Influence activity and the organization of research and development

The organizational design of research and development conditions theincentives of the researchers of the research project. In particular,the organizational form determines the allocation of effort of theresearcher between time spent on research and time spent lobbying management. Researchers prefer to spend their time on research. However,the researchers only get utility from performing research if theproject is approved for its full duration. Spending time lobbyingmanagement for the continuation of the researcher s project increasesthe probability that the management observes a favorable signal aboutthe project. Organizing a research joint venture increases theflexibility of the organizational form with respect to the continuationdecision. For low correlation between the signals of the partners aboutthe expected profitability of the project, we find that the organizationof a research joint venture reduces influence activity by the researchersand increases expected profits of the partners. For high correlationbetween the signals, internal research projects lower influence activityby the researchers. We try to relate the correlation of the partnerssignals to the characteristics of basic research versus more appliedresearch projects, and find that the model is consistent with theobservation that research joint ventures seem involved in more basicresearch projects compared to internal R&D departments, whichconcentrate on more applied research.

Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization

In this paper, we take an organizational view of organized crime. In particular, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality attending at the following characteristics: (i) contracts are not enforceable in court, (ii) all participants are subject to the risk of being punished, (iii) employees present a major threat to the entrepreneur having the most detailed knowledge concerning participation, (iv) separation between ownership and management is difficult because record-keeping and auditing augments criminal evidence.

Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: A managerial perspective

Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economictheory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes?Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individuals, punishing corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Shouldcorporate liability be criminal or civil? This paper has two majorcontributions to the literature. First, it provides a common analyticalframework to most results presented and largely discussed in the field.In second place, by making use of the framework, we provide new insightsinto how corporations should be punished for the offenses committed bytheir employees.

Common law and civil law as pro-market adaptations

We argue that in the development of the Western legal system, cognitive departures are themain determinant of the optimal degree of judicial rule-making. Judicial discretion, seen here as the main distinguishing feature between both legal systems, is introduced in civil law jurisdictions to protect, rather than to limit, freedom of contract against potential judicial backlash. Such protection was unnecessary in common law countries, where free-market relations enjoyed safer judicial ground mainly due to their relatively gradual evolution, their reliance on practitioners as judges, and the earlier development of institutional checks and balances that supported private property rights. In our framework, differences in costs and benefits associated with self-interest and lack of information require a cognitive failure to be active.

Market and institutional determinants in the regulation of conveyancers

Demand for law professionals in the conveyancing of property is decreasing because of market and institutional changes. On the market side, many transactions feature large, well-known parties and standardized transactions, which make professionals less effective or necessary for protecting the parties to private contracts. On the institutional side, public titling makes it possible to dispense with a broadening set of their former functions. Recording of deeds made professionals redundant as depositories of deeds and reduced demand for them to design title guarantees. Effective registration of rights increasingly substitutes professionals for detecting title conflicts with third parties and gathering their consent. Market changes undermine the information asymmetry rationale for regulating conveyancing, while institutional changes facilitate liberalizing not only conduct but also license regulations. These arguments are supported here by disentangling the logic of titling systems and presenting empirical evidence from the European and USA markets.

Additive utility with intransitive indifference and without independence: A homogeneous case

In the homogeneous case of one type of goods or objects, we prove theexistence of an additive utility function without assuming transitivityof indifference and independence. The representation reveals a positivefactor smaller than 1 that infuences rational choice beyond the utilityfunction and explains departures from these standard axioms of utilitytheory (factor equals to 1).

Job satisfaction and life satisfaction: Analysis of a reciprocal model with social demographic moderators

The general objective of the study was to empirically test a reciprocal model of job satisfaction and life satisfaction while controlling for some social demographic variables. 827 employees working in 34 car dealerships in Northern Quebec (56% responses rate) were surveyed. The multiple item questionnaires were analysed using correlation analysis, chi square and ANOVAs. Results show interesting patterns emerging for the relationships between job and life satisfaction of which 49.2% of all individuals have spillover, 43.5% compensation, and 7.3% segmentation type of relationships. Results, nonetheless, are far richer and the model becomes much more refined when social demographic indicators are taken into account. Globally, social demographic variables demonstrate some effects on each satisfaction individually but also on the interrelation (nature of the relations) between life and work satisfaction.

Optimised search heuristic combining valid inequalities and tabu search

This paper presents an Optimised Search Heuristic that combines a tabu search method with the verification of violated valid inequalities. The solution delivered by the tabu search is partially destroyed by a randomised greedy procedure, and then the valid inequalities are used to guide the reconstruction of a complete solution. An application of the new method to the Job-Shop Scheduling problem is presented.

Property as an economic concept: Reconciling legal and economic conceptions of property rights in a Coasean framework

Adopting a simplistic view of Coase (1960), most economic analyses of property rightsdisregard both the key advantage that legal property rights (that is, in rem rights) provide torightholders in terms of enhanced enforcement, and the difficulties they pose to acquirers interms of information asymmetry about legal title. Consequently, these analyses tend to overstatethe role of "private ordering" and disregard the two key elements of property law: first, theessential conflict between property (that is, in rem) enforcement and transaction costs; and,second, the institutional solutions created to overcome it, mainly contractual registries capable ofmaking truly impersonal (that is, asset-based) trade viable when previous relevant transactionson the same assets are not verifiable by judges. This paper fills this gap by reinterpreting bothelements within the Coasean framework and thus redrawing the institutional foundations of bothproperty and corporate contracting.

Endogenous spillovers, increased competition and re-organization waves

We consider an entrepreneur that is the sole producer of a costreducing skill, but the entrepreneur that hires a team to usethe skill cannot prevent collusive trade for the innovation related knowledge between employees and competitors. We showthat there are two types of diffusion avoiding strategies forthe entrepreneur to preempt collusive communication i) settingup a large productive capacity (the traditional firm) and ii)keeping a small team (the lean firm). The traditional firm ischaracterized by its many "marginal" employees that work shortdays, receive flat wages and are incompletely informed about the innovation. The lean firm is small in number of employees,engages in complete information sharing among members, that are paid with stock option schemes. We find that the lean firm is superior to the traditional firm when technological entry costsare low and when the sector is immature.

Caution, children crossing: Heterogeneity of victim's cost of care and negligence rule

The paper deals with a bilateral accident situation in which victims haveheterogeneous costs of care. With perfect information,efficient care bythe injurer raises with the victim's cost. When the injurer cannot observeat all the victim's type, and this fact can be verified by Courts, first-bestcannot be implemented with the use of a negligence rule based on thefirst-best levels of care. Second-best leads the injurer to intermediate care,and the two types of victims to choose the best response to it. This second-bestsolution can be easily implemented by a negligence rule with second-best as duecare. We explore imperfect observation of the victim's type, characterizing theoptimal solution and examining the different legal alternatives when Courts cannotverify the injurers' statements. Counterintuitively, we show that there is nodifference at all between the use by Courts of a rule of complete trust and arule of complete distrust towards the injurers' statements. We then relate thefindings of the model to existing rules and doctrines in Common Law and Civil Lawlegal systems.

Regulation and opportunism: How much activism do we need?

This paper analyzes the current trend towards firms self-regulation as opposed to the formal regulation of a negative externality. Firms respond to increasing activism in the market(conscious consumers that take into account the external effects of their purchase) by providing more socially responsible goods. However, because regulation is the outcome of a political process, an increase in activism might imply an inefficiently higher externality level. This may happen when a majority of non-activist consumers collectively free-ride on conscious consumers. By determining a softer than optimal regulation, they benefit from the behavior of firms, yet they have access to cheaper (although less efficient) goods.

The role of title insurance under recording and registration

This article outlines a transaction cost theory of title insurance andanalyses the role it plays in countries with recording and registrationof land titles. Title insurance indemnifies real estate right holdersfor losses caused by pre-existing title defects that are unknown whenthe policy is issued. It emerged to complement the errors and omissions insurance of professionals examining title quality. Poor organizationof public records led title insurers in the USA to integrate titleexamination and settlement services. Their residual claimant statusmotivates insurers to screen, cure and avoid title defects. Firmsintroducing title insurance abroad produce little information on titlequality, however. Their policies are instead issued on a casualty basis,complementing and enforcing the professional liability of conveyancers.Future development in markets with land registration is uncertainbecause of adverse selection, competitive reactions from establishedconveyancers and the ability of larger banks to self-insure title risks.

Strategies for an integrated distribution problem

The problems arising in the logistics of commercial distribution are complexand involve several players and decision levels. One important decision isrelated with the design of the routes to distribute the products, in anefficient and inexpensive way.This article explores three different distribution strategies: the firststrategy corresponds to the classical vehicle routing problem; the second isa master route strategy with daily adaptations and the third is a strategythat takes into account the cross-functional planning through amulti-objective model with two objectives. All strategies are analyzed ina multi-period scenario. A metaheuristic based on the Iteratetd Local Search,is used to solve the models related with each strategy. A computationalexperiment is performed to evaluate the three strategies with respect to thetwo objectives. The cross functional planning strategy leads to solutions thatput in practice the coordination between functional areas and better meetbusiness objectives.