Current transport and electroluminescence mechanisms in thin SiO2 films containing Si nanocluster-sensitized erbium ions.

We have studied the current transport and electroluminescence properties of metal oxide semiconductor MOS devices in which the oxide layer, which is codoped with silicon nanoclusters and erbium ions, is made by magnetron sputtering. Electrical measurements have allowed us to identify a Poole-Frenkel conduction mechanism. We observe an important contribution of the Si nanoclusters to the conduction in silicon oxide films, and no evidence of Fowler-Nordheim tunneling. The results suggest that the electroluminescence of the erbium ions in these layers is generated by energy transfer from the Si nanoparticles. Finally, we report an electroluminescence power efficiency above 10−3%. © 2009 American Institute of Physics. doi:10.1063/1.3213386

Correlation between charge transport and electroluminescence properties of Si-rich oxide/nitride/oxide-based light emitting capacitors.

The electrical and electroluminescence (EL) properties at room and high temperatures of oxide/ nitride/oxide (ONO)-based light emitting capacitors are studied. The ONO multidielectric layer is enriched with silicon by means of ion implantation. The exceeding silicon distribution follows a Gaussian profile with a maximum of 19%, centered close to the lower oxide/nitride interface. The electrical measurements performed at room and high temperatures allowed to unambiguously identify variable range hopping (VRH) as the dominant electrical conduction mechanism at low voltages, whereas at moderate and high voltages, a hybrid conduction formed by means of variable range hopping and space charge-limited current enhanced by Poole-Frenkel effect predominates. The EL spectra at different temperatures are also recorded, and the correlation between charge transport mechanisms and EL properties is discussed.

Experimental evidence on the multibidding mechanism

Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) and Veszteg (2004) propose the use of a multibidding mechanism for situations where agents have to choose a common project. Examples are decisions involving public goods (or public "bads"). We report experimental results to test the practical tractability and effectiveness of the multibidding mechanisms in environments where agents hold private information concerning their valuation of the projects. The mechanism performed quite well in the laboratory: it provided the ex post efficient outcome in roughly three quarters of the cases across the treatments; moreover, the largest part of the subject pool formed their bids according to the theoretical bidding behavior.

A foundation model for marxian breakdown theories based on a new falling rate of profit mechanism (Long version)

The paper presents a foundation model for Marxian theories of the breakdown of capitalism based on a new falling rate of profit mechanism. All of these theories are based on one or more of "the historical tendencies": a rising capital-wage bill ratio, a rising capitalist share and a falling rate of profit. The model is a foundation in the sense that it generates these tendencies in the context of a model with a constant subsistence wage. The newly discovered generating mechanism is based on neo-classical reasoning for a model with land. It is non-Ricardian in that land augmenting technical progress can be unboundedly rapid. Finally, since the model has no steady state, it is necessary to use a new technique, Chaplygin's method, to prove the result.

A foundation model for marxian breakdown theories based on a new falling rate of profit mechanism.

The paper presents a foundation model for Marxian theories of the breakdown of capitalism based on a new falling rate of profit mechanism. All of these theories are based on one or more of ?the historical tendencies?: a rising capital-wage bill ratio, a rising capitalist share and a falling rate of profit. The model is a foundation in the sense that it generates these tendencies in the context of a model with a constant subsistence wage. The newly discovered generating mechanism is based on neo-classical reasoning for a model with land. It is non-Ricardian in that land augmenting technical progress can be unboundedly rapid. Finally, since the model has no steady state, it is necessary to use a new technique, Chaplygin?s method, to prove the result.

Clean Development Mechanism and Sustainable Development: a discussion on the link between the CDM and Sustainable Development, an analysis of the current status of the CDM portfolio, and an multicriteria evaluation of the effects of additional incentives in order to foster broad local Sustainable Development dividends from the CDM projects

vegeu resum en el fitxer adjunt a l'inici del treball de recerca

Numerical simulation of combined heat transfer phenomena (conduction, convection, and radiation). Application to he optimisation of thermal systems

Thermal systems interchanging heat and mass by conduction, convection, radiation (solar and thermal ) occur in many engineering applications like energy storage by solar collectors, window glazing in buildings, refrigeration of plastic moulds, air handling units etc. Often these thermal systems are composed of various elements for example a building with wall, windows, rooms, etc. It would be of particular interest to have a modular thermal system which is formed by connecting different modules for the elements, flexibility to use and change models for individual elements, add or remove elements without changing the entire code. A numerical approach to handle the heat transfer and fluid flow in such systems helps in saving the full scale experiment time, cost and also aids optimisation of parameters of the system. In subsequent sections are presented a short summary of the work done until now on the orientation of the thesis in the field of numerical methods for heat transfer and fluid flow applications, the work in process and the future work.

Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement

In the presence of cost uncertainty, limited liability introduces the possibility of default in procurement with its associated bank-ruptcy costs. When financial soundness is not perfectly observable, we show that incentive compatibility implies that financially less sound contractors are selected with higher probability in any feasible mechanism. Informational rents are associated with unsound financial situations. By selecting the financially weakest contractor, stronger price competition (auctions) may not only increase the probability of default but also expected rents. Thus, weak conditions are suffcient for auctions to be suboptimal. In particular, we show that pooling firms with higher assets may reduce the cost of procurement even when default is costless for the sponsor.

A geometric mechanism of diffusion: Rigorous verification in a priori unstable Hamiltonian systems

In this paper we consider a representative a priori unstable Hamiltonian system with 2+1/2 degrees of freedom, to which we apply the geometric mechanism for diffusion introduced in the paper Delshams et al., Mem.Amer.Math. Soc. 2006, and generalized in Delshams and Huguet, Nonlinearity 2009, and provide explicit, concrete and easily verifiable conditions for the existence of diffusing orbits. The simplification of the hypotheses allows us to perform explicitly the computations along the proof, which contribute to present in an easily understandable way the geometric mechanism of diffusion. In particular, we fully describe the construction of the scattering map and the combination of two types of dynamics on a normally hyperbolic invariant manifold.

Context switching accounting mechanism

How many times a given process p preempts, either voluntarily or involuntarily, is an important threat to computer's processes throughput. Whenever running cpu-bound processes on a multi-core system without an actual system grid engine as commonly found on Grid Clusters, their performance and stability are directly related to their accurate implementation and the system reliability which is, to an extend, an important caveat most of the times so difficult to detect. Context Switching is time-consuming. Thus, if we could develop a tool capable of detecting it and gather data from every single performed Context Switch, we would beable to study this data and present some results that should pin-point at whatever their main cause could be.

An anonymous reputation mechanism for cloud computing networks using volunteer resources

One of the major problems when using non-dedicated volunteer resources in adistributed network is the high volatility of these hosts since they can go offlineor become unavailable at any time without control. Furthermore, the use ofvolunteer resources implies some security issues due to the fact that they aregenerally anonymous entities which we know nothing about. So, how to trustin someone we do not know?.Over the last years an important number of reputation-based trust solutionshave been designed to evaluate the participants' behavior in a system.However, most of these solutions are addressed to P2P and ad-hoc mobilenetworks that may not fit well with other kinds of distributed systems thatcould take advantage of volunteer resources as recent cloud computinginfrastructures.In this paper we propose a first approach to design an anonymous reputationmechanism for CoDeS [1], a middleware for building fogs where deployingservices using volunteer resources. The participants are reputation clients(RC), a reputation authority (RA) and a certification authority (CA). Users needa valid public key certificate from the CA to register to the RA and obtain thedata needed to participate into the system, as now an opaque identifier thatwe call here pseudonym and an initial reputation value that users provide toother users when interacting together. The mechanism prevents not only themanipulation of the provided reputation values but also any disclosure of theusers' identities to any other users or authorities so the anonymity isguaranteed.

Failure mechanism under tensile loads in CFRP 0-90º cross-ply laminates containing voids

The failure mechanism of a voided CFRP 0-90° cross-ply laminate under tensile loads applied in one direction was studied in this Final Degree Project. For this purpose, voided coupons were manufactured for being tested and a FEA was done. In both investigations, voids were placed in 90º and 0º direction, in order to understand the void location influence. On the one hand, the behaviour of the voided laminates was investigated through a FEM in order to preview the stress distribution within the material. On the other hand, voided specimens where manufactured by applying blowing agent in between the inner layers. These specimens were tested by a quasi-static step wise tensile test where data showing its real behaviour was collected. Specimens were X-rayed after each step of the test in order to investigate the failure mechanism of the composite. Data from the test was studied so that relations such as strength of the laminates, crack density per stress, void length per first crack at the void and void area per first crack at the specimen could be characterized

Consistent solutions in exchange economies: A characterization of the price mechanism

We characterize the Walrasian allocations correspondence by means offour axioms: consistency, replica invariance, individual rationality andPareto optimality. It is shown that for any given class of exchange economiesany solution that satisfies the axioms is a selection from the Walrasianallocations with slack. Preferences are assumed to be smooth, but may besatiated and non--convex. A class of economies is defined as all economieswhose agents' preferences belong to an arbitrary family (finite or infinite)of types. The result can be modified to characterize equal budget Walrasianallocations with slack by replacing individual rationality with individualrationality from equal division. The results are valid also for classes ofeconomies in which core--Walras equivalence does not hold.

Corporate finance and the monetary transmission mechanism

This paper analyzes the transmission mechanisms of monetarypolicy in a general equilibrium model of securities marketsand banking with asymmetric information. Banks' optimal asset/liability policy is such that in equilibrium capital adequacy constraints are always binding. Asymmetric information about banks' net worth adds a cost to outside equity capital, which limits the extent to which banks can relax their capital constraint. In this context monetarypolicy does not affect bank lending through changes in bank liquidity. Rather, it has the effect of changing theaggregate composition of financing by firms. The model also produces multiple equilibria, one of which displays all the features of a "credit crunch". Thus, monetary policy can also have large effects when it induces a shift from one equilibrium to the other.