Collaboration strategies and technological innovation: a contractual perspective of the relationship between firms and techonological centers

In this paper, a theoretical framework for analyzing the selection of governance structures for implementing collaboration agreements between firms and Technological Centers is presented and empirically discussed. This framework includes Transaction Costs and Property Rights’ theoretical assumptions, though complemented with several proposals coming from the Transactional Value Theory. This last theory is used for adding some dynamism in the governance structure selection. As empirical evidence of this theoretical explanation, we analyse four real experiences of collaboration between firms and one Technological Center. These experiences are aimed to represent the typology of relationships which Technological Centers usually face. Among others, a key interesting result is obtained: R&D collaboration activities do not need to always be organized through hierarchical solutions. In those cases where future expected benefits and/or reputation issues could play an important role, the traditional more static theories could not fully explain the selected governance structure for managing the R&D relationship. As a consequence, these results justify further research about the adequacy of the theoretical framework presented in this paper in other contexts, for example, R&D collaborations between firms and/or between Universities or Public Research Centers and firms.

The Part-time pay penalty in a segmented labor market

This paper is the first to examine the implications of switching to PT work for women's subsequent earnings trajectories, distinguishing by their type of contract: permanent or fixedterm. Using a rich longitudinal Spanish data set from Social Security records of over 76,000 prime-aged women strongly attached to the Spanish labor market, we find that PT work aggravates the segmentation of the labor market insofar there is a PT pay penalty and this penalty is larger and more persistent in the case of women with fixed-term contracts. The paper discusses problems arising in empirical estimation (including a problem not discussed in the literature up to now: the differential measurement error of the LHS variable by PT status), and how to address them. It concludes with policy implications relevant for Continental Europe and its dual structure of employment protection.

Libertad contractual y pactos parasociales

L'objecte del present treball és doble. D'una banda tractem d'examinar la naturalesa dels pactes parasocials com una manifestació del principi de llibertat contractual i, per tant, de l'autonomia de la voluntat i, d'una altra, analitzar la conflictivitat que tals pactes estan provocant en relació amb el dret de societats. En tant que tals pactes, quan es perfeccionen entre tots els socis, constituïxen, junt amb els estatuts, el verdader contingut contractual de la societat, en especial quan es tracta de societats tancades, resulta un element d'incertesa que la seua operativitat quede en dubte com ocorre en la pràctica. Pensem en la importància que un pacte parasocial representa per a la protecció dels interessos de les minories i el sentiment de fracàs que es genera quan, pretenent aplicar allò que s'ha pactat per a preservar tals drets, no resulten operatius en tot allò que no haja resultat incorporat als estatuts socials, com a conseqüència de l'existència de dos categories d'obligacions contractuals: unes que, subjectes al dret de societats, representen uns drets i obligacions de categoria superior, que aquelles incloses en els pactes parasocials, que se subjecten al dret contractual. Per això, al final del treball, s'apunta la conveniència de, en la línia iniciada pel legislador quant a la regulació dels protocols familiars, normativitzar el tractament de tals pactes parasocials quan es tracte de defendre els drets de les minories socials. Finalment, la tendència legislativa de resoldre la problemàtica de la dicotomía, dret contractual versus dret societari, suscita una esperança amb el projecte de llei de modificació de la llei 60/2003 de arbitratge, en tramitació parlamentària en estos moments, on es contempla la possibilitat de sotmetre a arbitratge la impugnació d'acords socials.

Is there a wage penalty for horizontal and vertical mismatch?

This paper studies how the horizontal and vertical mismatches in the labor market affect wage. We do so by taking into account that by choosing a job, wage and mismatches are simultaneously determined. The Seemingly Unrelated Equations model also allows us to control for any omitted variable that could cause biased estimators. We use REFLEX data for Spain. Results reveal that in most cases being horizontally matched has a wage premium and being over-educated does not affect wage. Results suggest that the modeling strategy successfully accounts for some omitted variable that affects simultaneously the probability of being horizontally matched and the wage. This could explain the existence of a wage penalty for over-educated workers when the omitted variable issue is not dealt with.

Standardized enforcement: Access to justice vs contractual innovation

We model the different ways in which precedents and contract standardization shapethe development of markets and the law. In a setup where more resourceful parties candistort contract enforcement to their advantage, we find that the introduction of astandard contract reduces enforcement distortions relative to precedents, exerting twoeffects: i) it statically expands the volume of trade, but ii) it crowds out the use ofinnovative contracts, hindering contractual innovation. We shed light on the largescale commercial codification occurred in the 19th century in many countries (evenCommon Law ones) during a period of booming commerce and long distance trade.

Contractual resolutions of financial distress

In a financial contracting model, we study the optimal debt structure to resolve financial distress. Weshow that a debt structure where two distinct debt classes co-exist - one class fully concentrated andwith control rights upon default, the other dispersed and without control rights - removes the controllingcreditor's liquidation bias when investor protection is strong. These results rationalize the use and theperformance of floating charge financing, debt financing where the controlling creditor takes the entirebusiness as collateral, in countries with strong investor protection. Our theory predicts that the efficiency ofcontractual resolutions of financial distress should increase with investor protection.

The role of institutions in the contractual process

Human beings increase their productivity by specializingtheir resources and exchanging their products. Theorganization of exchange is costly, however, becausespecialized activities need coordination and incentiveshave to be aligned. This work first describes how theseexchanges are organized in an institutional environment.It then focuses on the dual effect of this environment-as with any other specialized resource, institutions maybe used for expropriation purposes. They enjoyspecialization advantages in safeguarding exchange butthey also make possible new forms of opportunism,causing new costs of exchange. Three perverse tendenciesare identified:In the legal field, there is a surplus ofmandatory rules and, at the same time, a deficit in default rules. Second, courts activity is biased againstthe quasi-judicial role of the parties and the market. Third, Market enforcement is based on reputationalassets that are badly exposed to opportunism.

Contractual allocation of decision rights and incentives: The case of automobile distribution

We analyze empirically the allocation of rights and monetary incentives in automobile franchise contracts. These contracts substantially restrict the decision rights of dealers and grant manufacturers extensive contractual completion and enforcement powers, converting the manufacturers, de facto, in a sort of quasi-judiciary instance. Variation in the allocation of decision rights andincentive intensity is explained by the incidence of moral hazard in the relation. In particular, when the cost of dealer moral hazard is higher and the risk of manufactureropportunism is lower, manufacturers enjoy more discretion in determining the performance required from their dealers and in using mechanisms such as monitoring, termination and monetary incentives to ensure such performance is provided. We also explore the existence of interdependencies between the different elements of the system. and find some complementarities between completion and termination rights, and between monitoring rights and the intensity of incentives.

Standardized enforcement: Access to justice vs. contractual innovation

We model the effect of contract standardization on the development of markets andthe law. In a setting in which biased judges can distort contract enforcement, we findthat the introduction of a standard contract reduces enforcement distortions relative toreliance on precedents, exerting two effects: i) it statically expands the volume of trade,but ii) it crowds out the use of open-ended contracts, hindering legal evolution. We shedlight on the large-scale commercial codification undertaken in the nineteenth centuryin many countries (even common-law ones) during a period of booming commerce andlong-distance trade.

The determinants of contractual choice for private involvement in infrastructure projects in the United States

Reliance on private partners to help provide infrastructure investment and service delivery is increasing in the United States. Numerous studies have examined the determinants of the degree of private participation in infrastructure projects as governed by contract type. We depart from this simple public/private dichotomy by examining a rich set of contractual arrangements. We utilize both municipal and state-level data on 472 projects of various types completed between 1985 and 2008. Our estimates indicate that infrastructure characteristics, particularly those that reflect stand alone versus network characteristics, are key factors influencing the extent of private participation. Fiscal variables, such as a jurisdiction’s relative debt level, and basic controls, such as population and locality of government, increase the degree of private participation, while a greater tax burden reduces private participation.

Recovery Risk and Labor Costs in Public-Private Partnerships : Contractual Choice in the US Water industry

We use an ordered logistic model to empirically examine the factors that explain varying degrees of private involvement in the U.S. water sector through public-private partnerships. Our estimates suggest that a variety of factors help explain greater private participation in this sector. We find that the risk to private participants regarding cost recovery is an important driver of private participation. The relative cost of labor is also a key factor in determining the degree of private involvement in the contract choice. When public wages are high relative to private wages, private participation is viewed as a source of cost savings. We thus find two main drivers of greater private involvement: one encouraging private participation by reducing risk, and another encouraging government to seek out private participation in lowering costs.

Overeducation, skills and wage penalty: Evidence for Spain using PIAAC data

The literature on educational mismatches finds that overeducated workers suffer a wage penalty compared with properly educated workers with the same level of education. Recent literature also suggests that individuals’ skill heterogeneity could explain wage differences between overeducated and properly matched workers. The hypothesis is that overeducated workers earn less due to their lower competences and skills in relative terms. However, that hypothesis has been rarely tested due to data limitations on individuals’ skills. The aim of this paper is to test the individuals’ skill heterogeneity theory in Spain using microdata from PIAAC, because it is one of the developed countries supporting the highest overeducation rates and where its adult population holds the lowest level of skills among a set of developed countries. Our hypothesis is that the wage penalty of overeducation in Spain is explained by the lower skill level of overeducated workers. The obtained evidence confirms this hypothesis but only to a certain extent as skills only explain partially the wage penalty of overeducation.

Comentario a la STS de 16 de mayo de 2012: Condiciones potestativas, incumplimiento contractual y cláusula resolutoria expresa

Resumen y objeto: Los socios de una Sociedad, en virtud del principio de autonomía de la voluntad, pueden definir a través de una cláusula expresa inserta en un contrato entre socios el tipo de incumplimiento que da lugar a la resolución de las compraventas de participaciones de esa sociedad. Dicha cláusula no puede considerarse como una condición puramente potestativa, dependiente de la exclusiva voluntad del deudor, puesto que está ligada al hecho del incumplimiento.

Venture capital meets contract theory: risky claims or formal control?

This paper develops a theory of the joint allocation of formal control and cash-flow rights in venture capital deals. We argue that when the need for investor support calls for very high-powered outside claims, entrepreneurs should optimally retain formal control in order to avoid excessive interference. Hence, we predict that risky claims should be be negatively correlated to control rights, both along the life of a start-up and across deals. This challenges the idea that risky claims should a ways be associated to more formal control, and is in line with contractual terms increasingly used in venture capital, in corporate venturing and in partnership deals between biotech start-ups and large drug companies. The paper provides a theoretical explanation to some puzzling evidence documented in Gompers (1997) and Kaplan and Stromberg (2000), namely the inclusion in venture capital contracts of contingencies that trigger both a reduction in VC control and the conversion! of her preferred stocks into common stocks.