Money, Fame and the Allocation of Talent: Brain Drain, the Matthew Effect and the Institution of Science

The earning structure in science is known to be flat relative to the one in the private sector, which could cause a brain drain toward the private sector. In this paper, we assume that agents value both money and fame and study the role of the institution of science in the allocation of talent between the science sector and the private sector. Following works on the Sociology of Science, we model the institution of science as a mechanism distributing fame (i.e. peer recognition). We show that since the intrinsic performance is less noisy signal of talent in the science sector than in the private sector, a good institution of science can mitigate the brain drain. We also find that providing extra monetary incentives through the market might undermine the incentives provided by the institution and thereby worsen the brain drain. Finally, we study the optimal balance between monetary and non-monetary incentives in science.

Money, fame and the allocation of talent: Brain drain and the institution of science

The earning structure in science is known to be flat relative to the one in theprivate sector, which could cause a brain drain toward the private sector. In thispaper, we assume that agents value both money and fame and study the role ofthe institution of science in the allocation of talent between the science sector andthe private sector. Following works on the Sociology of Science, we model theinstitution of science as a mechanism distributing fame (i.e. peer recognition). Weshow that since the intrinsic performance is less noisy signal of talent in the sciencesector than in the private sector, a good institution of science can mitigate thebrain drain. We also find that providing extra monetary incentives through themarket might undermine the incentives provided by the institution and therebyworsen the brain drain. Finally, we study the optimal balance between monetaryand non-monetary incentives in science.

Desenvolupament d'un agent intel·ligent dins el marc de la competició TAC SCM

Aquest projecte està emmarcat dins el grup eXiT d’Intel•lig`encia Artificial del Departament d’Electrònica i Automàtica (EIA) de la Universitat de Girona. Pertany a l’àmbit de la Intel•ligència Artificial i, concretament, en l’apartat d’agents intel•ligents. En el nostre cas, tractarem el desenvolupament d’un agent intel•ligent en un entorn determinat, el de la gestió d’una cadena de producció. Amb l’objectiu de proporcionar un marc experimental on provar diferents tecnologies de suport a la gestió de la cadena de producció, la comunitat d’investigadors va proposar una competició internacional: la Trading Agent Competiton (TAC). En aquesta competició existeixen diferents modalitats. En particular, la Swedish Institution of Computer Science (SICS), juntament amb la Carnegie Mellon University de Pittsburg, Minnesotta, van proposar al 2003 un escenari de muntatge de PC’s basat en el proveïment de recursos, l’embalatge de PC’s i les ventes a clients. Aquesta modalitat és coneguda com aTAC-SCM (Supply Chain Management)

Prime property institutions for a subprime era: Toward innovative models of homeownership

This Article breaks new ground toward contractual and institutional innovation in models of homeownership, equity building, and mortgage enforcement. Inspired by recent developments in the affordable housing sector and other types of public financing schemes, we suggest extending institutional and financial strategies such as time- and place-based division of property rights, conditional subsidies, and credit mediation to alleviate the systemic risks of mortgage foreclosure. Two new solutions offer a broad theoretical basis for such developments in the economic and legal institution of homeownership: a for-profit shared equity scheme led by local governments alongside a private market shared equity model, one of "bootstrapping home buying with purchase options".