Trade disclosure and price dispersion

This paper determines the effects of post-trade opaqueness on market performance. We find that the degree of market transparency has important effects on market equilibria. In particular, we show that dealers operating in a transparent structure set regret-free prices at each period making zero expected profits in each of the two trading rounds, whereas in the opaque market dealers invest in acquiring information at the beginning of the trading day. Moreover, we obtain that if there is no trading activity in the first period, then market makers only change their quotes in the opaque market. Additionally, we show that trade disclosure increases the informational efficiency of transaction prices and reduces volatility. Finally, concerning welfare of market participants, we obtain ambiguous results. Keywords: Market microstructure, Post-trade transparency, Price experimentation, Price dispersion.

Price policies and Price dispersion in the private healthcare insurance industry: The Catalan case

We present an overlapping generations model that explains price dispersion among Catalonian healthcare insurance firms. The model shows that firms with different premium policies can coexist. Furthermore, if interest rates are low, firms that apply equal premium to all insureds can charge higher average prices than insurers that set premiums according to the risk of insured. Economic theory, health insurance, health economics.

Strategic behavior and price discovery

The paper analyzes the effects of strategic behavior by an insider in a price discovery process, akin to an information tatonnement, in the presence of a competitive informed sector. Such processes are used in the preopening period of continuous trading systems in several exchanges. It is found that the insider manipulates the market using a contrarian strategy in order to neutralize the effect of the trades of competitive informed agents. Furthermore, consistently with the empirical evidence available, we find that information revelation accelerates close to the opening, that the market price does not converge to the fundamental value no matter how many rounds the tatonnement has, and that the expected trading volume displays a U-shaped pattern. We also find that a market with a larger competitive sector (smaller insider) has an improved informational efficiency and an increased trading volume. The insider provides a public good (a lower informativeness of the price) for the competitive informed sector.

New evidence on inflation persistence and price stickiness in the Euro area: Implications for macro modelling

This paper evaluates new evidence on price setting practices and inflation persistence in the euro area with respect to its implications for macro modelling. It argues that several of the most commonly used assumptions in micro-founded macro models are seriously challenged by the new findings.

Long run relationships and price rigidity

I study a repeated buyer-seller relationship for the exchange of a givengood. Asymmetric information over the buyer's reservation price, which issubject to random shocks, may lead the seller to use a rigid pricing policydespite the possibility of making higher profits through price discriminationacross the different satates of the buyer's reservation price. The existence of a flexible price subgame perfect equilibrium is shown for the buyerssufficiently locked-in. When the seller faces a population of buyers whose degree of involvmentin the relatioship is unknown, the flexible price equilibrium is notnecessarily optimal. Thus tipically the seller will prefer to use therigid price strategy. A learning process allowing the seller to screenthe population of buyers is derived abd the existence of a switching pointbetween the two regimes (i.e. price rigidity and price felxibility) isshown.

Drug price differentials caused by de-listing and price cap policies

This paper analyses the behaviour of pharmaceutical companies that face the threat of having their drugs excluded from reimbursement and the markets characterised also by price caps. We conclude that price elasticity of demand and cost differentials cause the price discounts which drug firms offer to health care organisations. Additionally, we conclude that price cap regulations affect the time path of prices, resulting in higher prices for new products and lower prices for old products.

Drug price differentials caused by de-listing and price cap policies

This paper analyses the behaviour of pharmaceutical companies that face the threat of having their drugs excluded from reimbursement and the markets characterised also by price caps. We conclude that price elasticity of demand and cost differentials cause the price discounts which drug firms offer to health care organisations. Additionally, we conclude that price cap regulations affect the time path of prices, resulting in higher prices for new products and lower prices for old products.

HouSI: Heuristic for delimitation of housing submarkets and price homogeneous areas

This paper seeks to address the problem of the empirical identification of housing market segmentation,once we assume that submarkets exist. The typical difficulty in identifying housing submarkets when dealing with many locations is the vast number of potential solutions and, in such cases, the use of the Chow test for hedonic functions is not a practical solution. Here, we solve this problem by undertaking an identification process with a heuristic for spatially constrained clustering, the"Housing Submarket Identifier" (HouSI). The solution is applied to the housing market in the city of Barcelona (Spain), where we estimate a hedonic model for fifty thousand dwellings aggregated into ten groups. In order to determine the utility of the procedure we seek to verify whether the final solution provided by the heuristic is comparable with the division of the city into ten administrative districts.

Collusion and fights in an experiment with price-setting firms and production in advance

We present results from 50-round market experiments in which firms decide repeatedly both on price and quantity of a completely perishable good. Each firm has capacity to serve the whole market. The stage game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. We run experiments for markets with two and three identical firms. Firms tend to cooperate to avoid fights, but when they fight bankruptcies are rather frequent. On average, pricing behavior is closer to that for pure quantity than for pure price competition and price and efficiency levels are higher for two than for three firms. Consumer surplus increases with the number of firms, but unsold production leads to higher efficiency losses with more firms. Over time prices tend to the highest possible one for markets both with two and three firms.

Price competition under cost uncertainty: A laboratory analysis

We study the relation between the number of firms and price-cost margins under price competition with uncertainty about competitors' costs. We present results of an experiment in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. In line with the theoretical prediction, market prices decrease with the number of firms, but on average stay above marginal costs. Pricing is less aggressive in duopolies than in triopolies and tetrapolies. However, independently from the number of firms, pricing is more aggressive than in the theoretical equilibrium. Both the absolute and the relative surpluses increase with the number of firms. Total surplus is close to the equilibrium level, since enhanced consumer surplus through lower prices is counteracted by occasional displacements of the most efficient firm in production.

Asymmetric demand information in uniform and discriminatory call auctions: an experimental analysis motivated by electricity markets

We study the outcomes of experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty. Our study is motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. Our main aim is to compare the effect of asymmetric demand-information between sellers on the performance of the two auction institutions. In our baseline conditions all sellers have the same information, whereas in our treatment conditions some sellers have better information than others. In both information conditions we find that average transaction prices and price volatility are not significantly different under the two auction institutions. However, when there is asymmetric information among sellers the discriminatory auction is significantly less efficient. These results are not in line with the typical arguments made in favor of discriminatory pricing in electricity industries; namely, lower consumer prices and less price volatility. Moreover, our results provide some indication that discriminatory auctions reduce technical efficiency relative to uniform auctions.

Organizational form and business performance

This project deals with the generation of profitability and the distribution of its benefits. Inspired by Davis (1947, 1955), we define profitability as the ratio of revenue to cost. Profitability is not as popular a measure of business financial performance as profit, the difference between revenue and cost. Regardless of its popularity, however, profitability is surely a useful financial performance measure. Our primary objective in this project is to identify the factors that generate change in profitability. One set of factors, which we refer to as sources, consists of changes in quantities and prices of outputs and inputs. Individual quantity changes aggregate to the overall impact of quantity change on profitability change, which we call productivity change. Individual price changes aggregate to the overall impact of price change on profitability change, which we call price recovery change. In this framework profitability change consists exclusively of productivity change and price recovery change. A second set of factors, which we refer to as drivers, consists of phenomena such as technical change, change in the efficiency of resource allocation, and the impact of economies of scale. The ability of management to harness these factors drives productivity change, which is one component of profitability change. Thus the term sources refers to quantities and prices of individual outputs and inputs, whose changes influence productivity change or price recovery change, either of which influences profitability change. The term drivers refers to phenomena related to technology and management that influence productivity change (but not price recovery change), and hence profitability change.

Environmental Tax on Products and Services Based on Their Carbon Footprint: A Case Study of the Pulp and Paper Sector

The main aim of this work is to define an environmental tax on products and services based on their carbon footprint. We examine the relevance of conventional life cycle analysis (LCA) and environmentally extended input-output analysis (EIO) as methodological tools to identify emission intensities of products and services on which the tax is based. The short-term price effects of the tax and the policy implications of considering non-GHG are also analyzed. The results from the specific case study on pulp production show that the environmental tax rate based on the LCA approach (1,8%) is higher than both EIO approaches (0,8% for product and 1,4% for industry approach), but they are comparable. Even though LCA is more product specific and provides detailed analysis, EIO would be the more relevant approach to apply economy wide environmental tax. When the environmental tax considers non-GHG emissions instead of only CO2, sectors such as agriculture, mining of coal and extraction of peat, and food exhibit higher environmental tax and price effects. Therefore, it is worthwhile for policy makers to pay attention on the implication of considering only CO2 tax or GHG emissions tax in order for such a policy measure to be effective and meaningful. Keywords: Environmental tax; Life cycle analysis; Environmental input-output analysis.

Noise and aggregation of information in large markets

We study a novel class of noisy rational expectations equilibria in markets with largenumber of agents. We show that, as long as noise increases with the number of agents inthe economy, the limiting competitive equilibrium is well-defined and leads to non-trivialinformation acquisition, perfect information aggregation, and partially revealing prices,even if per capita noise tends to zero. We find that in such equilibrium risk sharing and price revelation play dierent roles than in the standard limiting economy in which per capita noise is not negligible. We apply our model to study information sales by a monopolist, information acquisition in multi-asset markets, and derivatives trading. Thelimiting equilibria are shown to be perfectly competitive, even when a strategic solutionconcept is used.

An overlapping generations approach to price policies in privatehealthcare insurance. The Catalan case

We analyze premium policies and price dispersion among private healthcare insurance firms from an overlapping-generations model. The model shows that firms that apply equal premium to all policyholders and firms that set premiums according to the risk of insured can coexist in the short run, whereas coexistence is unlikely in the long run because it requires the coincidence of economic growth and interest rates. We find support for the model’s results in the Catalan health insurance industry. Keywords: Economic theory, price policies, health insurance, health economics, overlapping-generations. JEL Classifications: I11 / L11 / L23