Between pluralism and majoritarianism: the European Court of Human Rights on religious symbols and education

How is it possible to square the development of a consistent Europeanapproach to religious diversity with the recognition of the sometimes-conflictiveplurality of state-religion models? The Court´s support of the liberalprinciples of separation and neutrality have either been deplored by Christianconservatives as the result of European Christophobia, or celebratedby secularists as contributing to the formation of a Europe free of religion.In contrast, the present chapter argues for a differentiated approach toEuropean jurisprudence, outlining how the Court has been oscillating betweenan appealing liberal-pluralist perspective or framework, and a questionablemajoritarian one. Both perspectives are illustrated by focusing onrepresentative decisions in the area of religious education and symbols.

Property as an economic concept: Reconciling legal and economic conceptions of property rights in a Coasean framework

Adopting a simplistic view of Coase (1960), most economic analyses of property rightsdisregard both the key advantage that legal property rights (that is, in rem rights) provide torightholders in terms of enhanced enforcement, and the difficulties they pose to acquirers interms of information asymmetry about legal title. Consequently, these analyses tend to overstatethe role of "private ordering" and disregard the two key elements of property law: first, theessential conflict between property (that is, in rem) enforcement and transaction costs; and,second, the institutional solutions created to overcome it, mainly contractual registries capable ofmaking truly impersonal (that is, asset-based) trade viable when previous relevant transactionson the same assets are not verifiable by judges. This paper fills this gap by reinterpreting bothelements within the Coasean framework and thus redrawing the institutional foundations of bothproperty and corporate contracting.

Contractual allocation of decision rights and incentives: The case of automobile distribution

We analyze empirically the allocation of rights and monetary incentives in automobile franchise contracts. These contracts substantially restrict the decision rights of dealers and grant manufacturers extensive contractual completion and enforcement powers, converting the manufacturers, de facto, in a sort of quasi-judiciary instance. Variation in the allocation of decision rights andincentive intensity is explained by the incidence of moral hazard in the relation. In particular, when the cost of dealer moral hazard is higher and the risk of manufactureropportunism is lower, manufacturers enjoy more discretion in determining the performance required from their dealers and in using mechanisms such as monitoring, termination and monetary incentives to ensure such performance is provided. We also explore the existence of interdependencies between the different elements of the system. and find some complementarities between completion and termination rights, and between monitoring rights and the intensity of incentives.

The Emerging Human Rights Revolution: The Beginning of the Fifth Historical Process in the Consolidation of Human Rights

Emerging human rights are destined to modify, improve and transform a number of already traditional concepts so as to achieve greater guarantees and protection for the rights of individuals and collectivities. One of the big changes that will be brought about by the concept and conception of emerging human rights is that, following on from the processes of positivization, generalization, internationalization and specification, they represent the beginning of the fifth historical process in the consolidation of human rights, namely the process of interaction. A number of breakthroughs have already been achieved, such as the recognition of emerging biocultural rights in the recently adopted Nagoya Protocol on access to genetic resources and shared benefits.

The colonial origins of Civil War

The dominant hypothesis in the literature that studies conflict is that poverty is the main cause of civil wars. We instead analyze the effect of institutions on civil war, controlling for income per capita. In our set up, institutions are endogenous and colonial origins affect civil wars through their legacy on institutions. Our results indicate that institutions, proxied by the protection of property rights, rule of law and the efficiency of the legal system, are a fundamental cause of civil war. In particular, an improvement in institutions from the median value in the sample to the 75th percentile is associated with a 38 percentage points reduction in the incidence of civil wars. Moreover, once institutions are included as explaining civil wars, income does not have any effect on civil war, either directly or indirectly.