one-year period (in the internal medicine department) were avoided. In a subgroup analysis, the mean cost per process (admission-discharge) for a conventional hospitalization was 3,416.13 Euros, while it was 735.65 Euros in the Quick Diagnosis Unit. Patients expressed a high degree of satisfaction with Quick Diagnosis Unit care. CONCLUSIONS: Quick Diagnosis Units represent a useful and cost-saving model for the diagnostic study of patients with potentially severe diseases. Future randomized study designs involving comparisons between controls and intervention groups would help elucidate the usefulness of Quick Diagnosis Units as an alternative to conventional hospitalization.

Implantación de la ISO 14001 en una planta de tratamiento de vehículos fuera de uso (VFU)

Nos hemos propuesto implantar la ISO 14001 en un centro autorizado de tratamiento de vehículos fuera de uso, denominado Recycling Gandía, S.L., con el fin de que dicho centro pueda obtener una ventaja competitiva, respecto de otros centros ubicados próximamente, dada la fuerte competencia existente. Con la implantación de un Sistema de Gestión Medioambiental y más concretamente la ISO 14001, se puede conseguir una mejora de la imagen de la empresa, un ahorro de costes, se pueden mejorar las relaciones con la Administración e incluso con las entidades financieras, se puede contribuir a la motivación de los trabajadores, se asegura el cumplimiento de la legislación ambiental. La actividad que nos ocupa, se dedica a la recepción y descontaminación de vehículos al final de su vida útil, reutilizando piezas o componentes de recambio., Los objetivos del presente trabajo van a ser fundamentalmente, el implantar el Manual de Gestión Ambiental en la planta de tratamiento de vehículos fuera de uso y el describir todos los procedimientos genéricos a seguir. Como conclusiones de este trabajo, tendremos las auditorías con las no conformidades detectadas, así como el compromiso adquirido en todos los niveles y departamentos de la empresa, lo cual se traducirá en una mejor satisfacción de los clientes y por tanto un aumento en el número de vehículos a tratar.

Price rivalry in airline markets: A study of a successful strategy of a network carrier against a low-cost carrier

Competition in airline markets may be tough. In this context, network carriers have two alternative strategies to compete with low-cost carriers. First, they may establish a low-cost subsidiary. Second, they may try to reduce costs using the main brand. This paper examines a successful strategy of the first type implemented by Iberia in the Spanish domestic market. Our analysis of data and the estimation of a pricing equation show that Iberia has been able to charge lower prices than rivals with its low-cost subsidiary. The pricing policy of the Spanish network carrier has been particularly aggressive in less dense routes and shorter routes.

The Political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politicians perceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters. To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknown and investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians make too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannot be fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistent with a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection. They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economic uncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

The political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politiciansperceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters.To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknownand investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politiciansmake too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannotbe fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary tothe conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may,under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study howpolitical rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistentwith a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection.They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economicuncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Competition and cost overruns. Optimal misspecification of procurement contracts

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in the initial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design specification in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspecification. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design specification and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project s design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design s specification level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design specification and shows that the sponsor s optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design specification so as to make significant cost overruns likely. Since no such misspecification occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Competition and cost overruns in procurement

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in theinitial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design speciffication in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspeciffication. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design speciffication and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project's design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design's speciffication level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design speciffication and shows that the sponsor's optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design speciffication so as to make signifficant cost overrunslikely. Since no such misspeciffication occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Cost-effectiveness of early detection of breast cancer in Catalonia (Spain)

Background: Breast cancer (BC) causes more deaths than any other cancer among women in Catalonia. Early detection has contributed to the observed decline in BC mortality. However, there is debate on the optimal screening strategy. We performed an economic evaluation of 20 screening strategies taking into account the cost over time of screening and subsequent medical costs, including diagnostic confirmation, initial treatment, follow-up and advanced care. Methods: We used a probabilistic model to estimate the effect and costs over time of each scenario. The effect was measured as years of life (YL), quality-adjusted life years (QALY), and lives extended (LE). Costs of screening and treatment were obtained from the Early Detection Program and hospital databases of the IMAS-Hospital del Mar in Barcelona. The incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) was used to compare the relative costs and outcomes of different scenarios. Results: Strategies that start at ages 40 or 45 and end at 69 predominate when the effect is measured as YL or QALYs. Biennial strategies 50-69, 45-69 or annual 45-69, 40-69 and 40-74 were selected as cost-effective for both effect measures (YL or QALYs). The ICER increases considerably when moving from biennial to annual scenarios. Moving from no screening to biennial 50-69 years represented an ICER of 4,469€ per QALY. Conclusions: A reduced number of screening strategies have been selected for consideration by researchers, decision makers and policy planners. Mathematical models are useful to assess the impact and costs of BC screening in a specific geographical area.

The Cost of ownership in the governance of interfirm collaborations

This paper investigates the selection of governance forms in interfirm collaborations taking into account the predictions from transaction costs and property rights theories. Transaction costs arguments are often used to justify the introduction of hierarchical controls in collaborations, but the ownership dimension of going from “contracts” to “hierarchies” has been ignored in the past and with it the so called “costs of ownership”. The theoretical results, tested with a sample of collaborations in which participate Spanish firms, indicate that the cost of ownership may offset the benefits of hierarchical controls and therefore limit their diffusion. Evidence is also reported of possible complementarities between reputation effects and forms of ownership that go together with hierarchical controls (i.e. joint ventures), in contrast with the generally assumed substitutability between the two.

Delegation and information sharing in oligopoly

Information sharing in oligopoly has been analyzed by assuming that firms behave as a sole economic agent. In this paper I assume that ownership and management are separated. Managers are allowed to falsely report their costs to owners and rivals. Under such circumstances, if owners want to achieve information sharing they must use managerial contracts that implement truthful cost reporting by managers as a dominant strategy. I show that, contrary to the classical result, without the inclusion of message-dependent payments in managerial contracts there will be no information sharing. On the other hand, with the inclusion of such publicly observable payments and credible ex-ante commitment by owners not to modify these payments, there will be perfect information sharing without the need for third parties. Keywords: Information sharing, Delegation, Managerial contracts. JEL classification numbers: D21, D82, L13, L21

On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model

For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. In order to prove this result, we also show that under this domain of preferences (which contains the domain of responsive preferences of the college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking Lemma holds as well. We exhibit an example showing that none of these three results remain true if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q-separable.

Price competition under cost uncertainty: A laboratory analysis

We study the relation between the number of firms and price-cost margins under price competition with uncertainty about competitors' costs. We present results of an experiment in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. In line with the theoretical prediction, market prices decrease with the number of firms, but on average stay above marginal costs. Pricing is less aggressive in duopolies than in triopolies and tetrapolies. However, independently from the number of firms, pricing is more aggressive than in the theoretical equilibrium. Both the absolute and the relative surpluses increase with the number of firms. Total surplus is close to the equilibrium level, since enhanced consumer surplus through lower prices is counteracted by occasional displacements of the most efficient firm in production.