Tax evasion, technology shocks, and the cyclicality of government revenues

This paper analyzes the behavior of the tax revenue to output ratio over the business cycle. In order to replicate the empirical evidence, we develop a simple model combining the standard Ak growth model with the tax evasion phenomenon. When individuals conceal part of their true income from the tax authority, they face the risk of being audited and hence of paying the corresponding fine. Under the empirically plausible assumptions that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution exhibits a sufficiently small value and that productivity shocks are serially correlated, we show that the elasticity of government revenue with respect to output is larger than one, which agrees with the empirical evidence. This result holds even if the tax system displays flat tax rates. We extend the previous setup to generate larger fiscal deficits when the economy experiences a recession.

The effects of tax deductibility on the mix of property taxes and use charges: an empirical analysis of the spanish case

This paper tests some hypothesis about the determinants of the local tax structure. In particular, we focus on the effects that the property tax deductibility in the national income tax has on the relative use of the property tax and user charges. We deal with the incentive effects that local governments face regarding the different sources of revenue by means of a model in which the local tax structure and the level of public expenditure arise as a result of the maximizing behaviour of local politicians subject to the economic effects of the tax system. We attempt to test the hypothesis developed with data corresponding to a set of Spanish municipalities during the period 1987-9l. We find that tax deductibility provides incentives to raise revenues from the property tax but does not introduce a biass against user charges or in favor of overall spending growth

The effects of tax deductibility on the mix of property taxes and use charges: an empirical analysis of the spanish case

This paper tests some hypothesis about the determinants of the local tax structure. In particular, we focus on the effects that the property tax deductibility in the national income tax has on the relative use of the property tax and user charges. We deal with the incentive effects that local governments face regarding the different sources of revenue by means of a model in which the local tax structure and the level of public expenditure arise as a result of the maximizing behaviour of local politicians subject to the economic effects of the tax system. We attempt to test the hypothesis developed with data corresponding to a set of Spanish municipalities during the period 1987-9l. We find that tax deductibility provides incentives to raise revenues from the property tax but does not introduce a biass against user charges or in favor of overall spending growth

Una estimación del coste marginal en bienestar del sistema impositivo en España

Actual tax systems do not follow the normative recommendations of yhe theory of optimal taxation. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the informational difficulties of knowing or estimating all relevant elasticities and parameters. Secondly, the political complexities that would arise if a new tax implementation would depart too much from current systems that are perceived as somewhat egalitarians. Hence an ex-novo overhaul of the tax system might just be non-viable. In contrast, a small marginal tax reform could be politically more palatable to accept and economically more simple to implement. The goal of this paper is to evaluate, as a step previous to any tax reform, the marginal welfare cost of the current tax system in Spain. We do this by using a computational general equilibrium model calibrated to a point-in-time micro database. The simulations results show that the Spanish tax system gives rise to a considerable marginal excess burden. Its order of magnitude is of about 0.50 money units for each additional money unit collected through taxes.

El comportamiento penalmente relevante en el delito de defraudación tributaria: una propuesta político-criminal

El sistema tributario es fundamental en el Estado social y democrático de Derecho, pues el ejercicio y efectivo disfrute de muchos derechos fundamentales depende del correcto funcionamiento de la actividad tributaria. Además de esto, la situación económica actual demanda una adecuada política en contra del fraude tributario, lo que necesariamente implica analizar si el modelo penal vigente es el más adecuado para enfrentar el fraude fiscal. Teniendo en cuenta que muchas de las características de la criminalidad tributaria no son exclusivas de un país, pues ésta trasciende habitualmente las fronteras de los países por medio del recurso a empresas multinacionales o la localización de empresas en “paraísos fiscales”, el análisis del fraude tributario no debe limitarse al examen jurídico del modelo legislativo español, debiendo trascender a un estudio de política criminal que vincula consideraciones criminológicas y jurídicas. En consecuencia, en esta investigación se propone un análisis que no se reduce a los debates exclusivamente jurídicos. Se busca, además, efectuar un examen que tenga por fundamento una perspectiva criminológica y de Law in action a fin de evaluar críticamente la respuesta a la criminalidad tributaria por parte del modelo de regulación penal vigente en España. Esta orientación permitirá una más amplia comprensión del fenómeno de la criminalidad tributaria, así como de las categorías jurídicas adecuadas político criminalmente para su prevención. Este estudio interdisciplinario nos conducirá, al final de la investigación, tanto a proponer la interpretación del modelo de legislación penal vigente, como una reforma al mismo que pretenda solucionar algunos de los problemas de prevención que a lo largo de la investigación se señalan.

Healthy, educated and wealthy : Is the welfare state really harmful for growth?

In this paper, we study how public and private expenditures in health and education affect economic growth by their influence on people's health, abilities, skills and knowledge. We consider a growth accounting framework in order to test whether welfare expenditures more than offset the efficiency losses caused by distortionary taxation, and whether the effects of public expenditure on economic growth differ from those of private expenditure. Our empirical analysis is based on a panel of 19 OECD countries observed between 1971 and 1998. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that the contribution of welfare expenditures more than compensates for the distortions caused by the tax system; and the estimated positive impact is stronger for health than for education. We also find some evidence that public expenditure influences GDP growth more than private expenditure.

Healthy, educated and wealthy : Is the welfare state really harmful for growth?

In this paper, we study how public and private expenditures in health and education affect economic growth by their influence on people's health, abilities, skills and knowledge. We consider a growth accounting framework in order to test whether welfare expenditures more than offset the efficiency losses caused by distortionary taxation, and whether the effects of public expenditure on economic growth differ from those of private expenditure. Our empirical analysis is based on a panel of 19 OECD countries observed between 1971 and 1998. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that the contribution of welfare expenditures more than compensates for the distortions caused by the tax system; and the estimated positive impact is stronger for health than for education. We also find some evidence that public expenditure influences GDP growth more than private expenditure.

If you want me to stay, pay

Devolution of political power is constantly on the political agenda in both Italy and Spain. Fiscal policy in these countries has granted specific privileges to some regions. Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste,(VdA) and País Vasco-Euskadi (PV) have an extensive say over spending decisions, and receive nearly all regional tax revenues. Although both VdA and PV are among the richest regions in each country, both are net beneficiaries of the fiscal equalisation system. This preferential treatment is the outcome of a fiscal system with limits on taxing power and debt issuance, and is meant as a compensation for the lack of autonomy. It so prevents calls for more fiscal autonomy, or even outright secession. The economic effects of this asymmetric federalism are negative Although partial equalisation reduces excessive redistribution built in the fiscal equalisation system, more autonomy could pay off with more efficient government. Asymmetric federalism moreover creates a political impasse in the negotiation of a more efficient tax system and financing arrangement.

Taxation of nuclear waste in Spain

Law 15/2012 established in Spain four new environmental taxes and extended the scope objective excise duties on mineral oils to tax the use of natural gas and coal as sources of electricity. One of the newly created taxes falls on all electric power producers, and has as tax base the turnover. The second one tax hydropower production, and the other two fall on the nuclear industry. So, there are two new taxes in Spain on the production of electricity from nuclear sources. The first one is a tax on nuclear waste production; the second one is a tax on the storage of nuclear waste. However, these are not the only levies in the Spanish tax system affecting nuclear waste. At the State level there are already several charges on nuclear waste. At the regional level, on the other hand, two Autonomous Communities were taxing nuclear waste. The creation of these new State taxes will finish with the regional taxes, but the State will be oblige to compensate these regions for losing revenues. The purpose of this work is to carry out a critical analysis of the Spanish system of taxation on nuclear waste.

Economic impacts of alternative water policy scenarios in the Spanish production system: an input-output analysis

The objective of this paper is to analyse the economic impacts of alternative water policies implemented in the Spanish production system. The methodology uses two versions of the input-output price model: a competitive formulation and a mark-up formulation. The input-output framework evaluates the impact of water policy measures on production prices, consumption prices, intermediate water demand and private welfare. Our results show that a tax on the water used by sectors considerably reduces the intermediate water demand, and increases the production and consumption prices. On the other hand, according to Jevons' paradox, an improvement in technical efficiency, which leads to a reduction in the water requirements of all sectors and an increase in water production, increases the amount of water consumed. The combination of a tax on water and improved technical efficiency takes the pressure off prices and significantly reduces intermediate water demand. JEL Classification: C67 ; D57 ; Q25. Keywords: Production prices; Consumption prices; Water uses; Water policy; Water taxation.

Economic impact of alternative policy measures implemented on the energy activities of the Catalan production system: an input-output analysis

The aim of the paper is to analyse the economic impact of alternative policies implemented on the energy activities of the Catalan production system. Specifically, we analyse the effects of a tax on intermediate energy uses, a reduction in the final production of energy, and a reduction in intermediate energy uses. The methodology involves two versions of the input-output price model: a competitive price formulation and a mark-up price formulation. The input-output price framework will make it possible to evaluate how the alternative measures modify production prices, consumption prices, private welfare, and intermediate energy uses. The empirical application is for the Catalan economy and uses economic data for the year 2001.

Tax Coordination Between Regions in Spain. The Role of the Courts

Overview of the Tax Coordination of the Regions in Spain from the point of view of the role of the Courts in developing the present system

Does the EU financing system contribute to shadow economic activity?

Financial contributions to the EU budget depend basically on official GDP. This means that countries with higher shadow economic activity contribute less than they should contribute in a system based on actual GDP and therefore could reduce their incentive to fight against such activities. In this paper we investigate if the EU financing system really has an influence on the intensity with which governments in EU member states fight against shadow economic activity. We find that the EU net contributors significantly fight more intensively against shadow economic activity while EU net receivers significantly fight less. As a result, shadow economic activity is higher in net receiver and lower in net contributor countries than it were in comparison with a scenario of nationally balanced EU funding. Quantitatively and averaged over the time period 2001-2007, the diagnosed effect amounts to a stimulation of hidden economic activity by almost 10% for particular economies. JEL classification: C31, D63, F33, H21, H26. Keywords: EU financing system, shadow economy, tax auditing.

Is there a connection between the tax administration and the political power?

This paper offers empirical evidence from Spain of a connection between the tax administration and the political power. Firstly, the regional tax administration is not immune to the budgetary situation of regional government, and tends to exert a greater (or lesser) effort in tax collection the greater (or lower) the (expected) public deficit. At the same time, the system of unconditional grants from the central layer of government provokes an ¿income effect¿ which disincentivises the efforts of the tax administration. Secondly, these efforts also decrease when the margin to lose a parliamentary seat in an electoral district is cut, although the importance of this disincentive decreases according to the parliamentary strength of the incumbent