Capitalism, unemployment and the transition to the contemporary pattern of growth

A new model of unemployment based on an idea of Marx is presented and used to interpret the development of the British economy from the beginning of capitalism to the present. It is shown that unemployment may be created purposely by capitalists in order to weaken the bargaining position of the workers. This mechanism leads to complex temporal pattern of unemployment and can explain why wages took almost a century and a half to react to the growing capital to labour ratio that characterised early British capitalism.

A foundation model for marxian theories of the breakdown of capitalism

Marx and the writers that followed him have produced a number of theories of the breakdown of capitalism. The majority of these theories were based on the historical tendencies: the rise in the composition of capital and the share of capital and the fall in the rate of profit. However these theories were never modeled with main stream rigour. This paper presents a constant wage model, with capital, labour and land as factors of production, which reproduces the historical tendencies and so can be used as a foundation for the various theories. The use of Chaplygins theorem in the proof of the main result also gives the paper a technical interest.

A marxian model of the breakdown of capitalism

This paper sets out a Marxian model that is based on the one by Stephen Marglin with one sector and continuous substitution. It is extended by adding technical progress and land as a factor of production. It is then shown that capital accumulation causes the preconditions for the breakdown of capitalism to emerge; that is, it causes the organic composition of capital to rise, the rate of profit to fall and the rate of exploitation to rise. A compressed history of the idea of the breakdown of capitalism is then set out and an explanation is given as to how the model relates to this and how it may serve as the basis for further research.

Productivity Growth during the English Industrial Revolution: A Dual Approach

This paper presents new estimates of total factor productivity growth in Britain for the period 1770-1860. We use a dual technique recently popularized by Hsieh (1999), and argue that the estimates we derive from factor prices are of similar quality to quantity-based calculations. Our results provide further evidence, derived from this independent set of sources, that productivity growth during the British Industrial Revolution was relatively slow. During the years 1770-1800, TFP growth was close to zero, according to our estimates. The period 1800-1830 experienced an acceleration of productivity growth. The Crafts-Harley view of the Industrial Revolution is thus reinforced. We also consider alternative explanations of slow productivity growth, and reject the interpretation that focuses on the introduction of steam as a general purpose technology.

The Speed of the Financial Revolution: Evidence from Hoare’s Bank

Finance is important for development, yet the onset of modern economic growth in Britain lagged the British financial revolution by over a century. We present evidence from a new West-End London private bank to explain this delay. Hoare’s Bank loaned primarily to a highly select and well-born clientele, although it did not discriminate against “unknown” borrowers in the early 18th century. It could not extend credit more generally because of government restrictions (usury limits) and policies (frequent wars). Britain’s financial development could have aided growth substantially, had it not been for the rigidities and turmoil introduced by government interference.

The electric revolution in Latin America

Latin America participated in the electric revolution which profoundly transformed the most developed Western economies between 1880 and 1930. The electrification of Latin America began relatively soon after these economies, but it was incapable of keeping up with them. Public electric lighting was introduced early in the big Latin American cities, where electric trams started running at almost the same time as in Europe, and electricity spread rapidly in the mining sector. In the most advanced countries or areas in the region, the manufacturing industry substituted the steam engine with the electric motor, following the example of industry in the United States and Europe. Nevertheless, towards 1930 electricity consumption per inhabitant for Latin America was far below that of the more advanced economies, and only the Latin American countries which lead the process of electrification had reached levels of electric consumption that were similar to those of the late industrialised European countries. One of the most striking features of the electric revolution in Latin America is rooted precisely in the enormous national differences. These differences are indicative of the great economic inequalities existing in the heart of the region and these nations highly diverse capacity for economic modernisation.

Credit rationing and crowding out during the Industrial Revolution: Evidence from Hoare's Bank, 1702-1862

Crowding-out during the British Industrial Revolution has long been one of the leadingexplanations for slow growth during the Industrial Revolution, but little empirical evidence exists to support it. We argue that examinations of interest rates are fundamentally misguided, and that the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century private loan market balanced through quantity rationing. Using a unique set of observations on lending volume at a London goldsmith bank, Hoare s, we document the impact of wartime financing on private credit markets. We conclude that there is considerable evidence that government borrowing, especially during wartime, crowded out private credit.

Factor prices and productivity growth during the British Industrial Revolution

This paper presents new estimates of total factor productivity growth in Britain for the period1770 1860. We use the dual technique and argue that the estimates we derive from factorprices are of similar quality to quantity-based calculations. Our results provide further evidence,calculated on the basis of an independent set of sources, that productivity growth duringthe British Industrial Revolution was relatively slow. The Crafts Harley view of theIndustrial Revolution is thus reinforced. Our preferred estimates suggest a modest accelerationafter 1800.

Wage structures and family economies in the Catalan textile industry in an age of nascent capitalism

This paper deals with changes in managerial practices in Catalonia in anage of nascent capitalism (1830-1925) and adaptive family strategies inorder to face the absence of state welfare. During the 19 t h Century andin the absence of recorded labor contracts, human resources of the firmwere organized by means of implicit contracts and informal labor markets.With the advent of scientific organization of labor, wage per hour workedbegan to be recorded. This is why in the 1920s the perfect competitionmodel applies to our case. On the other hand, in the same period, and inthe absence of state welfare, ideas stemming from cooperative game theoryapply to the pattern of household income formation. Kin related networkswere used to improve the living standards of the household. In thisparticular direction we also show that there was a demonstration effectby means of which migrant s living standards were higher than those ofnatives.

Why England? Demand, growth and inequality during the Industrial Revolution

Why was England first? And why Europe? We present a probabilistic model that builds on big-push models by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), combined with hierarchical preferences. The interaction of exogenous demographic factors (in particular the English low-pressure variant of the European marriage pattern)and redistributive institutions such as the old Poor Law combined to make an Industrial Revolution more likely. Essentially, industrialization is the result of having a critical mass of consumers that is rich enough to afford (potentially) mass-produced goods. Our model is then calibrated to match the main characteristics of the English economy in 1750 and the observed transition until 1850.This allows us to address explicitly one of the key features of the British IndustrialRevolution unearthed by economic historians over the last three decades the slowness of productivity and output change. In our calibration, we find that the probability of Britain industrializing is 5 times larger than France s. Contrary to the recent argument by Pomeranz, China in the 18th century had essentially no chance to industrialize at all. This difference is decomposed into a demographic and a policy component, with the former being far more important than the latter.

Falling real wages during an industrial revolution

The Industrial Revolution was characterized by technologicalprogress and an increasing capital intensity. Why did real wages stagnateor fall in the beginning? I answer this question by modeling the IndustrialRevolution as the introduction of a relatively more capital intensiveproduction method in a standard neoclassical framework. I show that{\sl real wages fall in the beginning of an industrial revolution if andonly if technological progress in the relatively more capital intensivesector is relatively fast.}

Private borrowing during the financial revolution: Hoare’s Bank and its customers, 1702-1724

The financial revolution improved the British government s ability to borrow, andthus its ability to wage war. North andWeingast argued that it also permitted privateparties to borrow more cheaply and widely.We test these inferences with evidencefrom a London bank.We confirm that private bank credit was cheap in the earlyeighteenth century, but we argue that it was not available widely. Importantly, thegovernment reduced the usury rate in 1714, sharply reducing the circle of privateclients that could be served profitably.

"Next-generation" Sequencing (NGS): The new genomic revolution

In the past 5 years "Next-generation" Sequencing (NGS) technologies have transformed genomics by delivering fast, inexpensive and accurate genomeinformation changing the way we think about scientific approaches in basic,applied and clinical research. The inexpensive production of large volumes ofsequence data is the main advantage over the automated Sanger method,making this new technology useful for many applications. In this chapter, a brieftechnical review of NGS technologies is given, along with the keys to NGSsuccess and a broad range of applications for NGS technologies.

The Emerging Human Rights Revolution: The Beginning of the Fifth Historical Process in the Consolidation of Human Rights

Emerging human rights are destined to modify, improve and transform a number of already traditional concepts so as to achieve greater guarantees and protection for the rights of individuals and collectivities. One of the big changes that will be brought about by the concept and conception of emerging human rights is that, following on from the processes of positivization, generalization, internationalization and specification, they represent the beginning of the fifth historical process in the consolidation of human rights, namely the process of interaction. A number of breakthroughs have already been achieved, such as the recognition of emerging biocultural rights in the recently adopted Nagoya Protocol on access to genetic resources and shared benefits.