Regulating financial conglomerates

We investigate the optimal regulation of financial conglomerates which combinea bank and a non-bank financial institution. The conglomerate s risk-taking incentivesdepend upon the level of market discipline it faces, which in turn isdetermined by the conglomerate s liability strucure. We examine optimal capitalrequirements for standalone institutions, for integrated financial conglomerates,and for financial conglomerates that are structured as holding companies.For a given risk profile, integrated conglomerates have a lower probability offailure than either their standalone or decentralised equivalent. However, whenrisk profiles are endogenously selected conglomeration may extend the reachof the deposit insurance safety net and hence provide incentives for increasedrisk-taking. As a result, integrated conglomerates may optimally attract highercapital requirements. In contrast, decentralised conglomerates are able to holdassets in the socially most efficient place. Their optimal capital requirementsencourage this. Hence, the practice of regulatory arbitrage , or of transferingassets from one balance sheet to another, is welfare-increasing. We discuss thepolicy implications of our finding in the context not only of the present debateon the regulation of financial conglomerates but also in the light of existingUS bank holding company regulation.

Corporate finance and the monetary transmission mechanism

This paper analyzes the transmission mechanisms of monetarypolicy in a general equilibrium model of securities marketsand banking with asymmetric information. Banks' optimal asset/liability policy is such that in equilibrium capital adequacy constraints are always binding. Asymmetric information about banks' net worth adds a cost to outside equity capital, which limits the extent to which banks can relax their capital constraint. In this context monetarypolicy does not affect bank lending through changes in bank liquidity. Rather, it has the effect of changing theaggregate composition of financing by firms. The model also produces multiple equilibria, one of which displays all the features of a "credit crunch". Thus, monetary policy can also have large effects when it induces a shift from one equilibrium to the other.

Optimal regulation of a fully insured deposit banking system

We analyze risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurancein the presence of private information when the market value of depositinsurance can be determined using Merton's (1997) formula. We show that,under the assumption that transferring funds from taxpayers to financialinstitutions has a social cost, the optimal regulation combines differentlevels of capital requirements combined with decreasing premia on depositinsurance. On the other hand, it is never efficient to require the banksto hold riskless assets, so that narrow banking is not efficient. Finally,chartering banks is necessary in order to decrease the cost of asymmetricinformation.

Infrastructure and nation building: The regulation and financing of network transportation infrastructures in Spain (1720-2010)

This paper analyzes Spanish infrastructure policy since the early 1700s: Road building in the eighteenth century, railway creation and expansion in the nineteenth, motorway expansion in the twentieth, and high speed rail development in the twenty-first. The analysis reveals a long-term pattern, in which infrastructure policy in Spain has been driven not by the requirements of commerce and economic activity, but rather by the desire to centralize transportation around the country’s political capital.

Efficiency and environmental regulation: a 'complex situation'

Production of desirable outputs is often accompanied by undesirable by products that have damaging effects on the environment, and whose disposal is frequently regulated by public authorities. In this paper, we compute directional technology distance functions under particular assumptions concerning disposability of bads in order to test for the existence of what we call ‘complex situations’, where the biggest producer is not the greatest polluter. Furthermore, we show that how in such situations, environmental regulation could achieve an effective reduction in the aggregate level of bad outputs without reducing the production of good outputs. Finally, we illustrate our methodology with an empirical application to a sample of Spanish tile ceramic producers.

La Solvencia financiera del asegurador de vida y su relación con el coste de capital

Esta investigación relaciona el margen de solvencia que normativamente deben acreditar los aseguradores de vida con los recursos propios que cualquier empresa debe poseer para poder ejercer su actividad. Analizaremos la incidencia que la remuneración de esos recursos tiene en la propia actividad de comercialización de los seguros demostrando su relación inversa con el tipo de interés garantizado en los contratos. Analizaremos asimismo la incidencia que los eventuales cambios en los tipos de interés pueden tener en la remuneración que puede ofrecerse a esos recursos y propondremos una ecuación que incorpore todos estos aspectos, comprobando que las relaciones que actualmente ofrece la disciplina académica son casos particulares de la ecuación general, casos que demostraremos que incorporan unas hipótesis implícitas bastante restrictivas.

Opción de responsabilidad limitada y opción de abandonar: una integración para el análisis del coste de capital

El objetivo de este documento es formalizar el valor de las acciones de una empresa endeudada, la responsabilidad limitada de los accionistas de una sociedad anónima y la rentabilidad exigida en un horizonte perpetuo, aplicando la teoría de opciones. El modelo que se elabora parte del establecido por Fisher Black y Myron Scholes en 1973 sobre el valor de las acciones de una empresa endeudada en un horizonte monoperiódico. En este modelo se encuentra un problema: la limitación del horizonte a un solo período. El modelo que se desarrolla en este documento, se basa en que el horizonte de la empresa es, en principio, ilimitado, y es frecuente que se mantenga un determinado grado de endeudamiento a lo largo de su vida. Es decir, se considera el endeudamiento de la empresa de horizonte perpetuo. Como consecuencia, los accionistas pueden declarar la quiebra en cualquier momento independientemente del vencimiento de la deuda, dejando la empresa en manos de los acreedores. Basándose en este modelo de horizonte perpetuo, se introduce la opción de abandonar. Se utiliza el valor de venta que tiene el activo de la empresa en el mercado, los accionistas lo comparan con el valor de las deudas, y deciden si es más rentable seguir con la empresa o vender los elementos del activo en el mercado. Para la valoración, se utiliza la fórmula deducida por Merton (1990) de la opción de venta americana perpetua. También se utiliza las opciones de barrera. Una vez valorada la responsabilidad limitada de los accionistas en un horizonte perpetuo, se puede calcular el interés efectivo en condiciones de riesgo.

Human capital as a factor of growth and employment at the regional level. The case of Spain

We use statistical techniques to quantify the effects of school attainment on individual wages, participation rates and employment probabilities in Spain, and to measure the contribution of education to labour productivity at the regional level. These estimates are then combined with data on private and public expenditure on education and with information on taxes and social benefits to construct measures of the private and social returns to schooling, to explore the effects of public policies on private incentives to invest in human capital, and to analyse the long-term effects of schooling on public finances. The results are used, together with estimates of the returns to alternative assets, to draw some tentative conclusions regarding the adequacy of the aggregate investment patterns observed in the regions of Spain, and to identify changes in the design of national and EU cohesion and growth policies that may help enhance their effectiveness.

Marx's analysis of the falling rate of profit on the first version of volume III of capital

The paper provides a description and analysis of the Hodgskin section of Theories of Surplus Value and the general law section of the first version of Volume III of Capital. It then considers Part III of Volume III, the evolution of Marx's thought and various interpretations of his theory in the light of this analysis. It is suggested that Marx thought that the rate of profit must fall and even in the 1870s hoped to be able to provide a demonstration of this. However the main conclusions are: 1. Marx's major attempt to show that the rate of profit must fall occurred in the general law section. 2. Part III does not contain a demonstration that the rate of profit must fall. 3. Marx was never able to demonstrate that the rate of profit must fall and he was aware of this.

Social capital and government in the production of public goods

As a response to the rapidly growing empirical literature on social capital and the evidence of its correlation with government performance, we build a theoretical framework to study the interactions between social capital and government's action. This paper presents a model of homogeneous agents in an overlapping generations framework incorporating social capital as the values transmitted from parent to child. The government's role is to provide public goods. First, government expenditure is exogenously given. Then, it will be chosen at the preferred level of the representative agent. For both setups the equilibrium outcomes are characterized and the resulting dynamics studied. Briefly we include an analysis of the effect of productivity growth on the evolution of social capital. The results obtained caution caution against both the crowding out effect of the welfare state and the impact of sustained economic growth on social capital.

Human capital in a global and knowledge-based economy. Part 2. Asssessment at the EU country level.

This report is an extension and partial update of de la Fuente and Ciccone (2002). It constructs estimates of the private and social rates of return on schooling for fourteen EU countries using microeconometric estimates of Mincerian wage equations, the results of cross-country growth regressions and OECD data on educational expenditures, tax rates and social benefits. The results are used to draw some tentative conclusions regarding the optimality of observed investment patterns and educational subsidy levels.

Human capital in a global and knowledge-based economy

This document is a report prepared for the DG for Employment and Social Affairs of the European Commission. It surveys the available evidence on the contribution of investment in human capital to aggregate productivity growth and on its impact on wages and other labour outcomes at the individual level. It also draws some tentative policy conclusions for an average European country.

Human capital in growth regressions: how much difference does data quality make? An update and further results

We construct estimates of educational attainment for a sample of OECD countries using previously unexploited sources. We follow a heuristic approach to obtain plausible time profiles for attainment levels by removing sharp breaks in the data that seem to reflect changes in classification criteria. We then construct indicators of the information content of our series and a number of previously available data sets and examine their performance in several growth specifications. We find a clear positive correlation between data quality and the size and significance of human capital coefficients in growth regressions. Using an extension of the classical errors in variables model, we construct a set of meta-estimates of the coefficient of years of schooling in an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function. Our results suggest that, after correcting for measurement error bias, the value of this parameter is well above 0.50.