Competition with forward contracts: a laboratory analysis motivated by electricity market design

We use experiments to study the efficiency effects for a market as a whole of adding the possibility of forward contracting to a pre-existing spot market. We deal separately with the cases where spot market competition is in quantities and where it is in supply functions. In both cases we compare the effect of adding a contract market with the introduction of an additional competitor, changing the market structure from a triopoly to a quadropoly. We find that, as theory suggests, for both types of competition the introduction of a forward market significantly lowers prices. The combination of supply function competition with a forward market leads to high efficiency levels.

Price competition under cost uncertainty: A laboratory analysis

We study the relation between the number of firms and price-cost margins under price competition with uncertainty about competitors' costs. We present results of an experiment in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. In line with the theoretical prediction, market prices decrease with the number of firms, but on average stay above marginal costs. Pricing is less aggressive in duopolies than in triopolies and tetrapolies. However, independently from the number of firms, pricing is more aggressive than in the theoretical equilibrium. Both the absolute and the relative surpluses increase with the number of firms. Total surplus is close to the equilibrium level, since enhanced consumer surplus through lower prices is counteracted by occasional displacements of the most efficient firm in production.

Party competition in regional elections: a framework for analysis

Whilst scholars have long recognised that processes of decentralisation create new regional arenas where distinct patterns of party competition are likely to emerge, there has been little systematic analysis of the dynamics of such competition. This working paper thus proposes a framework for analysing party competition between regional branches of state-wide parties, and autonomist parties, in regional arenas. Firstly, the different strategies political parties may adopt in response to their perceptions of voter preferences and to the strategies pursued by their competitors are identified. Secondly, different factors that impact on parties' strategic choices, and which may constrain a party's ability to select electorally optimal strategies in a given political context, are proposed.

Asynchronous growth and competition in a two-sex age-structured population model

Asynchronous exponential growth has been extensively studied in population dynamics. In this paper we find out the asymptotic behaviour in a non-linear age-dependent model which takes into account sexual reproduction interactions. The main feature of our model is that the non-linear process converges to a linear one as the solution becomes large, so that the population undergoes asynchronous growth. The steady states analysis and the corresponding stability analysis are completely made and are summarized in a bifurcation diagram according to the parameter R0. Furthermore the effect of intraspecific competition is taken into account, leading to complex dynamics around steady states.

Driving competition in local gasoline markets

Relevant market definition is still a key element of economic analysis of competition in the gasoline market. It is particularly difficult to handle when competition is local and market power is geographically constrained like is the case in the gasoline market. We analyse how the application of the hypothetical monopolist or Small but Significant Non-Transitory Increase in Prices (SSNIP) test performs for defining isochrones using only information on prices and distance among competitors. We conclude that geographic information systems can be very successfully used to define more precisely relevant geographic market in the gasoline retailing. The application to the Spanish gasoline market concludes that geographic relevant market is composed by 5-6 minutes of travel time. Localised market power should be taken into account when analysing the adverse effects of mergers and entry regulations in gasoline retailing. Only drawing small enough isochrones will drive competition in local markets because it is just close rivals that compete effectively with each other.

Interbank Competition with Costly Screening

We analyse credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker s (1990) analysis, where he demonstrates that no pure strategy equilibrium exists when banks have zero screening costs. In our set up we show that interest rate on loans are largely independent of marginal costs, a feature consistent with the extant empirical evidence. In equilibrium, banks make positive profits in our model in spite of the threat of entry by inactive banks. Moreover, an increase in the number of active banks increases credit risk and so does not improve credit market effciency: this point has important regulatory implications. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case where banks have differing screening abilities.

Conflicts of interest, information provision and competition in banking

In some markets, such as the market for drugs or for financial services, sellers have better information than buyersregarding the matching between the buyer's needs and the good's actual characteristics. Depending on the market structure,this may lead to conflicts of interest and/or the underprovision of information by the seller. This paper studies this issuein the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, as banks' pricecompetition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We compare two different firm structures,specialized banking, where financial institutions provide a unique financial product, and one-stop banking, where a financialinstitution is able to provide several financial products which are horizontally differentiated. We show first that, althoughconflicts of interest may prevent information disclosure under monopoly, competition forces full information provision forsufficiently high reputation costs. Second, in the presence of market power, one-stop banks will use information strategicallyto increase product differentiation and therefore will always provide reliable information and charge higher rices thanspecialized banks, thus providing a new justification for the creation of one-stop banks. Finally, we show that, ifindependent financial advisers are able to provide reliable information, this increases product differentiation and thereforemarket power, so that it is in the interest of financial intermediaries to promote external independent financial advice.

The empirics of spatial competition: evidence from European regions

The New Economic Geography literature allows detailed analysis of the factors that determine the location decisions of firms in integrated markets. However, the competitive process is modelled in a rather rudimentary way, and the empirical evidence has usually been obtained from reduced-form econometric specifications. This study describes a structural model that takes into account strategic interactions between firms. We investigate the relationship between the degree of perceived competition ¿ not only from local firms but from firms in other regions ¿ and geographic concentration. The preliminary results indicate that, in aggregate terms, local firms present stronger competition than firms in other regions. Moreover, it is confirmed that greater geographical concentration of production reduces market power, due to the intensification of local competition; however, its impact on production costs is unclear.

The empirics of spatial competition: evidence from European regions

The New Economic Geography literature allows detailed analysis of the factors that determine the location decisions of firms in integrated markets. However, the competitive process is modelled in a rather rudimentary way, and the empirical evidence has usually been obtained from reduced-form econometric specifications. This study describes a structural model that takes into account strategic interactions between firms. We investigate the relationship between the degree of perceived competition ¿ not only from local firms but from firms in other regions ¿ and geographic concentration. The preliminary results indicate that, in aggregate terms, local firms present stronger competition than firms in other regions. Moreover, it is confirmed that greater geographical concentration of production reduces market power, due to the intensification of local competition; however, its impact on production costs is unclear.

Reconciling phonological neighborhood effects in speech production through single trial analysis

A crucial step for understanding how lexical knowledge is represented is to describe the relative similarity of lexical items, and how it influences language processing. Previous studies of the effects of form similarity on word production have reported conflicting results, notably within and across languages. The aim of the present study was to clarify this empirical issue to provide specific constraints for theoretical models of language production. We investigated the role of phonological neighborhood density in a large-scale picture naming experiment using fine-grained statistical models. The results showed that increasing phonological neighborhood density has a detrimental effect on naming latencies, and re-analyses of independently obtained data sets provide supplementary evidence for this effect. Finally, we reviewed a large body of evidence concerning phonological neighborhood density effects in word production, and discussed the occurrence of facilitatory and inhibitory effects in accuracy measures. The overall pattern shows that phonological neighborhood generates two opposite forces, one facilitatory and one inhibitory. In cases where speech production is disrupted (e.g. certain aphasic symptoms), the facilitatory component may emerge, but inhibitory processes dominate in efficient naming by healthy speakers. These findings are difficult to accommodate in terms of monitoring processes, but can be explained within interactive activation accounts combining phonological facilitation and lexical competition.

Determinants of Broadband Access: Is Platform Competition always the Key Variable to Success?

Previous studies have identified the rivalry among technological platforms as one of the main driving forces of broadband services penetration. This paper draws on data from the Spanish market between 2005 and 2011 to estimate the main determinants of broadband prices. Controlling for broadband tariffs features and network variables, we examine the impact of the different modes of competition on prices. We find that inter-platform competition has no significant effects over prices, while intra-platform competition is a key driver of the prices charged in the broadband market. Our analysis suggests that the impact of different types of competition on prices is critically affected by the levels of development of the broadband market achieved by the considered country

Why do municipalities cooperate to provide local public services? An empirical analysis

Intermunicipal cooperation is being increasingly adopted in various countries as a part of local service delivery reforms. This paper draws on survey data from Spain’s municipalities to examine the reasons underpinning the decisions of local governments to engage in intermunicipal cooperation and privatisation. Our empirical analysis indicates that small municipalities prefer to rely on cooperation for reducing costs, while their larger counterparts prefer to privatise the delivery of services. By cooperating, scale economies can be achieved with lower transaction costs and fewer concerns for competition than is the case via private production.

Vertical relations and local competition : an empirical approach

The analysis of vertical industry relations forms an essential element in the field of industrial organization. This paper tests hypotheses derived from transaction cost theory and the principal-agent problem in Chile’s petrol market. It shows that local competition plays an important role in the choice of a disintegrated vertical structure, and that low levels of service investment have the same effect. Conversely, the number of own-brand outlets and a high level of investment in services reduce the probability of disintegration. The paper demonstrates that vertical disintegration has a null effect on wholesale petrol prices and a positive effect on retail petrol prices of between 1.6 and 7 per cent, depending on fuel type.

Driver costs in small firms: Empirical analysis for farms

The agricultural sector has always been characterized by a predominance of small firms. International competition and the consequent need for restraining costs are permanent challenges for farms. This paper performs an empirical investigation of cost behavior in agriculture using panel data analysis. Our results show that transactions caused by complexity influence farm costs with opposite effects for specific and indirect costs. While transactions allow economies of scale in specific costs, they significantly increase indirect costs. However, the main driver for farm costs is volume. In addition, important differences exist for small and big farms, since transactional variables significantly influence the former but not the latter. While sophisticated management tools, such ABC, could provide only limited complementary useful information but no essential allocation bases for farms, they seem inappropriate for small farms

Driver costs in small firms: Empirical analysis for farms

The agricultural sector has always been characterized by a predominance of small firms. International competition and the consequent need for restraining costs are permanent challenges for farms. This paper performs an empirical investigation of cost behavior in agriculture using panel data analysis. Our results show that transactions caused by complexity influence farm costs with opposite effects for specific and indirect costs. While transactions allow economies of scale in specific costs, they significantly increase indirect costs. However, the main driver for farm costs is volume. In addition, important differences exist for small and big farms, since transactional variables significantly influence the former but not the latter. While sophisticated management tools, such ABC, could provide only limited complementary useful information but no essential allocation bases for farms, they seem inappropriate for small farms