Civil war and foreign influence

We study a symmetric information bargaining model of civil war where a third (foreign) party can affect the probabilities of winning the conflict and the size of the post conflict spoils. We show that the possible alliance with a third party makes peaceful agreements difficult to reach and might lead to new commitment problems that trigger war. Also, we argue that the foreign party is likely to induce persistent informational asymmetries which might explain long lasting civil wars. We explore both political and economic incentives for a third party to intervene. The explicit consideration of political incentives leads to two predictions that allow for identifying the influence of foreign intervention on civil war incidence. Both predictions are confirmed for the case of the U.S. as a potential intervening nation: (i) civil wars around the world are more likely under Republican governments and (ii) the probability of civil wars decreases with U.S. presidential approval rates.

Institutions, Public Debt and Foreign Finance

We study the role of domestic financial institutions in sustaining capital flows to the private and public sector of a country whose government can default on its debt. As in recent public debt crises, in our model public defaults weaken banks' balance sheets, disrupting domestic financial markets. This effect leads to a novel complementarity between private capital inflows and public borrowing, where the former sustain the latter by boosting the government's cost of default. Our key message is that, by shaping the direction of private capital flows, financial institutions determine whether financial integration improves or reduces government discipline. We explore the implications of this complementarity for financial liberalization and debt-financed bailouts of banks. We present some evidence consistent with complementarity.

Common law and civil law as pro-market adaptations

We argue that in the development of the Western legal system, cognitive departures are themain determinant of the optimal degree of judicial rule-making. Judicial discretion, seen here as the main distinguishing feature between both legal systems, is introduced in civil law jurisdictions to protect, rather than to limit, freedom of contract against potential judicial backlash. Such protection was unnecessary in common law countries, where free-market relations enjoyed safer judicial ground mainly due to their relatively gradual evolution, their reliance on practitioners as judges, and the earlier development of institutional checks and balances that supported private property rights. In our framework, differences in costs and benefits associated with self-interest and lack of information require a cognitive failure to be active.

The economics of organized crime and optimal law enforcement

This paper extends the optimal law enforcement literature to organized crime.We model the criminal organization as a vertical structure where the principal extracts some rents from the agents through extortion. Depending on the principal's information set, threats may or may not be credible. As long as threats are credible, the principal is able to fully extract rents.In that case, the results obtained by applying standard theory of optimal law enforcement are robust: we argue for a tougher policy. However, when threats are not credible, the principal is not able to fully extract rents and there is violence. Moreover, we show that it is not necessarily true that a tougher law enforcement policy should be chosen when in presence of organized crime.

Trade liberalization in Uruguay: Domestic and foreign firms

The reallocation of resources is one of the main impacts of tradeliberalization processes. In the case of manufacturing industries resourceswill be reallocated from import--competing sectors to export--orientedsectors. This paper studies the effects that a more open economic environmenthas had on the entry conditions for foreign and domestic firms in Uruguayanmanufacturing industries. We find significant differences in the behaviorof foreign and domestic firms, both when they are incumbents or when theyact as potential entrants. In general, foreign firms seem to be moresuccessful in applying entry deterring strategies, due to advantages inforeign markets, deeper financial resources or better technological capabilities.They also appear to be more responsive to entry conditions when theyface the prospects of entering a given industry.

Integrated random processes exhibiting long tails, finite moments, and power-law spectra

A dynamical model based on a continuous addition of colored shot noises is presented. The resulting process is colored and non-Gaussian. A general expression for the characteristic function of the process is obtained, which, after a scaling assumption, takes on a form that is the basis of the results derived in the rest of the paper. One of these is an expansion for the cumulants, which are all finite, subject to mild conditions on the functions defining the process. This is in contrast with the Lévy distribution¿which can be obtained from our model in certain limits¿which has no finite moments. The evaluation of the spectral density and the form of the probability density function in the tails of the distribution shows that the model exhibits a power-law spectrum and long tails in a natural way. A careful analysis of the characteristic function shows that it may be separated into a part representing a Lévy process together with another part representing the deviation of our model from the Lévy process. This

Accessing Legal Information in Catalonia. Open Acces to Legislation and Case Law

The article outlines free online legal resources to conduct research on Catalan and Spanish legislation and case-law. Most of these resources are primary sources made public by government bodies. The list shows how the Spanish and Catalan governments, in their attempt to promote equal access to legislation and case-law, cover the different jurisdictions. The text also mentions some resources to conduct historical legal research about legislation and case law, and some free legal private websites.

Women in police services in the EU: facts and figures 2012

The Institute for Public Security of Catalonia (ISPC), the only state-funded education and research centre for police in Catalonia-Spain, developed in 2012 a comparative study on Gender diversity in police services in the European Union. The study is an update of the research Facts & Figures 2008 that was carried out by the European Network of Policewomen (ENP), a non-profit organization that works in partnership with colleagues from police and/or law enforcement organizations in its member countries to facilitate positive changes in the position of women in police services. To gather the 2012 data, the ISPC invited EU Member States’ police services to cooperate in the study answering a 10- ITEM questionnaire. The questionnaire was the same tool used in 2008 by the ENP. In February 2012, the ISPC sent the questionnaires through Cepol National Contact Points’ network. In order to include as many police services as possible in the study, the ENP also supported us to gather some of the data. Altogether we received questionnaires from 29 police services corresponding to 17 UE countries. Besides, we used data from open sources about England and Wales police services and the French National Police. In this document you can find: first, the tool we used to collect the data; second, the answers we gathered presented per country; finally, some comparative tables and graphics developed by the ISPC. Countries: Austria, Belgium Cyprus, Denmark, England, Wales, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Swden.

Judges' cognition and market order

We argue that during the crystallization of common and civil law in the 19th century, the optimal degree of discretion in judicial rulemaking, albeit influenced by the comparative advantages of both legislative and judicial rulemaking, was mainly determined by the anti-market biases of the judiciary. The different degrees of judicial discretion adopted in both legal traditions were thus optimally adapted to different circumstances, mainly rooted in the unique, market-friendly, evolutionary transition enjoyed by English common law as opposed to the revolutionary environment of the civil law. On the Continent, constraining judicial discretion was essential for enforcing freedom of contract and establishing a market economy. The ongoing debasement of pro-market fundamentals in both branches of the Western legal system is explained from this perspective as a consequence of increased perceptions of exogenous risks and changes in the political system, which favored the adoption of sharing solutions and removed the cognitive advantage of parliaments and political leaders.