Cultural leaders and the clash of civilizations

This article builds a micro founded model of the clash of cultures. The clash is defined as the parent's fear of a trait change by their child in an overlapping generations model with intergenerational transmission of cultural traits. The extent of the clash is manipulated by cultural leaders who benefit from the cultural education effort by parents. We identify three channels through which the leaders can affect the clash of cultures: (i) by providing beneficial cultural values, (ii) by claims of cultural superiority and (iii) by cultural alienation, i.e. by inducing cultural dislike towards their own group. We show that all three channels can be in the leader's interest but channels (ii) and (iii) reduce the utility of the leader's goup members. This hints to a strong conflict of interest within groups - between the population at large and the benefactors of radicalization. We further show how the use of alienation relates to the economic opportunities available to a group.

The dynamics of research networks in Brite-Euram

Network formation within the BRITE--EURAM program is investigated.Wedescribe the role of the hub of the network, which is defined as the setofmain contractors that account for most of the participations. We studytheeffects that the conflict of objectives within European research fundingbetween pre-competitive research vs. European cohesion has on theformationof networks and on the relationship between different partnersof the network. \\A panel data set is constructed including the second and third frameworkof theBrite--Euram program. A model of joint production of research results isusedto test for changes in the behavior of partners within the twoframeworks. \\The main findings are that participations are very concentrated, that isasmall group of institutions account for most of the participations, butgoingfrom the second to the third framework the presence of subcontractorsand singleparticipants increases substantially. This result is reinforced by the factthat main contractors receive smaller spill-ins within networks, butspill-insincrease from the second to the third framework.

Environmental management problems, future generations and social decisions

The decisions of many individuals and social groups, taking according to well-defined objectives, are causing serious social and environmental problems, in spite of following the dictates of economic rationality. There are many examples of serious problems for which there are not yet appropriate solutions, such as management of scarce natural resources including aquifer water or the distribution of space among incompatible uses. In order to solve these problems, the paper first characterizes the resources and goods involved from an economic perspective. Then, for each case, the paper notes that there is a serious divergence between individual and collective interests and, where possible, it designs the procedure for solving the conflict of interests. With this procedure, the real opportunities for the application of economic theory are shown, and especially the theory on collective goods and externalities. The limitations of conventional economic analysis are shown and the opportunity to correct the shortfalls is examined. Many environmental problems, such as climate change, have an impact on different generations that do not participate in present decisions. The paper shows that for these cases, the solutions suggested by economic theory are not valid. Furthermore, conventional methods of economic valuation (which usually help decision-makers) are unable to account for the existence of different generations and tend to obviate long-term impacts. The paper analyzes how economic valuation methods could account for the costs and benefits enjoyed by present and future generations. The paper studies an appropriate consideration of preferences for future consumption and the incorporation of sustainability as a requirement in social decisions, which implies not only more efficiency but also a fairer distribution between generations than the one implied by conventional economic analysis.

Clínica jurídica ambiental

La “Clínica Jurídica Ambiental” constitueix una experiència d’innovació docent desenvolupada en el marc del Màster Oficial en Dret Ambiental i de la Llicenciatura en Dret de la Universitat Rovira i Virgili des del curs 2005-2006. El mètode clínic, que parteix dels principis de la contextualització de l’aprenentatge en escenaris reals, el model de learning by doing i la redefinició dels rols de l’alumne i del professor en el procés d’ensenyament-aprenentatge, és una estratègia que permet a l’alumne una formació integral orientada a la capacitació professional, d’acord amb el canvi de paradigma educatiu que suposa la creació de l’EEES. Es pretén així assolir una millor qualitat dels titulats a partir d’una formació en competències genèriques i específiques assolibles només amb estratègies d’aprenentatge actiu que facilitin l’autonomia i la responsabilització en la construcció del propi aprenentatge. Paral·lelament, la metodologia obliga a establir mecanismes de coordinació entre el professorat de diverses àrees de coneixement jurídiques. Els alumnes treballen en petits grups, durant el curs acadèmic, sobre un cas real subministrat per un client extern (administracions públiques, fiscalia, ONG,s). Els alumnes tenen un tutor intern, professor, i un tutor extern, que pertany a la institució que ha subministrat el cas. El tutor intern avalua de manera contínua i individual el procés d’aprenentatge de l’alumne (60% de la qualificació final); l'extern avalua el resultat final (40 % de la qualificació final), que s’ha de presentar com a treball de grup quan finalitza el curs acadèmic. El finançament atorgat per l’AGAUR, en el marc de la convocatòria MQD 2006, ha permès introduir millores significatives en aquest projecte: la introducció de la figura dels practitioners (advocats en exercici) en l’equip docent; l’organització d’un Seminari Internacional sobre Clinical Legal Education, i la realització de sessions plenàries formatives pels professors i els alumnes de la Clínica.

Disseny i desenvolupament d'un sistema de gestió de les comunitats de veïns

Les comunitats de veïns i els seus problemes han evolucionat molt el darrer segle; la impossibilitat de trobar un horari de reunió comú compatible, la falta de temps per a realitzar tasques administratives o la desinformació en l’àmbit jurídic en són exemples. Aquest projecte presenta una solució adaptada a aquestes necessitats basada en una eina TIC de gestió de comunitats que estalviarà temps i diners a veïns i professionals, posant a l’abast la informació i els diferents recursos relatius a la gestió de la comunitat en qualsevol lloc i moment, automatitzant part del procés administratiu dels gestors de comunitats

EU's democracy promotion policy in the Mediterranean: Squaring the stability – democracy circle?

Why does the EU have an ambiguous and inconsistent democracy promotion (DP) policy towards the Mediterranean countries? This paper argues that the EU´s DP is determined by a crucial conflict of interests conceptualised as a stability – democracy dilemma. The EU has been attempting to promote democracy, but without risking the current stability and in connivance with incumbent autocratic regimes. In view of this dilemma, the four main characteristics of the EU´s DP promotion are explored, namely: gradualism, a strong notion of partnership-building, a narrow definition of civil society, and a strong belief in economic liberalisation. A fifth feature, relation of the EU with moderate Islamists, is analysed in the paper as it represents the most striking illustration of its contradictions. The paper concludes by arguing that the definition of a clear DP by the EU that considered engagement with moderate Islamists would represent a major step towards squaring its stability – democracy circle.

The credit ratings game

The spectacular failure of top-rated structured finance products has broughtrenewed attention to the conflicts of interest of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs). We modelboth the CRA conflict of understating credit risk to attract more business, and the issuerconflict of purchasing only the most favorable ratings (issuer shopping), and examine theeffectiveness of a number of proposed regulatory solutions of CRAs. We find that CRAs aremore prone to inflate ratings when there is a larger fraction of naive investors in the marketwho take ratings at face value, or when CRA expected reputation costs are lower. To theextent that in booms the fraction of naive investors is higher, and the reputation risk forCRAs of getting caught understating credit risk is lower, our model predicts that CRAs aremore likely to understate credit risk in booms than in recessions. We also show that, due toissuer shopping, competition among CRAs in a duopoly is less efficient (conditional on thesame equilibrium CRA rating policy) than having a monopoly CRA, in terms of both totalex-ante surplus and investor surplus. Allowing tranching decreases total surplus further.We argue that regulatory intervention requiring upfront payments for rating services (beforeCRAs propose a rating to the issuer) combined with mandatory disclosure of any ratingproduced by CRAs can substantially mitigate the con.icts of interest of both CRAs andissuers.

La teoría de los clivajes y el conflicto social moderno

This article was delivered as an area-paper to the Critical Political Science Meeting of Bilbao, November the 15th 2008, which was organized by the Political Science Department of the UPV (University of the Basque Country). The paper introduces an updated and synthetic version of the model designed by S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan in 1967 in order to identify the confrontational divides distinctive of European modernization and, in this way, trace the origins of modern party systems. The expanded model proposed is applied, on the one hand, to a variety of empirical cases, prominently the postransitional Spanish case; and on the other, shows its usefulness in order to better understand the distinctive structure of the social conflict of the globalization era.

Iron mining in Goa (India) : an interdisciplinary study

En aquest article es presenten breument els diferents capítols d’un treball interdisciplinari per tal d’entendre el context de prohibició de la mineria de ferro a Goa a finals del 2012 i proporcionar la informació necessària per tal d’orientar i gestionar la presa de decisions sobre l’activitat minera en un futur. Els sis primers capítols consisteixen en l’estudi del medi abiòtic, medi biòtic, fluxos de materials, aspectes socials, aspectes econòmics i finalment aspectes polítics. En canvi, en els dos últims capítols s'avaluen i es gestionen els impactes ambientals de la mineria mitjançant, per una banda, una anàlisi DPSIR i, d'altra banda, es proposen tres escenaris per integrar les diferents variables i fomentar la participació en la presa de decisions. S’ha dut a terme una extensa recerca mitjançant la recopilació de dades, entrevistes i visites a les zones d’estudi d’interès per tal d’entendre el conflicte de la mineria a Goa.

Proceso electoral y prosopografía de los diputados de las Cortes Extraordinarias de Cádiz (1810-1813)

En el presente trabajo analizamos el proceso de elección de los diputados españoles en las Cortes Extraordinarias de Cádiz (1810-1813), la sociología de estos parlamentarios y su asistencia en el Parlamento. Después de efectuar el análisis observamos en primer lugar que hubo cuatro modalidades de elección de los diputados y que, una vez escogidos, nunca se cubrieron todos los puestos de diputado otorgados. En segundo lugar, detectamos que los diputados elegidos por los diversos entes que participaron en el proceso electoral fueron en su mayoría de condición social acomodada y representativos de la sociedad española, sobresaliendo en número el grupo de diputados eclesiásticos, de leyes y funcionarios.

A Model of ethnic conflict

We present a model of conflict, in which discriminatory government policy or social intolerance is responsive to various forms of ethnic activism, including violence. It is this perceived responsiveness -captured by the probability that the government gives in and accepts a proponed change in ethnic policy- that induces individuals to mobilize in support for their cause. Yet, mobilization is costly and demonstrators have to be compensated accordingly. Individuals have to weigh their ethnic radicalism with their material well-being to determine the size of their money contribution to the cause. Our main results are: (i) a one-sided increase in radicalism or in population size increases conflict; (ii) a one-sided increase in income has ambiguous effects depending on the elasticity of contributions to income; (iii) an increase in within-group inequality increases conflict; and (iv) an increase in the correlation between ethnic radicalism and inequality also increases conflict.

An instrumental analysis of the European Union's capability to act in conflict response

Descripció i anàlisi dels instruments polítics, econòmics, civils i militars de la Unió Europea per enfrontar qualsevol conflicte.

Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests

We study comparative statics of manipulations by women in the men-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in the two-sided one-to-one marriage market. We prove that if a group of women employs truncation strategies or weakly successfully manipulates, then all other women weakly benefit and all men are weakly harmed. We show that our results do not appropriately generalize to the many-to-one college admissions model.

Conflict prevention and decentralized governance: some remarks about the state of the art in theory and practice

Is there a link between decentralized governance and conflict prevention? This article tries to answer the question by presenting the state of the art of the intersection of both concepts. Provided that social conflict is inevitable and given the appearance of new threats and types of violence, as well as new demands for security based on people (human security), our societies should focus on promoting peaceful changes. Through an extensive analysis of the existing literature and the study of several cases, this paper suggests that decentralized governance can contribute to these efforts by transforming conflicts, bringing about power-sharing and inclusion incentives of minority groups. Albeit the complexity of assessing its impact on conflict prevention, it can be contended that decentralized governance might have very positive effects on the reduction of causes that bring about conflicts due to its ability to foster the creation of war/violence preventors. More specifically, this paper argues that decentralization can have a positive impact on the so-called triggers and accelerators (short- and medium-term causes).

Bringing actors and violent conflict into forced migration literature. A model of the decision to return

Populations displaced as a result of mass violent conflict have become one of the most pressing humanitarian concerns of the last decades. They have also become one salient political issue as a perceived burden (in economic and security terms) and as an important piece in the shift towards a more interventionist paradigm in the international system, based on both humanitarian and security grounds. The saliency of these aspects has detracted attention from the analysis of the interactions between relocation processes and violent conflict. Violent conflict studies have also largely ignored those interactions as a result of the consideration of these processes as mere reaction movements determined by structural conditions. This article takes the view that individual’s agency is retained during such processes, and that it is consequential, calling for the need to introduce a micro perspective. Based on this, a model for the individual’s decision of return is presented. The model has the potential to account for the dynamics of return at both the individual and the aggregate level. And it further helps to grasp fundamental interconnections with violent conflict. Some relevant conclusions are derived for the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina and about the implications of the politicization of return.