Why do emerging economies borrow short term?

We argue that one reason why emerging economies borrow short term is that it is cheaperthan borrowing long term. This is especially the case during crises, as in these episodes therelative cost of long-term borrowing increases. We construct a unique database of sovereignbond prices, returns, and issuances at di¤erent maturities for 11 emerging economies from 1990to 2009 and present a set of new stylized facts. On average, these countries pay a higher riskpremium on long-term than on short-term bonds. During crises, the di¤erence between the tworisk premia increases and issuance shifts towards shorter maturities. To illustrate our argument,we present a simple model in which the maturity structure is the outcome of a risk sharingproblem between an emerging economy subject to rollover crises and risk averse internationalinvestors.

Clathrin Assembly Lymphoid Myeloid Leukemia (CALM) Protein: Localization in Endocytic-coated Pits, Interactions with Clathrin, and the Impact of Overexpression on Clathrin-mediated Traffic

The clathrin assembly lymphoid myeloid leukemia (CALM) gene encodes a putative homologue of the clathrin assembly synaptic protein AP180. Hence the biochemical properties, the subcellular localization, and the role in endocytosis of a CALM protein were studied. In vitro binding and coimmunoprecipitation demonstrated that the clathrin heavy chain is the major binding partner of CALM. The bulk of cellular CALM was associated with the membrane fractions of the cell and localized to clathrin-coated areas of the plasma membrane. In the membrane fraction, CALM was present at near stoichiometric amounts relative to clathrin. To perform structure-function analysis of CALM, we engineered chimeric fusion proteins of CALM and its fragments with the green fluorescent protein (GFP). GFP-CALM was targeted to the plasma membrane-coated pits and also found colocalized with clathrin in the Golgi area. High levels of expression of GFP-CALM or its fragments with clathrin-binding activity inhibited the endocytosis of transferrin and epidermal growth factor receptors and altered the steady-state distribution of the mannose-6-phosphate receptor in the cell. In addition, GFP-CALM overexpression caused the loss of clathrin accumulation in the trans-Golgi network area, whereas the localization of the clathrin adaptor protein complex 1 in the trans-Golgi network remained unaffected. The ability of the GFP-tagged fragments of CALM to affect clathrin-mediated processes correlated with the targeting of the fragments to clathrin-coated areas and their clathrin-binding capacities. Clathrin-CALM interaction seems to be regulated by multiple contact interfaces. The C-terminal part of CALM binds clathrin heavy chain, although the full-length protein exhibited maximal ability for interaction. Altogether, the data suggest that CALM is an important component of coated pit internalization machinery, possibly involved in the regulation of clathrin recruitment to the membrane and/or the formation of the coated pit.

Credit markets and the propagation of monetary policy shocks

This paper analyzes the propagation of monetary policy shocks through the creation of credit in an economy. Models of the monetary transmission mechanism typically feature responses which last for a few quarters contrary to what the empirical evidence suggests. To propagate the impact of monetary shocks over time, these models introduce adjustment costs by which agents find it optimal to change their decisions slowly. This paper presents another explanation that does not rely on any sort of adjustment costs or stickiness. In our economy, agents own assets and make occupational choices. Banks intermediate between agents demanding and supplying assets. Our interpretation is based on the way banks create credit and how the monetary authority affects the process of financial intermediation through its monetary policy. As the central bank lowers the interest rate by buying government bonds in exchange for reserves, high productive entrepreneurs are able to borrow more resources from low productivity agents. We show that this movement of capital among agents sets in motion a response of the economy that resembles an expansionary phase of the cycle.

Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores (revised version)

We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent balancedness, based on transfer rate mappings. We also define a new equilibrium condition on transfer rates and we prove the existence of core payoff vectors satisfying this condition. The additional requirement of transfer rate equilibrium refines the core concept and allows the selection of specific core payoff vectors. Lastly, the class of parametrized cooperative games is introduced. This new setting and its associated equilibrium-core solution extend the usual cooperative game framework and core solution to situations depending on an exogenous environment. A non-emptiness result for the equilibrium-core is also provided in the context of a parametrized cooperative game. Our proofs borrow mathematical tools and geometric constructions from general equilibrium theory with non convexities. Applications to extant results taken from game theory and economic theory are given.

Deconstructing Purism: Unconscious Drives and Meta-argumentation in Straight Photography

The thesis investigates the nature of the Purist discourse in photography, with the aim of unveiling its lack of a solid theoretical foundation and its unconscious content. Purism outlines the fact that photography is a unique craft, that may not borrow ideas from painting or any other art forms. What makes the Purist discourse suspect and attracts attention to its possible circular style? The fact that the views expressed by its supporters include a frenzied edge, an unnecessary ardor, a combative tone that discloses that there’s something hidden, something that doesn’t serve the purpose of presenting an unbiased philosophical claim

Approaches to OER Development

OER development is becoming more sophisticated as instructors and course specialists become more familiar with the environment. Most OER development approaches for online courses have been developed from those that were appropriate in the face-to-face context. However, the OER online environment opens up new possibilities for learning as well as holding particular limitations. This paper presents some approaches that OER implementers should bear in mind when initiating and supporting OER course development projects.1. Beg, borrow, or steal courseware. Don't reinvent the wheel.2. Take what exists and build the course around it.3. Mix and match. Assemble. Don't create.4. Avoid the "not invented here" syndrome. 5. Know the content -garbage in and garbage out.6. Establish deadlines. Work to deadlines, but don't be unrealistic. 7. Estimate your costs and then double them. Double them again. 8. Be realistic in scheduling and scoping.9. The project plan must be flexible. Be prepared for major shifts.10. Build flexibly for reuse and repurposing -generalizability reduces costs 11. Provide different routes to learning. 12. Build to international standards.There are necessary features in every OER, including introduction, schedule etc. but it is most important to keep the course as simple as possible. Extreme Programming (XP) methodology can be adapted from software engineering to aid in the course development process.

El préstec de documents en un campus virtual : generant un nou concepte

El préstec de documents és un dels pilars fonamentals de la biblioteca per donar suport a l'estudi, docència i recerca. A la Biblioteca de la Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, la diferència principal respecte a altres biblioteques universitàries, és el nou concepte virtual sense parets, i aquest concepte s'estén també a aquest servei de préstec. Els usuaris no han d'accedir necessàriament a un espai físic per consultar les fonts d'informació disponibles, ni per endur-se documents en préstec. Des de casa, i de manera remota, poden demanar els documents en els que estiguin interessats, des del mateix catàleg i sense cap tipus d'intermediari gràcies al desenvolupament d'un nou servei de préstec de documents, que genera alhora un nou model dins d'un campus virtual.

Inference of distributional parameters from compositional samples containing nondetects

Low concentrations of elements in geochemical analyses have the peculiarity of beingcompositional data and, for a given level of significance, are likely to be beyond thecapabilities of laboratories to distinguish between minute concentrations and completeabsence, thus preventing laboratories from reporting extremely low concentrations of theanalyte. Instead, what is reported is the detection limit, which is the minimumconcentration that conclusively differentiates between presence and absence of theelement. A spatially distributed exhaustive sample is employed in this study to generateunbiased sub-samples, which are further censored to observe the effect that differentdetection limits and sample sizes have on the inference of population distributionsstarting from geochemical analyses having specimens below detection limit (nondetects).The isometric logratio transformation is used to convert the compositional data in thesimplex to samples in real space, thus allowing the practitioner to properly borrow fromthe large source of statistical techniques valid only in real space. The bootstrap method isused to numerically investigate the reliability of inferring several distributionalparameters employing different forms of imputation for the censored data. The casestudy illustrates that, in general, best results are obtained when imputations are madeusing the distribution best fitting the readings above detection limit and exposes theproblems of other more widely used practices. When the sample is spatially correlated, itis necessary to combine the bootstrap with stochastic simulation

Endogenous Credit Cycles and Financial Dampening in an Adverse Selection Economy

We propose an adverse selection framework in which the financial sector has a dual role. It amplifies or dampens exogenous shocks and also generates endogenous fluctuations. We fully characterize constrained optimal contracts in a setting in which entrepreneurs need to borrow and are privately informed about the quality of their projects. Our characterization is novel in analyzing pooling and separating allocations in a context of multi-dimensional screening: specifically, the amounts of investment undertaken and of entrepreneurial net worth are used to screen projects. We then embed these results in a dynamic competitive economy. First, we show how endogenous regime switches in financial contracts may generate fluctuations in an economy that exhibits no dynamics under full information. Unlike previous models of endogenous cycles, our result does not rely on entrepreneurial net worth being counter-cyclical or inconsequential for determining investment. Secondly, the model shows the different implications of adverse selection as opposed to pure moral hazard. In particular, and contrary to standard results in the macroeconomic literature, the financial system may dampen exogenous shocks in the presence of adverse selection.

Adverse Selection, Credit, and Efficiency: the Case of the Missing Market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our envi- ronment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow from banks. As is generally the case in economies with adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium of our economy is shown to be ine¢ cient. Under adverse selection, the choices made by one type of agents limit what can be o¤ered to other types in an incentive-compatible manner. This gives rise to an externality, which cannot be internalized in a competitive equilibrium. We show that, in this type of environment, the ine¢ ciency associated to adverse selection is the consequence of one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added (say, a .security market.), in which entrepreneurs can obtain funds beyond those o¤ered by banks, we show that the e¢ cient allocation is an equilibrium of the economy. In such an equilibrium, all entrepreneurs borrow at a pooling rate in the security market. When they apply to bank loans, though, only entrepreneurs with good projects pledge these additional funds as collateral. This equilibrium thus simultaneously entails cross- subsidization and separation between di¤erent types of entrepreneurs.

Financing Constraints, Irreversibility, and Investment Dynamics

We develop a model of an industry with many heterogeneous firms that face both financing constraints and irreversibility constraints. The financing constraint implies that firms cannot borrow unless the debt is secured by collateral; the irreversibility constraint that they can only sell their fixed capital by selling their business. We use this model to examine the cyclical behavior of aggregate fixed investment, variable capital investment, and output in the presence of persistent idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Our model yields three main results. First, the effect of the irreversibility constraint on fixed capital investment is reinforced by the financing constraint. Second, the effect of the financing constraint on variable capital investment is reinforced by the irreversibility constraint. Finally, the interaction between the two constraints is key for explaining why input inventories and material deliveries of US manufacturing firms are so volatile and procyclical, and also why they are highly asymmetrical over the business cycle.

Adverse selection, credit, and efficiency: the case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitive equilibrium is typically inefficient. We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurs with additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of these additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it does not condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the markets for monitored loans.

Cartelera musical : del Renacimiento al Barroco

El título del siguiente trabajo está inspirado en la revista Billboard (U.S.A.), lista de éxitos musicales (U.S.A.,1936), y la Cartella Musicale de Adriano Banchieri (Venecia, 1601), queriendo hacer homenaje a las músicas o melodías más escuchadas. Este fenómeno que aparentemente involucra sólo la recepción, fue muy común durante el s. XVI (período en el cual nos centraremos), pero también mucho antes y hasta nuestros días. El término técnico utilizado para el estudio del mismo, será el de “préstamo”, en música, desarrollado por varios musicólogos pero principalmente por Peter Burkholder. Este proceso ha involucrado no sólo la recepción, sino también la composición, interpretación, intercambio, etc. Mi idea es argumentar y documentar en la medida de lo posible este fenómeno mediante algunos ejemplos concretos.

Endogenous credit cycles

I develop an overlapping-generations framework in which changes in lending standards generateendogenous cycles. In my economy, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about thequality of their projects need to borrow funds. Intermediaries screen entrepreneurs both throughthe amount of investment undertaken and through the level of entrepreneurial net worth.I show that endogenous regime switches in financial contracts from pooling to separatingand vice-versa may generate fluctuations even in the absence of exogenous shocks. Whenthe economy is in the pooling (separating) regime, lending standards seem lax ( tight ) andinvestment is high (low). Differently from the existing literature, my model does not requireentrepreneurial net worth to be counter cyclycal or inconsequential for determining aggregateinvestment.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need toborrow from banks. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitiveequilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added to provide entrepreneurs withadditional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of thisadditional market is that it must be non-exclusive, in the sense that entrepreneurs must be ableto simultaneously borrow from many different lenders operating in it. This makes it possible toattain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new market while separating them in themarket for bank loans.