Social Security in Theory and Practice (II): Efficiency Theories, Narrative Theories, and Implications for Reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forces create and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "government economizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory". The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

Social security in theory and practice (II): Efficiency theories, narrative theories and implications for reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forcescreate and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "governmenteconomizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory".The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

Social security in theory and practice (I): Facts and political theories

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forcescreate and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? We document some of the internationally and historically common features of Social Security programs including explicit and implicit taxes on labor supply, pay-as-you-go features, intergenerational redistribution, benefits which areincreasing functions of lifetime earnings and not means-tested. We partition theories of Social Security into three groups: "political", "efficiency" and "narrative" theories. We explore three political theories in this paper: the majority rational voting model (with its two versions: "the elderly as the leaders of a winning coalition with the poor" and the "once and for all election" model), the "time-intensive model of political competition" and the "taxpayer protection model". Each of the explanations is compared with the international and historical facts. A companion paper explores the "efficiency" and "narrative" theories, and derives implicationsof all the theories for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan.

Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences

We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over allocations: given an allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent can be forced to be a user and no agent who wants to be a user can be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property.

Codes of best practice in competitive markets for managers

We study firms' corporate governance in environments where possibly heterogeneous shareholders compete for possibly heterogeneous managers. A firm, formed by a shareholder and a manager, can sign either an incentive contract or a contract including a Code of Best Practice. A Code allows for a better manager's control but makes manager's decisions hard to react when market conditions change. It tends to be adopted in markets with low volatility and in low-competitive environments. The firms with the best projects tend to adopt the Code when managers are not too heterogeneous while the best managers tend to be hired through incentive contracts when the projects are similar. Although the matching between shareholders and managers is often positively assortative, the shareholders with the best projects might be willing to renounce to hire the best managers, signing contracts including Codes with lower-ability managers.

Leadership in collective action

We extend the model of collective action in which groups compete for a budged by endogenizing the group platform, namely the specific mixture of public/private good and the distribution of the private good to group members which can be uniform or performance-based. While the group-optimal platform contains a degree of publicness that increases in group size and divides the private benefits uniformly, a success-maximizing leader uses incentives and distorts the platform towards more private benefits - a distortion that increases with group size. In both settings we obtain the anti-Olson type result that win probability increases with group size.

The Electoral Determinants of Collective Remittances: The Mexican 3x1 Program for Migrants

The 3x1 Program for Migrants is a matching grant scheme that seeks to direct the money sent by migrant organizations abroad to the provision of public and social infrastructure, and to productive projects in migrants’ communities of origin. To do so, the municipal, state, and federal administrations match the amount sent by hometown associations by 3 to 1. This opens the door to the political manipulation of the program. We explore the impact of a particular facet of Mexican political life on the operation of the 3x1: its recent democratization and the increasing political competition at the municipal level. Relying on the literature on redistributive politics, we posit that an increasing number of effective parties in elections may have two different effects. On the one hand, the need to cater to more heterogeneous constituencies may increase the provision of public projects. On the other hand, since smaller coalitions are needed to win elections under tighter competition, fewer public and more private (clientelistic) projects could be awarded. Using a unique dataset on the 3x1 Program for Migrants for over 2,400 municipalities in the period 2002 through 2007, we find a lower provision of public goods in electorally competitive jurisdictions. Thus, we remain sceptical about the program success in promoting public goods in politically competitive locations with high migration levels.

A well-posedness theory in measures for some kinetic models of collective motion

We present existence, uniqueness and continuous dependence results for some kinetic equations motivated by models for the collective behavior of large groups of individuals. Models of this kind have been recently proposed to study the behavior of large groups of animals, such as flocks of birds, swarms, or schools of fish. Our aim is to give a well-posedness theory for general models which possibly include a variety of effects: an interaction through a potential, such as a short-range repulsion and long-range attraction; a velocity-averaging effect where individuals try to adapt their own velocity to that of other individuals in their surroundings; and self-propulsion effects, which take into account effects on one individual that are independent of the others. We develop our theory in a space of measures, using mass transportation distances. As consequences of our theory we show also the convergence of particle systems to their corresponding kinetic equations, and the local-in-time convergence to the hydrodynamic limit for one of the models.

A critical analysis of dimensions and curve fitting practice in economics

When dealing with sustainability we are concerned with the biophysical as well as the monetary aspects of economic and ecological interactions. This multidimensional approach requires that special attention is given to dimensional issues in relation to curve fitting practice in economics. Unfortunately, many empirical and theoretical studies in economics, as well as in ecological economics, apply dimensional numbers in exponential or logarithmic functions. We show that it is an analytical error to put a dimensional unit x into exponential functions ( a x ) and logarithmic functions ( x a log ). Secondly, we investigate the conditions of data sets under which a particular logarithmic specification is superior to the usual regression specification. This analysis shows that logarithmic specification superiority in terms of least square norm is heavily dependent on the available data set. The last section deals with economists’ “curve fitting fetishism”. We propose that a distinction be made between curve fitting over past observations and the development of a theoretical or empirical law capable of maintaining its fitting power for any future observations. Finally we conclude this paper with several epistemological issues in relation to dimensions and curve fitting practice in economics

Conflict prevention and decentralized governance: some remarks about the state of the art in theory and practice

Is there a link between decentralized governance and conflict prevention? This article tries to answer the question by presenting the state of the art of the intersection of both concepts. Provided that social conflict is inevitable and given the appearance of new threats and types of violence, as well as new demands for security based on people (human security), our societies should focus on promoting peaceful changes. Through an extensive analysis of the existing literature and the study of several cases, this paper suggests that decentralized governance can contribute to these efforts by transforming conflicts, bringing about power-sharing and inclusion incentives of minority groups. Albeit the complexity of assessing its impact on conflict prevention, it can be contended that decentralized governance might have very positive effects on the reduction of causes that bring about conflicts due to its ability to foster the creation of war/violence preventors. More specifically, this paper argues that decentralization can have a positive impact on the so-called triggers and accelerators (short- and medium-term causes).

Reconsideration of dimensions and curve fitting practice in economics ellaborating on Georgescu-Roegen’s economic methodology

This paper is to examine the proper use of dimensions and curve fitting practices elaborating on Georgescu-Roegen’s economic methodology in relation to the three main concerns of his epistemological orientation. Section 2 introduces two critical issues in relation to dimensions and curve fitting practices in economics in view of Georgescu-Roegen’s economic methodology. Section 3 deals with the logarithmic function (ln z) and shows that z must be a dimensionless pure number, otherwise it is nonsensical. Several unfortunate examples of this analytical error are presented including macroeconomic data analysis conducted by a representative figure in this field. Section 4 deals with the standard Cobb-Douglas function. It is shown that the operational meaning cannot be obtained for capital or labor within the Cobb-Douglas function. Section 4 also deals with economists "curve fitting fetishism". Section 5 concludes thispaper with several epistemological issues in relation to dimensions and curve fitting practices in economics.

Comunidad y ciudadanía activa: fenomenología de una ocupación ética en un contexto de inmigración

La teoria i la praxi de la investigació qualitativa actual és hereva de la tradició fenomenològica. L’objectiu de la investigació està relacionat amb la comprensió profunda de les dimensions de l’educació i el treball, així com la seva significació per a les dones i els homes amb històries de vida marcades per la immigració. També, el treball de la investigació actual analitza la construcció de una identitat individual i col•lectiva de les dones i els homes amb una història d’immigració i reflexiona com desenvolupen el seu compromís a través d’una ocupació ètica. Es fa èmfasi en els elements transversals de la cultura i les construccions de gènere dins del domini de treball i educació. El mètode biogràfic narratiu es va utilitzar per estudiar les qüestions plantejades per la investigació. El procés de triangulació de les veus de les dones, els homes i de l’organització participant es va duu a terme per assegurar la validesa dels resultats i es van interpretar els indicadors de la recerca des del marc teòric proposat. A mode de conclusió, el treball es refereix a la formació permanent i considera que la violació del dret a l’educació és un factor que limita les oportunitats d’experimentar aquest tipus d’ocupació i, té efectes en la integritat personal i col·lectiva. Esperem que aquesta investigació pugui contribuir a la política d’immigració de les diferents organitzacions.

Suboptimal Management of Coronary Risk in Daily Clinical Practice: Results from a Mediterranean Cohort of HIV-Infected Patients With Myocardial Infarction

Background: The incidence of cardiovascular events in HIV patients has fallen. Methods: We identified 81 patients with a history of coronary events from 2 hospitals in Spain to evaluate management of CVRF before and after the event. Results: The prevalence of coronary events was 2.15%. At the time of the coronary event, CVRF were highly prevalent. Decrease in total cholesterol (P=0.025) and LDLc(P=0.004) was observed. LDLc and HDLc were determined and the percentage of patients with LDLc &100 mg/dL remained stable at the last visit. Conclusions: The prevalence of coronary disease in our cohort was low. Although CVRF were highly.

Collective intelligence

Estudio e implantación de algoritmos de recomendación, búsqueda, ranking y aprendizaje.